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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The struggle against Great Britain by the original 
thirteen colonies in North America arrested the dominance 
of the world by the British Empire and simultaneously in­
troduced the new United States into world politics. The 
Revolution produced an immediate need for competent men to 
negotiate with European countries in order to secure the 
various forms of aid and the alliances that were essential 
for the survival of this venture in republicanism. Hence 
the study of American foreign policy essentially begins 
/ 
with revolutionary diplomacy and an awareness of its suc­
cess and^airixires^. 
The men and events involved in this initial era of 
American diplomacy have been the subject of niunerous mono­
graphs, biographies and articles. This thesis will confine 
itself to a study of American writings, with the exception 
of Bernard Fay's well'^accepted volume on Franklin. (Fay's 
books, which Include Louis XVI of The End of the World and 
The Revolutionary Spirit in France and America: A Study of 
Moral and Intellectual Relations between France and America 
at the End of the 18th Century, are well received on both 
sides of the Atlantic for their content and scholarship.) 
1 
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This thesis will concentrate on historical evaluations of 
the American diplomats and their political and private 
activities in Europe» It will point out the prevailing 
scholarly opinions on these subjects, and then discuss 
the authors who present new approaches. 
The representatives of the United States were plunged 
into the intricacies of European politics. Certain problems 
almost invariably confronted these first diplomats from the 
United States, Their instructions from Congress usually 
proved unrealistic during the actual negotiations with Eu­
ropean foreign ministers. The men dispatched from the United 
States discovered the difficulty in following the congres­
sional instructions while trying to ingratiate themselves 
and their country with a particular European nation. Then, 
among the original Paris commission, there were serious dis­
agreements and, even with John Adams as a replacement for 
Silas Deane, the quarrels continued. The contradictions 
between official and personal goals often contributed towards 
the confusion and disagreements among the Americans and Eu­
ropeans. Defining the goals of the United States if inde­
pendence were achieved often presented problems, especially 
as the discussions of the terms of a peace treaty progressed. 
Basically, historians who wrote in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries are quite enamored of the ef­
forts of the American diplomats to secure recognition of Amer­
ican independence, while more recent historians recognize the 
3 
conflicts of allegiance^ and priorities experienced by some 
of the American envoys. Great Britain was determined to 
retain control of the colonies, both to enhance her economic 
structure and to sustain her strong position on the Conti­
nent. In addition, France and Spain were forced to make 
adjustments in receiving representatives from a rebellious 
United States, because the American envoys insisted that 
European governments recognize the independence of the United 
States before negotiations for alliances or treaties could 
begin. This required great flexibility on the part of the 
European statesmen, since at least several realized that an 
independent United States could possibly present a geograph­
ical and political threat to any kind of power balance 
Europe could try to maintain. The American commissioners 
had to adjust to the instinct of self-preservation that per­
vaded the courts of Europe and Great Britain. 
Four nineteenth-century historians have written or 
edited books about Arthur Lee, Benjamin Franklin and John 
Adams which emphasize their invaluable roles in American 
diplomacy. The two-volume work on Franklin by Edward Hale 
and Edward Hale, Jr., is comprised of Franklin's writings, 
and the editorial comments praise Franklin's contributions 
to the revolutionary effort. As controversial as Arthur 
Lee's diplomatic and political career was, his grand-
nephew, Richard Henry Lee, endeavors to characterize him 
as the epitome of wisdom in his decisions and a martyr 
for having withstood personal attacks from Deane and Franklin. 
4 
For authors who study Arthur Lee, this biography is the only 
primary text available. Because of the bias in these two 
volumes, subsequent authors must attempt to substantiate or 
discredit the opinions of this first writer. The account of 
John Adams's life by John T. Morse is another nineteenth-
century biographical study which praises the abilities of 
A d a m s  a n d  r a r e l y  a l l u d e s  t o  a n y  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m s  w h i c h  r e ­
sulted from his recalcitrance and pride. 
In the nineteenth century, Francis Wharton compiled 
six volumes of the diplomatic correspondence of the Amer­
ican Revolution which provide material for a study of the 
men of the Revolution and their diplomacy, their attitudes 
a n d  a c t i v i t i e s .  T h e s e  v o l u m e s  d o  n o t  c o n t a i n  e d i t o r i a l  r e ­
marks attempting to shape the reader*s viewpoint, however. 
The transition made by twentieth-century historians 
in writing about the diplomacy of the American Revolution 
points towards more objective analyses of the men and the 
situations they encountered. Although J. C. Hildt is writ­
ing about a time period that extends beyond the Revolution, 
he does attempt to present a realistic view of the 
problems Francis Dana encountered in Russia. In contrast, 
George Clark seems to belong in the nineteenth-century 
tradition as he praises all the efforts that Silas Deane 
made towards securing the independence of the United States 
and condemns those men who criticized Deane's activities in 
Europe. His flagrant disregard for the canons of historical 
research and writing is exemplified by the absence of docu­
5 
mentation and the obvious bias in favor of Deane. E. S. 
Corwin's book on the alliance with France critically eval­
uates American policy in France, as he avoids a laudatory 
interpretation of the negotiations surrounding the Franco-
American alliance. W. P. Cresson and Frank Monaghan, two 
biographers of early American political leaders, have 
written useful accounts of the efforts of Francis Dana and 
John Jay in American diplomacy. Cresson carefully examines 
Dana's career in Russia and attributes the failure of his 
mission to the difficulty of fulfilling the congressional 
instructions and coping with the unexpected turmoil in 
Catherine's court. Monaghan emphasizes the adverse circum­
stances that John Jay faced in Spain and then extols his 
achievements on the peace commission in Paris. Moreover, 
both these accounts are useful not only for the information 
they provide about the lives and activities of these men in 
the European courts but also for the material concerning the 
machinations of European diplomacy. Thomas Perkins Abernethy 
h a s  w r i t t e n  t w o  a r t i c l e s  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  q u a r r e l s  t h a t  d e ­
veloped among the original representatives to Paris, Frank­
lin, Lee and Deane. In contrast to the eulogistic approach 
of the nineteenth'Century authors and the rather one-sided 
treatments by Cresson and Monaghan, Abernethy demonstrates 
that there were legitimate reasons for Lee to doubt the 
propriety of the activities of Deane and Franklin in Paris. 
His argument that historians have overlooked evidence im­
plicating Deane and Franklin in questionable financial 
6 
activities and in relationships with Englishmen, merits 
discussion in this historigraphical analysis. 
According to many historians, the scholarly milestone 
dealing with revolutionary diplomacy is Samuel Flagg Bemis's 
The Diplomacy of the American Hevolutibn, which was published 
in 1935. From a combination of European and American docu­
ments and printed sources, Bemis has achieved a rare combi­
n a t i o n  o f  s c h o l a r s h i p  a n d  o b j e c t i v i t y .  H e  a v o i d s  t h e  p i t ­
falls of psychological analysis of historical figures which 
indulges in observations of personalities and personal 
crises that might have influenced decision-making. His 
book discusses both American and European diplomacy, illus­
trating the significant effects that negotiations among 
European countries had upon the success or failure of Amer­
ican diplomatic efforts. 
Since the publication of Bemis's book, historiography 
has shown the influence of its scholarship. Carl Van Doren's 
biography of Franklin is complimentary in its discussion of 
Franklin's contributions to the Revolution, but he takes into 
account Franklin's earlier political setbacks and does not 
attempt to dismiss them as inconsequential. Van Doren indi­
cates, however, that Franklin's diplomatic achievements in 
Paris are beyond reproach. John C. Miller has undertaken 
the enormous tasks of covering many aspects of the Revolu­
tion and the effects which it had upon the formation of the 
national government. Arthur Darling writes of the diplo­
matic activities of the nation from 1763 to 1803. Miller 
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deals with the American envoys in Europe, excluding Dana, 
while Darling specifically emphasizes the roles of Frank­
lin and Jay in the final negotiations for peace. Both 
avoid the perils of biases in defending the actions of the 
American diplomats, but they generally commend their over­
all achievements in Europe, Van Doren, Darling and Miller 
also use more extensive bibliographies than the authors 
who precede Bemis. 
In the 195Qs, authors discuss with greater sophistica­
tion the men of the Revolution, their personalities, their 
diplomacy, and their concepts of the goals of the Revolu­
tion. Felix Gilbert*s article on American foreign policy 
is useful in explaining Adams's attitudes towards American 
alliances with European powers. Gerald Stourzh's analysis 
of Franklin's foreign policies reveals the philosophical, 
as well as the pragmatic reasons, which motivated Franklin's 
actions in Europe, Stourzh does not speculate about Frank­
lin's intentions in Europe but rather explains them through 
the use of his writings and those of his contemporaries. 
Stourzh provides factual information which is useful in the 
study of Franklin's diplomacy. Helen Auger deals with the 
clandestine activities, authorized by the United States 
government, of the Americans in Europe, although obviously 
impressed with Franklin's sagacity and Deane's ingenuity, 
she avoids offending her readers with an overwhelming sense 
of bias. Instead, she relates the activities of the pri­
vateering war with a certain sense of drama and action but 
8 
consistently maintains the scholarship o£ her book with ex­
tensive references to primary material. Both Coy H. James 
and Julian P. Boyd discuss the career of Silas Deane in 
Europe. In his unpublished dissertation, James writes 
favvorably of Deanecontributions to revolutionary diplo­
macy and defends his shortcomings and questionable associa­
tions against his critics. In Boyd's series of articles 
en Silas Deane, he reveals that the accusations linking 
Deane with Edward Bancroft, a man suspected of spying for 
the British, are basically true. These articles are schol­
arly in approach and content and do not succumb to the 
teimptations of sensationalism, although the title contains 
a touch of drama. Two other historians who have written 
articles about the men of the Revolution have contributed 
to an understanding of the personalities of Franklin and 
Adams. Max Beloff*s essay on Franklin as an international 
statesman is useful, although not exceptionally original in 
its content. The enigmatic personality of John Adams re­
ceives adequate treatment from Clinton Rossiter. Adams was 
a difficult person to evaluate as he was a man of extremes, 
and Rossiter attempts to explain Adams*s eccentricities 
which at the same time made him an outstanding patriot and 
yet a questionable diplomatic representative. E. James 
Ferguson points out that although commercialism pervaded 
t h e  f i r s t  A m e r i c a n  c o m m i s s i o n ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  a  r e a s o n  t o  d i s ­
miss the first diplomatic efforts as failures. 
More recent historians generally follow the canons of 
9 
research and scholarship established by Bemis in their mono­
graphs written about revolutionary diplomacy. Richard B. 
Morris's book deals with the peace commission and provides 
detailed examinations of the activities of Jay, Franklin, 
and Adams, which led up to the final negotiations for peace. 
Richard W. Van Alstyne does not limit his study to the dip­
lomats who influenced the American Revolution, and the 
reader is able to ascertain the interaction between domes­
tic and foreign affairs which might have affected American 
foreign policy. William Stinchcombe's study of French 
policy towards the American alliance creates the awareness 
of the influence conditions within the United States gov­
ernment had upon the successes or failures of its diplomacy. 
The two articles by David M. Griffiths on Russian-American 
foreign policy also exemplify modern scholarship in his use 
of available Russian as well as American sources. He is 
critical of Francis Dana*s inability to discern that Russian 
policy was based upon commercial gain rather than upon 
diplomatic considerations. Naturally, the criticism he 
directs against Dana contradicts Cresson's earlier appraisal 
of the reasons for Dana*s unsuccessful attempts at securing 
an alliance with Russia, H. James Henderson uses information 
from the congressional debates as the basis for an interest­
ing article on the factionalism that developed in Congress 
during its attempt to recall Franklin. 
Although Bernard Bailyn, Page Smith, Roger Burlingame, 
and Donald C, Smith have concentrated upon specific individ­
10 
uals in their writings, they have avoided imparting to the 
reader offensive biases. Page Smith's two-volume biography 
of John Adams is detailed about his life and is informative 
about his diplomatic endeavors in Paris, Holland, and then 
again in Paris on the peace commission. The sections con­
cerned with Adams's diplomatic efforts are favorable, but 
Smith has used the personal papers of Adams as his main 
source, which is an explanation for the praise Smith extends 
to Adams and his criticisms of Franklin. Bernard Bailyn's 
short article on Adams discusses many of the troublesome 
and unusual character traits which L. H. Butterfield's 
editions of Adams's diary and autobiography reveal. From 
Bailyn's discussion, it is easy to realize why Adams might 
have encountered difficulties in his dealings with the 
foreign ministers of France and Holland. Although Donald 
Smith's collection of John Jay's writings is brief, it does 
indicate Jay's concept of American foreign policy. Smith's 
editorial remarks are favorably disposed towards Jay's 
policies. Roger Burlingame has also contributed to the 
biographical studies on Franklin but has limited his work 
to Franklin's experiences in Europe, In some instances, 
he is almost critical of Franklin's subservience to French 
d e m a n d s  u p o n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h e  a p p r o a c h  o f  t h e s e  r e ­
cent writers is distinctly different from that of the 
nineteenth-century biographers who have heralded the early 
diplomats as virtually faultless. 
In a class separate from the previous historians is 
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Cecil B. Currey, who has taken it upon himself to expose 
Benjamin Franklin as a spy for the British. The sensation­
alism of his account arouses the skepticism of most know­
ledgeable historians who would disregard Currey's sweeping 
generalizations about Franklin*s dishonest activities. Al­
though some historians and reviewers might contend that 
such a book adds a needed dimension to historical writing, 
it would seem that the blatant charges he makes against 
Franklin without substantial evidence have seriously weak­
ened the credibility of his book. 
An historiographical study of the diplomacy of the 
American Revolution should trace the development of schol­
arship and professional writing. Although most of the 
above-mentioned authors have contributed to our knowledge 
about American foreign policy, some have demonstrated that 
the techniques of scholarly historical writing have eluded 
them. However, the different books on diplomacy and the 
men who formulated it are essential to a complete historio­
graphical study of early American foreign policy. 
CHAPTER II 
SILAS DEANE IN PARIS 
The Committee of Secret Correspondence decided that 
the American war effort could easily meet with disaster 
unless aid was obtained from a country with money and mili­
tary supplies. In 1776, the Committee appointed Silas 
Deane, a Connecticut merchant, as its representative in 
France for both diplomatic and commercial affairs. Had 
Deane persevered in an unblemished, loyal and patriotic 
career, he would be praised as the founder of American 
diplomacy in Europe. However, Deane's diplomatic years 
are controversial because of his involvement in extra­
curricular commercial activities, which some historians 
contend were detrimental to the struggling nation. In 
addition, historians argue about his commitment to the Amer­
ican cause and the degree to which he, as well as Franklin, 
transferred information vital to American success to the 
British. Edward Bancroft supposedly subverted Deane's 
career, but there is disagreement as to Deane's suscepti­
bility to his persuasions. A hatred developed between 
Deane and the Lee brothers, especially Arthur, because they 
suspected him of placing his personal affairs and economic 
gain above America*s best interests. Historians debate 
12 
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whether Deane and Arthur Lee vere unable to place matters 
of state above personalities and how this affected Deane's 
service to his country. Finally, Deane*s later life, after 
the completion of an investigation into the justice of his 
recall, added another dimension to his already complicated 
career. There is argument among historians as to whether 
he renounced his allegiance to the United States and became 
another Benedict Arnold in Europe. His death aroused little 
interest until printed conjectures suggested that Deane had 
been murdered by his comrade in complicity, Edward Bancroft. 
This chapter will pursue the issues pertaining to Deane's 
service in the Revolution, according to the differing view­
points of historians. 
Silas Deane's career in Europe involved securing French 
aid for the United States. However, his outside financial 
interests promote doubt with regard to his diligence in seek­
ing this aid, according to Carl Van Doren and Thomas Perkins 
Abernethy. Carl Van Doren's Secret History of the American 
Revolution C1941) intimates that because of Deane's outside 
commercial activities, he was especially susceptible to the 
attractive offers which Paul Wentworth, the chief British 
spy, made in his efforts to direct the attention of the Amer­
ican minister away from the cause of independence.^ Thomas 
Perkins Abernethy's article, "Commercial Activities of Silas 
^Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolu­
tion (New York: The Viking Press, 1941}, p. 62. (Hereinafter 
referred to as Van Doren, Secret Hi story.) 
14 
Deane in France" C1934), criticizes Deane's acceptance of 
Robert Morris's proposal that an organization be established 
which would carry on trade among all nations regardless o£ 
their status as belligerents. Members of this enterprise 
included Thomas Walpole, Ferdinand Grand, a French banker, 
M. le Ray de Chaumont, and a group of French merchants, in 
addition to Morris and his associates. To facilitate their 
operations, Caron de Beaumarchais-helped transfer the goods 
arriving from British ports to French ships bound for America. 
Abernethy even lists Vergennes as a participant in this 
private business stating, ". . . it is not unlikely that 
2 
Vergennes got his share of the profits." 
Silas Deane's career in Europe introduces the question 
of the extent to which personal financial ventures influ­
enced or interfered with his official purpose of securing 
French aid. John C. Miller and Helen Auger substantiate 
the allegation that Deane endeavored to represent the United 
States diplomatically, as well as assist the private finan­
cial interests of domestic firms. Both Miller and Auger 
acknowledge that Deane was actually on a double mission. 
In Miller's Triumph of Freedom (1948), he explains Deane's 
efforts to attempt simultaneously to obtain loans and sup­
plies from the French while he was representing the commer­
cial interests of Willing, Morris and Company for a 5 percent 
2Thomas Perkins Abernethy, "Commercial Activities of 
Silas Deane in France," American Historical Review. XXXIX 
(April, 1934), 478-479. (Hereinafter referred to as Aber­
nethy, "Commercial Activities.") 
15 
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commission. Auger's Secret War of Independence (1955) con­
curs that, although Deane was instructed to investigate the 
possibility of purchasing military supplies, he also repre­
sented Morris's business venture for personal profit. Sup­
posedly Deane was also involved in the Vandalia operations, 
an international trading company organized to sell land 
between the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Throughout Deane's 
mission in Europe, Robert Morris defended the legitimacy of 
Deane's mercantile connections and supported his integrity,^ 
Although Deane is never disassociated from the commer­
cialism that pervaded American negotiations in Europe, Gerald 
Stourzh and Coy H. James relate his commercial activities to 
his mercantile background. Gerald Stourzh, in Benjamin 
Franklin and American Foreign Policy (1954), states that 
Deane attempted to avoid power politics by placing relations 
with France on a commercial basis. Despite Deane's pro-
French sentiments, he wrote to Charles William Frederick 
Dumas in Holland, 
It is my ultimate and early wish that America may 
forever be unconnected with the politics or in­
terests of Europe as it is by nature situated 
distant from it, and that the friendly ties aris­
ing from a free, friendly and independent commerce 
may be the only ties between us.^ 
3 
John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom (Boston; Little, 
Brown and Co., 1948), p. 369. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Miller, Triumph.) 
'^Helen Auger, Secret War of Independence (Boston: Little, 
B r o w n  a n d  C o . ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,  p p .  1 0 1 ,  1 9 8 ,  3 1 4 .  ( H e r e i n a f t e r  r e ­
ferred to as Auger, Secret War.) 
^Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign 
16 
Stourzh received support from Coy H. James who, in his 
unpublished dissertation on "The Revolutionary Career o£ 
Silas Deane" (1955), refers to Deane as a . merchant 
conscious of and apprehensive for the commercial future of 
the colonies." Apparently Deane planned to re-enter busi­
ness when the war ended, and also believed that speculation 
in western lands would be profitable with the return of 
6 
peace. 
If Deane was involved in personal commercial ventures, 
it was not detrimental to his mission, according to James. 
T h i s  h i s t o r i a n  a l s o  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  D e a n e ' s  e f f o r t s  w e r e  p r i ­
marily directed towards securing independence; therefore, 
he urged the French alliance mainly for this reason. How­
ever, from his point of view, the economic aspects of the 
alliance were as important as the political. James assumes 
that the central problem in Deane's mission resulted from 
the failure of Congress to distinguish between commercial 
and diplomatic functions. Deane and Franklin considered 
that privateering and the sale of prizes were under their 
Policy CChicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 54), p. 128. 
CHereinafter referred to as Stourzh, Franklin. Foreign 
Policy.) See also Francis Wharton, The Revolutionary Diplo­
matic Correspondence of the United States C6 vols., Washing­
ton: Government Printing Office, 1889), II, p. 138; Deane 
wrote to Dumas, September 11, 1776, "If European power would 
protect commerce, that would be all that would be necessary." 
(Hereinafter referred to as Wharton, Diplomatic Correspon­
dence. ) 
6Coy H. James, "Revolutionary Career of Silas Deane" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 
1956), pp. 46, 193. (Hereinafter referred to as James, 
"Revolutionary Career.") 
17 
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jurisdiction, while Arthur Lee did not. 
E. James Ferguson prefers to approach Deane's career 
from the standpoint that Deane was typical of the* enter­
prising merchants of his day. His article in the William 
and Mary Quarterly, "Business, Government and the Congres­
sional Investigation in the Revolution" C1959), emphasizes 
that Deane was like all small capitalists who aspired to 
become more successful in an era of vast speculation. His 
political appointment allowed plenty of room for commercial 
activity, as he was in charge of disposing of prizes taken 
by American privateers, which he could easily sell to him-
O 
self or his partners. Considering the commercial atmo­
sphere, Ferguson decides there was nothing unethical about 
Deane's partnership with Robert Morris and his expectations 
of playing a vital role in Morris's expanding empire, 
Richard Van Alstyne implies that Deane combined com­
merce and politics to insure massive support from France 
and draw that country into the war, Deane's commercial 
schemes are enumerated by Van Alstyne in Empire and Indepen­
dence (1965), but he indicates that Deane hoped that if 
French merchants speculated in American trade, and the United 
States employed influential Frenchmen in the American army, 
^Ibid., p. 84. 
8 
E. James Ferguson, "Business, Government and the Con­
gressional Investigation in the Revolution," William and 
Mary Quarterly, XVI (July, 1959), 303-304. (Hereinafter 
referred to as Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation.") 
18 
the French government would be obligated to enter the war 
to support the Americans. Deane also emphasized the bene­
fits which would accrue to France if she participated in 
the privateering ventures and gave the United States aid. 
Then France would be permanently secure from English threats 
Q 
on the Continent or on the seas. 
Attempts by earlier historians to explain or justify 
Deane's commercial activities are discredited by Cecil B. 
Currey in his book. Code #72; Ben Franklin, Patriot or Spy 
(1972). He accuses Deane of establishing his own enter­
prise "separate from his profiteering partnership with 
Beaumarchais." This business was, of course, the firm 
which Abernethy mentions, and Deane's contribution was 
to arrange and coordinate its operations.^® 
Silas Deane's relationships with French officials and repre­
se n t a t i v e s  ,  e s p e c i a l l y  C o m t e  d e  V e r g e n n e s  a n d  B e a u m a r c h a i s  ,  c o n ­
tributed to the controversy over his career. Some histori­
ans define Deane*s association with Beaumarchais through the 
firm of Hortalez and Company as based strictly uppn govern­
mental business; others contend that both sought personal 
financial gain through the commercial activities of the 
Revolution. 
g 
Richard W. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 99, 101. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Van Alstyne, Empire.) 
^^Cecil B. Currey, Code #72; Ben Franklin. Patriot or 
Spy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1972), pp. 99-100. (Hereinafter referred to as Currey, 
Code #72.) 
19 
Hale, Bemis, Miller and Auger concur that their rela­
tionship was based upon official business. Edward Hale 
and Edward Hale, Jr., in Franklin in France (1887) state 
that from the letters exchanged between Beaumarchais and 
Deane, it is evident that their relationship placed govern-
11 
ment business first. Samuel Flagg Bemis explains in his 
book. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (1935) , 
that France established the policy of secret assistance 
12 
before Deane's arrival. Miller intimates that Deane and 
Beaumarchais were honest in their activities. Beaumarchais 
regarded Deane as the only trustworthy member of the Amer­
ican commission in Paris. Deane was the one man who objected 
to a separate peace between the United States and Great Brit­
ain, and he also prevented Lee and Franklin . . from 
13 
straying into the British camp." Because of the confused 
state of the accounts of Hortalez and Company, Auger insists 
that there is insufficient evidence to prove that Deane and 
Beaumarchais engaged in ventures for personal profit. She 
adds that Deane directed his attention first to the subject 
of a commercial treaty with France, to which Vergennes was 
receptive except for the American demand that France recog­
nize the independence of the colonies. 
l^Edward E. Hale, and Edward E. Hale, Jr., Franklin in 
France (2 vols., Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1888), I, p. 45. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Hale, Frank!in.) 
12sarauel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1935), 
p"!! 39. [Hereinafter referred to as Bemis, Diplomacy.) 
l^Miller, Triumph, p. 365. 
l^Auger, Secret War, pp. 131, 139. 
20 
Undeniably, there are questions involving Deane's 
relations with the French, but James, Stourzh and Van 
Alstyne regard none of them as critical enough to discredit 
Deane's entire mission. According to James, Beaumarchais 
promised French aid to Arthur Lee, but there is proof that 
he was not authorized to financially commit the French gov­
ernment. Then Vergennes came to support Beaumarchais's 
plan for French aid. Defending Deane and Beaumarchais, 
James discounts accusations that the two had turned a gift 
f r o m  t h e  F r e n c h  i n t o  a  c o m m e r c i a l  o p e r a t i o n . A l t h o u g h  
Stourzh recognizes that the French regarded Deane as the 
most reliable and sympathetic to the French government, 
he stresses Deane's hope that commerce would be the only 
1 
tie between the two countries. Van Alstyne considers 
the influence that Beaumarchais exerted over the French 
court to have been minimal. Historians have overestimated 
the importance of the French playwright. Deane regarded 
him as a willing tool, and the French court considered him 
expendable. Nowhere does Van Alstyne indicate that Deane, 
Vergennes and Beaumarchais pursued personal financial in­
terests. To Deane's credit, he never allowed the French 
to know where his true sympathies lay. In contrast to 
Miller, Van Alstyne explains that Deane played upon the 
fears and ambitions of the French, so that they would fear 
15 
James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 30, 39. 
16 
Stourzh, Franklin, foreign Policy, p. 128. 
21 
the possibility that a separate peace between the United 
17 
States and England might be negotiated. 
According to Currey, historians have incorrectly cred­
ited Deane with the honor of securing French aid when actu­
ally France and Spain had been dispatching aid through 
Beaumarchais before either Deane or Franklin arrived in 
France. The French considered it in their own best inter­
ests to hurt Great Britain by sending aid to the United 
^ 18 
States. 
Another aspect of Silas Deane»s career which has 
caused debate among historians is his friendship with 
Benjamin Franklin. The controversial issues relating to 
their friendship concern the association of Deane and 
Franklin with men suspected of being British agents, their 
mutual dislike of Arthur Lee, and the degree of indepen­
dence they exerted in negotiating with the French. Frank­
lin defended the integrity of their relationship until 
1781 when Deane allowed the British to publish his letters 
condemning the revolutionary effort. Franklin wrote Deane 
in 178 2 that the 
. . . publication of those letters has done 
great Prejudice to your Character there 
[America], and necessarily diminished much 
of the Regard your Friends had for you.l^ 
l^Van Alstyne, Empirg.^ pp. 97, 124. 
l^currey. Code #7 2, pp. 91, 93. 
l^Carl Van Doren, ed., Benjamin Franklin*s Autobiographr 
ical Writings CNew York: The Viking Press, 1945), p. 513. 
THereinafter referred to as Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical 
Writings.) 
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The Hales and Bernard Fay agree that Franklin supported 
Deane during frustrations of his mission which included 
the feud with the Lees and the presence of British spies 
2 0  
in his entourage. Fay adds in his book, Franklin, the 
A p o s t l e  o f  M o d e r n  T i m e s  ( 1 9 2 9 ) ,  t h a t  F r a n k l i n  e v e n  j e o p ­
ardized his secure position in Prance by defending Deane 
21 
against the Adams--Lee faction. 
There is agreement among Abernethy, Auger and James 
that Franklin and Deane enjoyed a close association, but 
they do not indicate that their relationship was dishonest. 
Abernethy admits that Franklin and Deane were committed to 
independence. They attempted to carry on the work of the 
« 
commission without Arthur Lee's cooperation, because Lee 
constantly endeavored to disrupt the harmony of the friend-
22 
ship between Franklin and Deane. In addition, they sought 
to prevent an agreement between Vergennes and Lord Stormont, the 
British minister in Paris, by creating an open scandal about 
French participation in American privateering raids. Frank­
lin was able to explain the privateering efforts to Con­
gress, and Deane knew how to handle organizational details 
for the privateering enterprise. Both urged Congress and 
the Committee to begin action on every sea on which Britain 
2 0  
Hale, Franklin. I, p, 49. See also Bernard Fay, 
Franklin, the Apostle of Modern Times (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1929), p. 443. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Fay, Apostle.) 
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Fay, Apostle, p. 443, 
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Abernethy, "Commercial Activities," 483. 
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23 
carried on commerce. Franklin definitely missed Deane 
in the commercial work after his recall, as Adams and Lee 
were of no help, but he rebuked Deane's later activities 
when he learned of the "intercepted letters" which Deane 
had written.Jamea corroborates the idea of a harmon­
ious relationship between the two men and says the friend­
ship continued after Deane*s recall to America and his 
return in disgrace to Paris. Franklin believed that since 
Deane had rendered valuable service to the Revolution, he 
deserved a fair trial in the United States. In writing to 
James Lovell in 1777, Franklin repeated that any mistakes 
Deane made earlier in his European career had long since 
been rectified by his devoted service to the government. 
However, Franklin admitted to Robert Livingston that by 
178 2 Deane had changed. His conversations had come to in­
clude ". . . 'an open vindication of Arnold's conduct."' 
An explanation for this change in Deane, Franklin thought, 
was that Deane*s mental faculties had gradually begun to 
decline. Franklin continued to insist, however, that his 
2 5 
service to the United States had been commendable. 
Currey criticizes their relationship, explaining that 
both Franklin and Deane worked more for their own private 
benefit than for the independence of their country. It 
23 
Auger, Secret War, p. 163. 
^^Ibid., pp. 298, 334. 
^^James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 141, 228-229. 
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was Franklin who instructed Deane to see Bancroft upon his 
arrival in France. When Arthur Lee would leave Paris, 
Deane and Franklin ignored their share of the diplomatic 
workload to pursue their own private interests. Their 
main concern was to remove Arthur Lee from Paris and, when 
he would return, neither Franklin nor Deane made an effort 
2 6 
to inform him of any developments during his absence. 
When Lee*s notes were stolen in Prussia, Franklin and 
Deane only increased their efforts to isolate him from 
their activities. Franklin and Deane participated in a 
"multitude of private and clandestine matters," which in­
cluded employing and defending British spies, allowing 
those who should not have had it special access to state 
information, arranging secret meetings with British agents 
27 
and misusing congressional funds. 
One of the contributing factors to the controversy 
surrounding Deane*s career was his association with men 
regarded by some historians as being British spies. The 
names of Paul Wentworth and Edward Bancroft are particularly 
associated with such nefarious activities. Deane's affinity 
towards Edward Bancroft unalterably links him to the British 
spy network, according to some historians. Other historians 
are sympathetic towards Deane, like Bemis, Auger, and James, 
and defend him as being unaware of Bancroft's devious char­
acter. They also claim that Deane rejected attractive mone-
26currey, Code #72, pp. 67, 126. 
27lbid, , pp. 126, 211-212. 
25 
tary offers made by Wentworth if Deane would agree to rec­
onciliation. Samuel Flagg Bemis emphasizes that, although 
the British sought Deane out, Wentworth's attempt to per-
2 8 
suade Deane to advocate reconciliation failed. Lee warned 
Deane about Bancroft's character. But since he could produce 
no proof, Deane discounted this information as he distrusted 
29 
Lee's continually suspicious temperament. In his Secret 
History of the American Revolution, Van Doren is more skep­
tical of Deane's rejection of Wentworth's offer. The oppor­
tunities and the advantages promised by Wentworth might have 
combined with Deane's interest in commercial activity to 
form the basis of a kind of preliminary agreement reconcil­
ing Britain and the United States. North was able to inform 
George III about goods purchased by the United States from 
France through a list furnished to Bancroft by Deane. Fur­
thermore, Van Doren, in contrast to Van Alstyne, asserts 
that the king was willing to trust Deane as one who would 
3 0 
bring the United States to an agreement on reconciliation. 
Edward Bancroft is suspected by some historians of hav­
ing been a British agent. It was Deane's close association 
with Bancroft which has caused much debate as to the sin-
2 8 
Samuel Flagg Bemis, "British Secret Service and the 
French-American Alliance," American Historical Review. XXXIX 
(April, 1934), 486, (Hereinafter referred to as Bemis, 
"British Secret Service.") "*See also Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 59. 
^^Bemis, "British Secret Service," 476, 
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Van Doren, Secret History, pp. 62-63. See also Van 
Alstyne, Empire, p. Ill, 
26 
cerity o£ Deane's commitment to independence. Both Bernard 
Fay and John C. Miller contend that Bancroft and William Carmichael 
informed Lord North of all American transactions in Paris, thus 
creating confusion in the American camp with everyone sus-
31 
pecting everyone else, Edward Bancroft cleverly insured 
that Deane would continue to supply him with information. 
For example, on one of his visits to England, he had himself 
arrested as an American agent. After he was miraculously 
released from prison, Deane never doubted that his friend 
3 2 
had fallen into the hands of the merciless Britons. 
Although Auger and James recognize that Bancroft easily 
influenced Deane, neither condemns Deane's patriotism but 
rather explains that Bancroft easily dominated Deane, who had 
a weaker character. Whenever Deane began to hesitate with 
regard to his association with Bancroft, the latter would 
soothe Deajie with plans for new projects involving Wentworth, 
33 
North and George III. Deane was conscious of being sur­
rounded by British agents like Wentworth, and realized that 
the French would resent frequent visits by Englishmen. How­
ever, early in Deane's mission, Bancroft had learned of its 
aims and continuously reported his knowledge of Deane's 
31 
Fay, Apostle, p. 426. See also Wharton, Diplomatic 
Correspondence, II, p. 170; Deane to Dumas, October 13, 
1776, "Mr. Carmichael can give you the best intelligence 
of present affairs in America." 
Miller, Triumph, p. 282, 
^^Auger, Secret War, p. 157. 
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letters, progress on treaties and commercial transactions, 
James admits that Deane's best friend and advisor during 
his mission was fundamentally dishonest, but easily deceived 
34 
Deane because of his warm personality, 
Edward Bancroft secured the dominant role in the rela­
tionship between the two men, according to Julian P. Boyd's 
article concerning the friendship between Deane and Ban­
croft (1959). Boyd recognizes that Bancroft's genius 
enabled him to fit Deane to his own plans, which involved 
schemes for gaining wealth from trade, purchasing supplies 
for Congress, land speculations, spying and double-dealing. 
William Eden's group of intelligence agents spied for vary­
ing motives, and Bancroft "... moved to the center of 
these flexible consciences, towering above all for deceit 
and good fortune." As a result of the information provided, 
England was so well informed about Franco-American negotia­
tions with regard to Deane's conversations with Vergennes 
and Beaumarchais that Stormont knew far more about what 
Deane was doing than did Congress, However, if it served 
the purposes of Bancroft and Deane to withhold information 
from Stormont, they did so without qualms. Eventually 
their "lives had been welded together in deceit and dis­
trust, and they possessed secrets about each other that made 
35 
alienation, to say the least, inadvisable." Thus, he 
34 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 41, 
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Julian P. Boyd, "Silas Deane: Death by a Kindly 
Teacher of Treason," William and Mary Quarterly, XVI 
28 
agrees with the earlier interpretations o£ Bemis and Auger 
and has influenced succeeding historians. 
In his discussion of the Bancroft-Deane friendship, 
Richard B. Morris concludes they had a close working rela­
tion, but Van Alstyne dismisses the concept of a British 
spy network as strictly conjecture. In The Peacemakers, 
the Great Powers and American Independence (1965), Morris 
characterizes Bancroft as an amoral opportunist who leaked 
news of the 1778 treaty with the French to promote his per­
sonal interests on the London Stock Exchange. However, 
Bancroft's close association with Deane carries "sinister 
overtones, and lends credence to, if it does not confirm 
3 6 
some of Arthur Lee's worst suspicions." On the other 
hand. Van Alstyne accuses historians, notably Samuel Flagg 
Bemis, of creating legends concerning the machinations of 
certain "British spies" who furnished the ministry with 
"secret information" about French diplomacy. He considers 
this idea as ridiculous and explains that any "facts" the 
British government might have received would have come from 
merchants who were suffering from the depredations of Spain 
37 
and France. 
Currey links Deane and Bancroft, explaining that Ban­
croft recruited Deane into the British "silent force" 
(April, July, October, 1959), 187, 320, 322, 336. (Herein­
after referred to as Boyd, "Silas Deane.") 
^^Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers, the Great Powers 
and American Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 
p. 10. (Hereinafter referred to as Morris, Peacemakers.) 
^'^Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 118. 
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through various inducements. Deane's desire to satisfy 
his personal interests allowed Bancroft to dominate his 
life in Paris. Currey adds, "His [Deane's] association 
with Bancroft ultimately cost him the opportunity for ser­
vice with a new nation, his reputation and eventually his 
life."^^ 
One of the main reasons Silas Deane elicits discus­
sion is because of his clash with Arthur Lee. Lee was 
certain that Deane was diverting congressional funds for 
his own benefit, while justifying his actions with the 
explanation that Beaumarchais had to be repaid. If this 
indiscretion was not enough, Lee also asserted that Deane 
maintained secret relations with the British through Ban­
croft. In an undocumented yet favorable account of Deane's 
career, George Clark, in his Silas Deane, A Connecticut 
Leader in the Revolution (1913), blames Arthur Lee as the 
p o l i t i c a l  e n e m y  o f  B e a u m a r c h a i s  a n d  D e a n e ,  w h o  w a s  " . . .  
determined to advance himself though he ruined every one 
39 
who stood in his way." E. S. Corwin mentions the contro­
versy between the two men in his book, French Policy and the 
American Alliance of 1778. He suggests that Lee was correct 
in assuming the supplies had needlessly been purchased, as 
they had been contributed by the Bourbon kings. Still, Lee 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 96. 
39 
George Clark, Silas Deane, A Connecticut Leader in 
the Revolution (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), p. 63. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Clark, Silas Deane.) 
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was unduly suspicious of Deane's financial motives.^® 
Also contributing to the conflict between the two men 
were Arthur Lee's objections to the authority assumed by 
Deane in the American commission, and Deane's efforts to 
discredit Lee. Thomas Perkins Abernethy says that Frank­
lin's appointment of Jonathan Williams to the commercial 
agency at Nantes aroused Lee's wrath. Not only was he ap­
pointed while Lee was in Spain, but he also received his 
orders only from Deane. Then Deane recommended that Lee 
employ John Thornton as his secretary. Thornton was assumed 
to be the British source of information on the Franco-
American treaty, and such accusations naturally implicated 
41 
Lee. In Abernethy's later article, "The Origin of the 
Franklin-Lee Imbroglio" (1938), he argues that the feud 
occurred, because Franklin and Deane were intent on taking 
the privateering business out of the hands of the official 
agents and utilizing it for their own purposes. He accuses 
other historians of unjustly condemning the Lees, because 
42 
they opposed Franklin and Deane. 
Bemis introduces a new element. He contends the feud 
arose from a misunderstanding concerning Deane's succession 
40 
E. S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance 
of 1778 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916) , 
pT] 207. (Hereinafter referred to as Corwin, French Policy.) 
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Abernethy, "Commercial Activities," 483-484. 
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Thomas Perkins Abernethy, "The Origin of the Franklin-
Lee Imbroglio," The North Carolina Historical Review, XV 
(January, 1938) , 51. (Hereinafter referred to as Abernethy, 
"Franklin-Lee Imbroglio.") 
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to Lee's role in dealing with Beaumarchais. In 1776, the 
Secret Committee on Correspondence sent Deane to seek French 
support politically and to secure military supplies from the 
French government. Although Beaumarchais had already dealt 
with Arthur Lee, he immediately turned to Deane as the man 
43 
with more authority. 
Miller agrees with Corwin that Lee was unduly suspic­
ious towards Deane. Although Lee vociferously charged that 
Deane was involved in a fraud with Beaumarchais, Miller 
notes that there was no evidence of extreme irregularity ex-
44 
cept for exceptionally disorderly accounts. 
James emphasizes that whenever Lee encountered a person 
whom he could not dominate, he immediately became convinced 
that the person was an adversary determined to destroy him. 
Lee's constant suspicions of Deane's brazen manner in his 
dealings with Beaumarchais eventually drove Franklin and 
Deane to send him on pointless missions to Madrid and Berlin. 
Lee complained to his brothers that, '"Mr. Deane, Dr. Ban­
croft, and William Carmichael . . . have been practicing 
against me, and what I do not know is how far it may ex­
tend.'" In addition, he surmised that important matters 
were being concealed from him, because of Deane's midnight 
visits to Versailles and, previous to that, the lack of any 
official communications while he was journeying about. As 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 35, 37. He states that there 
is a lack of evidence to document exactly what happened 
between Lee and Beaumarchais. 
44 
Miller, Triumph, pp. 369, 373. 
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a result o£ his doubting and jealous tendencies, he wrote 
to Richard Henry Lee, suggesting that he remain in France, 
"'the center o£ commercial activity,'" while Franklin was 
45 
sent to Vienna and Deane to Holland. Then, at the con­
clusion of the treaty of amity and commerce in 1778, Ralph 
Izard, William and Arthur Lee decided that Deane was favor­
ing New England's commercial interests at southern expense 
because of the prohibition of import duties on molasses 
46 
coming from the French West Indies. (This objectionable 
article was later struck out.) 
According to Boyd and Ferguson, all of Lee's accusa­
tions against Deane might not have been incorrect. Boyd 
holds that Lee's accusations might have had some validity 
because of Deane's relations with Bancroft and his ques­
tionable diversion of public funds. Apparently, Deane ex­
cluded Lee from his counsel immediately after meeting with 
Bancroft. He rejected Lee's warning that certain men were 
to be avoided, and was indignant that Lee suggested he 
should report such men to Congress. From Deane's viewpoint, 
such serious charges could not be made without proof. 
Arthur Lee's doubts regarding Deane's honesty increased 
about the time the alliance was signed when one of Deane's 
remittances to Samuel Wharton became involved in the pub­
lic accounts, thus confirming Lee's suspicion that Deane 
4 "i 
James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 102-103, 105. 
^^Ibid., p. 123. 
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was using public money for private gain.^^ Ferguson also 
recognizes that Lee had a possible basis for distrusting 
Deane because of his commercial activities and questionable 
personal associations. Ferguson holds that Lee believed 
from his conversations with Beaumarchais that the supplies 
were a gift from France. When Deane contracted for repay­
ment, Lee perceived a conspiracy simply because he failed 
to comprehend the personal commercialism that pervaded the 
48 
American commission. 
Agreeing with Bemis's earlier premise, Morris and Van 
Alstyne assert that the feud was a result of Beaumarchais's 
preference for Deane over Lee. Morris asserts that early 
in the Lee-Beaumarchais association, Lee became convinced 
that the French dramatist's supplies were a gift from the 
French government, and he denounced Deane's agreement to 
49 
repay Beaumarchais. Van Alstyne concurs that Beaumarchais's 
c h o i c e  o f  D e a n e  o v e r  L e e  w a s  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  e n m i t y  b e ­
tween Deane and Lee.^^ 
Currey combines the opinions of Boyd and Ferguson, 
stating that Deane deliberately avoided Lee, despite his 
instructions, and established an agreement with Beaumarchais. 
Deane then ignored Lee's warnings concerning Bancroft's 
^^Boyd, "Silas Deane," 186, 334. 
48 
Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation," 307. 
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Morris, Peacemakers, p. 9. 
^^Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 96. 
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character and Wentworth's dangerous influence.Lee's sus­
picions and hostilities are, to Currey, a legitimate indica­
tion of Deane's dishonesty. 
The quarrel between Lee and Deane finally resulted in 
Deane's official recall to the United States, This effort 
to resolve questions concerning Deane's public accounts met 
with varying reactions from Americans and received strong 
criticism from the French, who obviously preferred Deane 
to Lee. Some historians also question if Deane's efforts 
to straighten out his financial complications were sincere, 
intimating that Deane had something to hide after all. Al­
though Clark's book is of questionable historical value, 
he does lend considerable support to Deane's defense in the 
congressional recall. He believes the whole scenario was 
a plot Lee devised to increase his power. Consequently, 
Deane was only a tool Arthur used to strengthen his politi-
52 
cal machinery. In contrast to Clark, Thomas Perkins 
Abernethy claims that Deane intentionally left his papers 
in France in an effort to get a settlement without an audit, 
because he had failed to distinguish between public and 
private use of money. In addition, there was no account 
of the cargoes forwarded for public use, with a designation 
53 
of the persons to whom they had been consigned. In Van 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 94. 
^^Clark, Silas Deane, p. 132. 
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Doren's opinion there is insufficient evidence to resolve 
the accusations against Deane involving the misuse of con­
gressional funds and the release of secret information to 
the British. It is also impossible to determine if Con­
gress owed Deane a settlement for the financial trouble 
and mental trauma it caused him.^^ The matter of evidence 
became secondary as two opposing groups formed in Congress, 
Silas Deane's fate was put aside as the question became 
whether the businessmen or the people would run the coun­
try, Miller claims.Auger concludes that incomplete 
evidence made it impossible for Congress to substantiate 
the charges against Deane. 
Deane's recall received mixed reactions in America, 
but greatly disturbed the French. James details the ef­
forts of the French to protect Deane and clear his reputa­
tion. Vergennes and his colleagues chose to regard Deane's 
recall as a victory for the anti"Alliance members of Con­
gress. Thus, the French decided to bestow the highest 
recommendations upon Deane. Vergennes praised,"'. , , the 
zeal, activity and intelligence with which he has conducted 
the interests of the United States, by which he has merited 
the esteem of the King.*" Beaumarchais wrote a letter exon­
erating Deane from any wrongdoing with regard to Hortalez 
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and Company. The French preference for Deane aroused 
another conflict in Congress when Thomas Paine began pub­
lishing information from the files of the Committee on 
Secret Correspondence to implicate Deane. Paine hoped that 
this material would prove that the supplies Deane had con­
tracted for with Beaumarchais were actually a gift of the 
French government„ The French angrily denounced Paine's 
misuse of Franco-American classified information, and Paine 
was forced to resign from his relatively insignificant post 
5 8 
as clerk of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. 
French support of Deane placed Congress in a dilemma 
in attempting to resolve the issue of his guilt or innocence. 
James states that out of the many charges against Deane, 
only two are conspicuous enough to merit comments The first 
was that he was "in trade" and the second placed his ac­
counts in a state of "studied confusion." Congress refused 
either to convict Deane or acquit him, and its inability to 
rise above partisan strife contributed to this stalemate» 
Deane was dismissed from further attendance at Congress with 
neither censure nor approbation. Thus, he reasoned that 
since there were no charges, Congress must have approved his 
59 
conduct. Even though Deane received no formal vindication, 
Robert Morris, one of his sympathizers, wrote, 
I consider Mr. Deane as a martyr in the cause 
of America. But I have no doubt the day will 
^^James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 127, 130. 
58ibid., p„ 177. 
59Ibid., pp. 143, 181, 184. 
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come when his merit shall be universally 
acknowledged and the authors of these cal­
umnies held in the detestation they de­
served. 60 
E. James Ferguson does not excuse Deane's activities, 
yet he indulges in no condemnation of Deane based upon un­
founded prejudices. He argues that accusations of Deane*s 
speculating in British stocks are based upon hearsay testi­
mony. But since Deane financed a ship through Continental 
funds for his own use, and shifted the loss of a privately 
owned ship to the government by purchasing it in the gov­
ernment's name, the questions surrounding his activity de­
serve investigation. Ferguson admits that Congress was 
unjust in its treatment of Deane, listening to testimony 
from his enemies and only allowing him to reply in writing. 
The whole episode was inconclusive as only one or two 
irregularities were proven against Deane, However, the 
division of Congress into two camps, one defending Deane 
and the other attacking him, was demoralizing when Congress 
most needed unity. 
Page Smith, in his first volume on John Adams (1962), 
sympathizes with the dilemma Congress faced. Finding Deane 
guilty would also implicate Franklin, and to acquit Deane 
would indict Lee and Izard. Deane's proposal that he return 
to Europe for the necessary papers to clear himself seemed 
a logical solution and was agreeable to Congress, but Deane's 
^^Ibid., p. 191. 
^^Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation," 317, 307, 
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"impulse to self-destruction" caused him to turn to the 
people, as he wrote and published attacks against his ac-
62 
cusers. 
Briefly, Morris supports Ferguson in criticizing con­
gressional incompetency in handling the whole affair. After 
Congress heard all his accusers, Deane was allowed only 
written replies. When all the evidence was amassed, there 
was only enough "to prove one or two irregularities, and to 
suggest countless others." On the other hand, the Lee 
brothers were not innocent of speculation, as Arthur had 
shipped personal merchandise on continental vessels; while 
William simultaneously maintained his position as alderman 
in London and worked for the American commission in Paris. 
Morris indicts William Lee, stating that he was not above 
trying to capitalize on his knowledge of the potential 
alliance with France. 
Both H. James Henderson and Cecil Currey imply that 
Congress was justified in taking action against Deane. 
Deane was more concerned with making money through the 
Middle States*s merchants than with defending New England's 
rights, according to Henderson's article, "Congressional 
Factionalism and the Attempt to Recall Benjamin Franklin" 
(1970).^'^ From Currey's viewpoint, Congress recognized the 
62page Smith, John Adams (2 vols.; New York: Doubleday 
and Co., 1962), I, p. 423. OHlereinafter referred to as 
Smith, Adams.) 
63Morris, Peacemakers, p. 11. 
64h. James Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism and 
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possibility that Beaumarchais and Deane were defrauding the 
government, so it resolved to recall him. Any effort by 
Deane to bring order to his accounts was negligible, because 
he and Franklin realized the implications if they were dis­
closed . 
After Deane was dismissed by Congress without either 
censure or vindication, his attitude towards the Revolution 
changed. Historians debate whether he was intentionally 
traitorous in deserting American honor, or emotionally un­
balanced and insecure from the unjust treatment he had 
received from Congress. Miller acknowledges that Deane, 
having lost faith in the American Revolution, went over to 
the British as a propagandist, and was eventually classified 
by the Americans with Benedict Arnold, He adds that Deane's 
service to his country was generally beneficial despite his 
outside financial interests, as mixing profit and patriotism 
was hardly unique among his countrymen.Helen Auger's 
evaluation of Deane explains him as a man suffering from a 
martyr psychosis. By the time he returned to Paris, he was 
drained of every emotion but resentment, thus taking on the 
character others had chosen for him. She insists that his 
accomplishments during his service demonstrated incessant 
the Attempt to Recall Benjamin Franklin,'* William and Mary 
Quarterly. XXVII (April, 1970), 247. (Hereinafter referred 
to as Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism.") 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 205, 228. 
^^Miller, Triumph, p. 37 5. 
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resourcefulness in gaining French sympathy for the American 
c a u s e . J a m e s  a l s o  p o r t r a y s  h i m  a s  a  m a n  w h o s e  s e r v i c e s  
remained unrecognizedo Until the time of his death, he held 
6 8 
to the idea of returning to the United States, which im­
plies that he had not totally denied his allegiance to his 
native country„ 
Although Boyd categorizes Deane as avaricious and a 
fallen patriot, there is no evidence that he resorted to 
blackmail in his relationship with Bancrofto It was Ban­
croft who was reluctant to have Deane return to the United 
States in 1789, because Bancroft's secure monetary position 
would be endangered if Deane should reveal the intimacies 
of their relationship» Therefore, Boyd hypothesizes that 
69 
Bancroft conveniently ended Deane*s life. Deane's death 
has previously been attributed to suicide because of his 
depressed condition, which was a culmination of the treat­
ment he had received from Congress, the discouraging second 
trip to Europe, and his frustrated attempts to return to 
America. 
Although historians do not accord Silas Deane the 
prestigious position in the annals of the United States as 
some of the more dominant names in the diplomacy of the 
American Revolution, like Franklin, Adams and Jay, his career 
^^Auger, Secret War, pp» 318, 129. 
6 8 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 258o 
^^Boyd, "Silas Deane," 530, 547-549. 
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provides insight into the American diplomatic effort in 
Europe. Historians have found that primary sources con­
tributed greatly to their knowledge of this man. Yet, their 
interpretations differ significantly in some respects, and 
thus thdse varying viewpoints lend depth and interest to a 
historiographical study of the literature written about 
Silas Deane as an American diplomat. 
Basically, the same primary sources were available 
to even the earliest authors, although Deane's papers may 
not have been as well organized for these first historians. 
Naturally, those authors who have published more recently 
also have the use of earlier monographs and biographies to 
give additional detail to their discussions. Two early 
historians, E. S. Corwin and George Clark, represent the 
dichotomy that may result from historical interpretations, 
Corwin's extensive investigation of sources from French 
archives and material from Henri Doniol, as well as French 
printed sources and the writings of American revolutionary 
figures, including Deane, results in a very useful work on 
French policy during the Revolution. In contrast, Clark's 
biased and undocumented account of Silas Deane only serves 
to discredit Deane further, as this favorable presentation 
of Deane is dismissed as unreliable. Bernard Fay, a French 
author, is a necessary author to study in the historiography 
of the Revolution. Although he cites no footnotes, his ex­
tensive bibliography includes primary materials from Europe 
and America and naturally, the papers of Franklin. He is 
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very complimentary to Franklin, as the French do have great 
admiration for him; yet his account is not so biased as to 
make it useless. Carl Van Doren has investigated the Deane 
papers, along with colonial and federal records of the com­
mercial transactions of the Revolution, He also adds that 
the Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress were 
invaluableo John C. Miller's study includes many aspects 
of the Revolution besides diplomatic, and his use of manu­
scripts, historical collections, memoirs and letters, and 
monographs is extensive. Although he does not cite Deane's 
personal papers, he investigated congressional journals and 
related correspondence in evaluating Deane's contributions 
to the Revolution. Samuel Flagg Bemis does not deal exten­
sively with Silas Deane, but his thorough investigation of 
Doniol's documents, as well as the official correspondence 
of the American Congress and officials as edited by Sparks 
and Wharton, and the papers of Deane, Franklin and Arthur 
Lee, negate any accusations that Bemis was cursory in his 
study of Deane. His article on the British secret service 
primarily utilizes British correspondence, but he also uses 
French and American sources to avoid a limited interpreta­
tion that only one set of source material would provide, 
Bemis represents the transition between early twentieth-
century authors and more modern ones, as he combines pri­
mary and printed sources into an intelligent and objective 
analysis of American diplomacy. Helen Auger designates 
personal correspondence, including Deane's papers as her 
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most important sources. Her study o£ the diplomacy is in­
fluenced primarily by Bemis, Corwin and Stourzh, who have 
contributed more to the specific understanding of diplomacy 
than those authors whose subject matter includes all aspects 
of the American Revolution. From Gerald Strouzh, one gains 
a philosophical analysis of primary source material, which 
not only includes Franklin's papers, but also those of Adams, 
Arthur Lee and Deane. His interpretation represents a more 
modern approach to the subject of diplomacy, as he deals with 
personalities in diplomacy. He explains that the American 
envoys did not greatly influence France as she had decided 
to secure an alliance with the United States, regardless of 
who was the American representative. It was strictly a mat­
ter of how the American commissioners adapted to circumstances. 
In Coy H. James's unpublished dissertation, he concentrates 
upon the papers of Deane, Franklin, Lee and Adams, as well as 
those official correspondence pertinent to his discussion of 
Deane. This work is surprisingly objective and introduces 
Silas Deane as a historical character of many complicated 
facets which merit thorough investigation. Richard B. Morris 
writes mainly from personal papers about the men of the Revo­
lution. His narrative style expresses the opinion that men 
and not events make history, and yet, he is not overly lauda­
tory in his account of the American negotiators in Europe. 
Differing from Morris's approach is Richard W. Van Alstyne. 
Van Alstyne's source material is similar to that of previous 
authors, but he concentrates more on the information avail­
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able from European and American government documents. His 
short monograph highlights the important events contribut­
ing to independence, concentrating upon the maneuvering for 
reconciliation by the British, the Franco-American negotia­
tions for a treaty, and eventually the peace discussions and 
their effect in America and Europe. Cecil Currey has pub­
lished a recent interpretation of the same material that 
previous authors have used. However, he has misread and 
twisted these original sources to fit his thesis that Frank­
lin was a British spy, which also implicates Deane. The bias 
makes this account more of a popularization of old material. 
Valuable information is available from articles. 
Abernethy's two articles concentrate on primary sources, 
including the papers on Franklin, Arthur Lee and Deane, and 
government documents from England and the United States. 
His article on the Franklin-Lee imbroglio takes the unique 
position of defending Arthur Lee and supporting his accusa­
tions against Franklin and Deane. Julian P. Boyd's three-
part study of Deane is based on another extensive investiga­
tion of Deane's papers along with those of Franklin, Arthur 
Lee and Adams, and government correspondence. This series 
is valuable because of its in-depth study of the transition 
in Deane's personality as Edward Bancroft came to control 
completely his life. Henderson and Ferguson rely upon the 
records of Congress to state the facts involving the congres­
sional efforts to have Franklin recalled and its investiga­
tion of the business conducted by the Americans in Paris. 
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Both men studiously avoid evaluating the personalities in­
volved and make a sincere effort to record the facts for 
their readers. 
Silas Deane's career ended ignominiously, filled with 
controversy and doubts about his patriotism. Historians 
recognize Deane's penchant for commercial gain. However, 
the consensus among them is that commercialism during the 
Revolution was not abnormal, and that his roles as merchant 
and diplomat did not necessarily detract from the benefits 
he provided the United States in establishing the basis for 
French aid and the alliance. Both Van Alstyne and Currey 
dissent from this viewpoint, accusing Deane of deliberately 
setting up outside commercial activities which would be bene­
ficial to him. The idea that he and Beaumarchais established 
a thriving business with the assistance of congressional 
funds enrages authors like Currey, but is denied by Auger, 
James and Van Alstyne. Admittedly, Deane was pro-French; 
yet he refused to become beholden to any of his French 
associates. The purpose of his efforts, authors agree, was 
to ship goods to America, Both Deane and Beaumarchais were 
only continuing a policy the French had already established, 
as French aid, according to Van Alstyne and Currey, had been 
arriving in America before Deane and Beaumarchais met. 
Deane's association with Franklin receives attention to 
the degree that Franklin supported Deane's activities. There 
is general agreement that they worked well together, while 
Arthur Lee's naturally suspicious nature excluded him from 
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much of their negotiations. Hale and James state that 
Franklin did not extend his support to Deane when he pub­
lished the unpatriotic letters in England. Currey main­
tains they worked in close conjunction to insure the suc­
cess of their perfidious activities, although Franklin 
was finally forced to admit that he could defend Deane 
only on the basis of past performance= 
Deane's most questionable associations were those he 
established with Edward Bancroft and other British agents, 
Bemis, Auger, James and Miller realize the negative aspects 
of the friendship between him and Bancroft, but assume that 
Deane did not suspect Bancroft's dishonest and selfish mo­
tives. Currey promotes the idea that Deane was fully aware 
of Bancroft's dishonest character, and willingly joined him 
to enhance his personal fortune. Julian P. Boyd's article 
never condones their association, nor assumes that Deane was 
an innocent victim. Rather he explains that Deane succumbed 
to Bancroft's persuasive tactics in gaining Deane's coopera­
tion in supplying information to the British. Eventually, 
they became partners in deceit and Deane was never strong 
enough in character to extricate himself from this associa­
tion. Van Alstyne summarily dismisses the whole concept of 
a British spy network as ridiculous and unsubstantiated. He 
mentions, however, that Deane talked freely with Bancroft, 
which enabled him to report to London that Deane was bidding 
for an alliance and would quite possibly get it. 
The argument between Arthur Lee and Silas Deane over his 
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request for congressional repayments to Beaumarchais and 
Deane's friendship with Bancroft expanded into a vicious 
verbal and written battle. Corwin and Abernethy recognize 
Lee's justification in protesting Deane's private commercial 
activities. Corwin feels Lee overstated his suspicions, 
while Abernathy states that Deane and Franklin were guilty 
of the accusations Lee made. Boyd agrees that Lee had a 
basis for condemning Deane. On the other hand, James, Bemis 
and Ferguson realize that Lee failed to understand the com­
mercialism that pervaded the commission in Europe and thus 
assumed there was nothing honest about Deane. Currey justi­
f i e s  L e e ' s  v i t u p e r a t i v e  c a m p a i g n ,  b e c a u s e  D e a n e  f l a t l y  i g ­
nored his warnings concerning the activities of Wentworth 
and Bancroft. 
Generally, historians agree that congressional efforts 
to investigate Deane's European ventures failed dismally 
because of the sectional self-interest that arose. Deane's 
attempts to clear his reputation were ignored, and when he 
returned to Paris, he was rightfully embittered. No his­
torian defends Deane's efforts to disgrace the Revolution 
by publishing the critical letters in Great Britain. Per­
haps his unstable and trusting temperament gave rise to his 
efforts to gain personal friendships and monetary security 
in Europe, which led to his diplomatic decline and destruc­
tion. 
CHAPTER III 
WILLIAM AND ARTHUR LEE AS DIPLOMATS 
The entry of the Lee brothers into the diplomatic 
arena produced new obstacles and controversies in the Amer­
ican quest for independence. The basic tactlessness of 
Arthur and William Lee towards France, Spain and Prussia, 
and their antagonism against Silas Deane and Benjamin 
Franklin have aroused the criticisms of some historians„ 
Other authors have defended their diplomatic abilities and 
emphasized their adamant stand against any shady dealings 
in the American commission. The distrust that developed 
between the Lees and Franklin and Deane, argue some his­
torians, detracted from the success of American diplomacy 
in Europe. Other historians contend that, without their 
devotion to duty, the American commission might have dis­
integrated into a commercial venture for Franklin and Deane. 
Militia diplomacy and the Lees's willingness to migrate from 
court to court in Europe in search of alliances and support 
of American independence are also the subjects of contro­
versy among historians. The congressional battle that 
ensued after the recalls of Deane and Lee has resulted in 
historical discussions as to the validity of the congres­
sional actions. 
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Because of Arthur Lee's dogmatic approach to diplomacy 
and his unpredictable character traits, historians have dis­
cussed his fitness for diplomatic negotiations. The grand-
nephew of Arthur Lee, Richard Henry Lee, wrote a filiopie-
tistic biography of him in 1829. The Lees traditionally 
supported each other, so the bias in this two-volume work 
is not unexpected. Richard Henry Lee counters disparaging 
remarks against Arthur's character by defending his patrio­
tism and stating that even great persons in history cannot 
escape malicious accusations. Arthur's constant fidelity 
to the cause of independence enabled him to forgive the con­
gressional failure to offer him commissions to either Spain 
or Great Britain. He was so devoted to his country that he 
never allowed the hostile congressional factions, even dur­
ing the time of his recall, to alter his pro-American senti­
ments. John Adams's defense of Lee's actions towards Deane 
and his associates also strengthens Richard Henry Lee's 
argument that Lee was properly motivated in defending his 
country's cause.^ In a brief but succinct appraisal of 
Arthur Lee, Edward Hale's Franklin in France (1887) cate­
gorizes him as a man who longed to do something great, but 
who proved by his impatience and wrongheadedness that he 
2 
could hardly have succeeded. Cecil Currey's recent book, 
^Richard Henry Lee, Life of Arthur Lee (2 vols., Bostor: 
Wells and Lilly, Court Street, 1829) , I, pp. 152-155„ (Herein­
after referred to as Lee, Arthur Lee.) 
2 
Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 43-44. 
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Code #72: Ben Franklin, Patriot or Spy (1972), defends 
Arthur Lee against historians who have been unjust in their 
judgment of his character. Arthur's American associates in 
Paris created an atmosphere where he was constantly victi­
mized and suspected for uncooperative activity which natu-
3 
rally caused him to be bitter. 
While William Lee's role in diplomacy is considerably 
less prominent than his brother's. Auger views his tempera­
ment critically, while Currey states he was well-suited for 
his appointment to Nantes. Helen Auger's Secret War for 
Independence (1954) touches lightly on William to the extent 
that she brings out his selfish tendencies. A quotation 
from an article in the Morning Post in London, seems to sum­
marize her thoughts on William: '". . ^ His character . . . 
is well known to be tinctured with avarice, parsimony, self-
4 
ishness and meanness.'" Currey maintains that William Lee 
was very capable as his work at the commercial agency at 
Nantes demonstrated. 
Arthur Lee began his career in Europe in the spring of 
1776, as a colonial agent seeking monetary assistance for 
the rebellious colonies from European countries. He was 
first associated with Caron de Beaumarchais, the creator 
of The Marriage of Figaro. Beaumarchais's subsequent pre­
ference for Silas Deane, who was formally charged by Congress 
with securing French aid, aroused Lee's indignation. Because 
^Currey, Code #72, p. 156. 
^Auger, Secret War, p. 267. 
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of his intense pride, Lee coveted the success and the fame 
that supplying the colonies with the much needed military 
and monetary aid might provide. A controversy that developed 
from Lee's displacement in the commercial realm was over 
whether Congress was obligated to repay Beaumarchais or if 
France intended the aid to be a gift. Hale's assessment of 
the repayment controversy is unclear, although his informa­
tion is derived from primary sources. From the viewpoint of 
this nineteenth-century historian, the whole issue arose 
from Lee's proclivity for confusing the truth, especially 
when there was an opportunity to discredit Deane, Franklin 
and Beaumarchais. Hale adds that Lee eventually convinced 
himself that the King of France never expected repayment 
from the United States^ and Lee wrote Congress that Vergennes 
had assured him that no repayment was expected for the cargoes 
dispatched by Beaumarchais.^ 
Samuel Flagg Bemis's monograph on The Diplomacy of the 
American Revolution (1935) finds no clear evidence that 
Beaumarchais assured Lee that only nominal payments in Amer­
ican produce would be required in order to disguise the aid 
as a commercial transaction. When Beaumarchais realized that 
Deane had congressional instructions to purchase military 
stores, payable in American produce, he did not hesitate to 
demand repayment. Congress willingly agreed with Lee, who 
^Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 42, 43, 50. See also Wharton, 
Diplomatic Correspondence. I, p. 353. Vergennes in 1783 
affirms that the aid was granted with no repayment expectedo 
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pointed out that the French government had given Beaumarchais 
the supplies, hence he had no right to charge anything for 
them. It was not so much Lee as it was Congress which had 
made an agreement and then repudiated it, even when Congress 
realized that French supplies were responsible for the vic­
tory at Saratoga.^ 
Lee's objection to the United States repaying Beau­
marchais is criticized by John Miller, Helen Auger and Coy 
James. In his book, Triumph of Freedom (1948), Miller con­
tradicts earlier attempts to prove Lee had valid arguments 
in objecting to the repayment. He attributed Lee's attack 
on Beaumarchais and Deane to Lee's inability to forget that 
he had been replaced by Deane. Miller understands that 
Beaumarchais, never considering his shipments as a gift, 
7 
fully expected to be paid. Both Auger and James agree with 
Miller's contention that aid was not given to America without 
thought of repayment. According to Auger, Congress preferred 
to believe no repayment was necessary, but an audit of con­
gressional accounts by Alexander Hamilton showed that 
g 
Beaumarchais was owed 2,280,000 francs. James states that 
Beaumarchais was unaware that Lee had written his brothers 
that the French government expected no repayment. In addi­
tion, Lee's letters impugned the personal motives of 
^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 35, 37, 38-39. 
^Miller, Triumph, pp. 366, 368, 327. 
^Auger, Secret War, p. 327. 
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Beaumarchais and Deane. 
Some historians assert that the undeviating support o£ 
American independence that Arthur Lee displayed is admirable, 
yet other scholars disagree with this verdict. The patriotic 
zeal with which Richard Henry Lee credited Arthur Lee is also 
acclaimed by Bemis, who notes Lee's uncompromising opposition 
towards the British proposal of reconciliation.^^ Although 
James is critical of many aspects of Arthur Lee's career, he 
commends both Lees for their loyalty to the revolutionary 
c a u s e . I n  c o n t r a s t ,  R i c h a r d  V a n  A l s t y n e ,  i n  h i s  1 9 6 5  s t u d y  
entitled The Empire and Independence, places Arthur Lee in a 
more equivocal role, as he was plotting with Beaumarchais on 
one hand and making speeches in London recommending the 
12 
restoration of imperial unity on the other. Currey ex-
pectedly supports Bemis's praise of Arthur Lee's consistent 
affirmation of American independence.^^ 
The appointment of Arthur Lee as an agent by the Secret 
Committee on Correspondence and the subsequent arrangement 
that his brother, William, be the commercial agent at Nantes, 
caused diplomatic and personal controversies that jeopardized 
the success of the Franco-American treaties, according to 
9 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 34. 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 59. 
^^James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 71. 
12 
Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 70. 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 61. 
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some authors. Yet others contend that Arthur, and to a lesser 
degree William, contributed to the beneficial agreements ar­
rived at betwen France and America. Richard Henry Lee credits 
Arthur's "... earnestness and ability. . for establishing 
the receptive atmosphere that Deane and Franklin enjoyed in 
Paris. Lee frequently sought advice from Vergennes regarding 
the most practical ways to obtain Franco-American treaties. 
In reference to Lee's objection to Article Twelve, which 
allowed the French to export molasses tax-free from the French 
West Indies to America, Richard Henry Lee presents Arthur as 
much more flexible on reaching a solution than do succeeding 
authors. Lee conceded that he would agree to this section 
14 
if it were the only way to insure French coopeartion. E. S. 
Corwin's French Policy and the American Alliance (1916) con­
firms Lee's willingness to cooperate with France. Lee claimed 
to understand the Spanish-French relationship and never openly 
criticized French support of Spanish land claims in America.. 
Corwin censures those who discredit Lee's loyalty to the alli­
ance and does not comment upon Lee's objections to Article 
Twelve. 
More recent evaluations of Lee are more critical of his 
attitudes and diplomatic activities in France. Miller tersely 
categorizes him as the least popular of the three commission­
ers, because Lee behaved as though he had never known an 
14 
Lee, Arthur Lee, pp. 55, 139, 126. 
^^Corwin, French Policy, pp. 205, 166, 208. 
honest man.^^ Lee fell into increasing disfavor with the 
French until Conrad Alexandre Gerard finally requested his 
recall, Auger claims. She continues that the moment Lee re­
turned to Congress, he began fighting with Gerard, who he 
believed to be responsible for the criticism of his missions 
17 
to Spain and Prussia. William Stinchcombe, The American 
Revolution and the French Alliance (1969), also emphasizes 
the suspicion of the French court towards Lee, although it 
was based upon a mistaken belief that Lee had leaked news of 
18 
the alliance to Lord Shelburne. Although the French were 
rather devious in their relations with the American, they 
disliked Lee because they distrusted him. H. James Hender­
son's article, "Congressional Factionalism and the Recall 
of Franklin" (1970), mentions that Lee was in disfavor at 
19 
the French court. 
Among recent historians, Currey defends Arthur Lee, stat 
ing that his recalcitrance should not be considered "c . .of 
ficious interference as Franklin's biographers have main­
tained. . . ." Lee was more concerned with American sover­
eignty, and believed that the molasses clause in the commer­
cial treaty violated rights of reciprocity. Therefore, the 
l^Miller, Triumph, p. 361, 
^^Auger, Secret War, p, 327. 
1R 
William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and 
the French Alliance (Syracuse: University Press, 1969), p, 41. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Stinchcombe, French Alliance.) 
19 
Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 251; see 
also Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence. I, p. 525; Vergen-
nes informed Gerard that Lee had the confidence of neither 
France nor Spain, 
56 
French considered him an obstacle to the success of the 
I T  2 0  alliance« 
While Arthur was appointed in an official capacityj 
William waited in Paris for the congressional notice that 
would send him to the commercial agency at Nantes, James 
assumes that William's presence in the capital only confirmed 
his querulousness, as he complained about not being consulted 
by the commissioners and offered unsolicited advice about the 
21 
proper administration of congressional affairs. 
Although William's previous experience justified his 
position at the commercial agency at Nantes^ his loyalty 
was questionable, due to his lingering British political 
associations. Because of his experience as a London mer­
chant, Auger believes his appointment to Nantes was not 
unreasonable. . Upon arriving at Nantes, William discovered 
that Thomas Morris had been replaced as head of the commer­
cial agency by Jonathan Williams, Franklin's nephew. Thus, 
he complained bitterly that Deane and Williams had virtually 
taken over his job, and he agreed with the antagonism his 
brother held for them. His political connections with Eng­
land made the wisdom of his appointment doubtful. Both 
Auger and James point out that he retained his British 
citizenship and his position of alderman until 1780, which 
possibly indicated that his service to America was still 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 194-195. 
21 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 86. 
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subject to loyalty to Great Britain. Both James and 
Currey agree, however, that Lee's services at Nantes were 
useful in bringing order out o£ chaos. Currey adds that 
the entire task rested upon his abilities, as he received 
only minimal cooperation from Franklin, Deane and Wil-
23 
liamsc^^ 
The Lees consistently supported "militia diplomacy," 
or as Franklin called it "suitoring after alliances," and 
this has caused controversy among historians. Richard Henry 
Lee is reluctant to commend Arthur Lee's policy in Spain, as 
he terms Lee's approach towards Spain as "slow and cautious." 
He appealed to Spanish sympathies by pointing out that 
should America lose, war would be inevitable in Europe. 
Aid to the United States would give Spain the opportunity 
to disable England forever. Although Lee formally accom­
plished nothing significant, his public service was good, 
and he exercised foresight in seeking more responsive 
24 
countries like Prussia. Bemis is inclined to agree that 
the financial assistance from Spain, although in ". . . 
secret and small sums . . . made Lee's efforts worth-
, . T 25 while. 
Helen Auger designates this method of militia diplomacy 
as especially suited to the Lees, since their brother, 
^^Auger, Secret War, pp. 173-174, 276, 175; see also 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 85. 
23james, "Revolutionary Career," p. 87; see also 
Currey, Code #72, pp. 152-153, 
^^Lee, Arthur Lee, pp. 130, 83-84, 85. 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 91. 
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Francis, was in Congress and would support their efforts to 
bestow ministerial posts upon themselves and their friends. 
She adds that the only benefit of militia diplomacy was that 
it removed the Lees, especially Arthur, from Paris so Frank­
lin and Deane could continue the maritime war without inter­
ference. To emphasize the ineffectiveness of Arthur Lee's 
search for European alliances, Auger states that Lee's pri­
mary motive for negotiations with Spain was to satisfy his 
hunger for personal diplomatic triumphs. He was angered 
because the Spanish government prevented him from entering 
Madrid immediately, but the Spanish were displeased at the 
news of his visit, since the British ambassador would surely 
discover him, incognito or not. He contributed to Spain's 
annoyance with him by informing Charles III that Britain 
had no objection to the American commission in Paris; then 
he bluntly demanded a substantial loan. Auger appropriately 
calls these methods of suitoring after alliances "caveman 
style." It was only because of Spain's hatred of Britain 
9 f\ 
that Jeronimo Grimaldi agreed to any aid at all. 
Arthur Lee's Spanish diplomacy received favorable com­
ment from Van Alstyne, and naturally Currey is enthusiastic. 
Van Alstyne evaluates the establishment of a line of credit 
with Spanish bankers in Holland as noteworthy, even acclaimed 
27 
by Silas Deane. The ultimate praise is bestowed by Currey, 
Lee's indefatigable supporter. He claims that Lee distin-
26Auger, Secret War, pp. 126, 168, 160-161. 
27van Alstyne, Empire, p. 125. 
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guished himself by engineering the first major diplomatic 
breakthrough of the war in gaining four hundred thousand 
livres from the Spanish king and a promise of additional 
2 8 
payments. 
From Spain, Lee journeyed to Prussia which was another 
futile exercise in diplomacy. According to Richard Henry 
Lee, it would have taken an extraordinary man to achieve 
the objectives of commercial intercourse, prevention of aid 
to Great Britain, and the purchase of war materials, because 
Prussia was obligated to Britain by certain treaties. Lee's 
viewpoint of the itinerant diplomat once again assumed posi­
tive tones. He adds that Arthur left Prussia only after 
duly impressing King Frederick and Baron de Schulenburg and 
receiving assurances that . . Prussia would not be the 
29 
last power to acknowledge the independency of his country.'" 
Lee indicates that the theft of important state documents in 
Lee's possession was only a minor setback in comparison to 
the progress he gained towards recognition. 
Miller and Auger critically evaluate Lee's negotiations 
in Prussia, while Currey blames Franklin and Deane for exag­
gerating the failure of his mission. Frederick's evasiveness 
failed to discourage Arthur, according to Miller, Disguising 
himself as a private citizen, Lee tactlessly pursued the 
emperor even after Frederick informed Lee that he would 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 116-117. 
29 
Lee, Arthur Lee, pp. 86, 89, 98. 
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tolerate no more demands for recognition. Despite all his 
maneuvering and persistence, all Lee gained was permission 
to buy clothing and arms, which Miller discounts as insig-
30 
nificant. Auger dismisses the mission as a failure, with 
the theft of Arthur's papers by the British as its outstand­
ing event. Arthur failed to take advantage of Frederick's 
31 
intense resentment of Great Britain. Currey mentions the 
theft of the official papers, but blames Franklin and Deane 
32 
for exploiting the event in order to discredit Lee, 
As if Arthur's failure in Prussia was not enough, William 
embarked upon a journey to Berlin to gain concessions from 
Frederick. Schulenburg explained that the mission was futile 
from the outset, as the king was unwilling to agree to any 
33 
kind of commercial relations. From Miller's viewpoint, 
Arthur and William were totally misplaced in Prussia as they 
were "... crotchety, hot-tempered and overzealous diplo­
mats. . . 
From Prussia, William's peripatetic route led him to 
Vienna where he found the emperor as reluctant to see him 
as Frederick. Bemis explains his activities from Vienna to 
Holland. William attributed his rebuff in Vienna to the 
30 
Miller, Triumph, pp. 363-364; see also Wharton, Dip­
lomatic Correspondence, I, p. 524, 
^^Auger, Secret War, pp, 214-215. 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 127, 
33 
Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, p. 293, 
^^Miller, Triumph, p. 363, 
61 
Emperor's preoccupation with the War o£ the Bavarian Suc-
cession„ The penultimate stage of William's diplomatic 
career occurred in Holland where he and one Jean de Neuf-
ville drew up an absolutely pointless treaty^ William had 
no such official power and „ everybody knew the burgo­
masters of Amsterdam had no authority to draw up treaties 
with foreign powersThe text of the treaty followed the 
Franco-American treaty of commerce, but the American com­
missioners in Paris never considered it binding, and neither 
35 
did the burgomasters» 
Returning again to William's first venture in Prussia, 
Auger agrees that his effort was insignificant, while Currey's 
dissenting voice argues that William has not been properly 
recognized for his achievements. According to Auger, William 
was in a disadvantageous position before he arrived because 
of Arthur's impertinence in directing Frederick as how to 
run his country better. Therefore, William was ignored in 
his attempts to increase the paltry concessions for the 
United States to buy clothing and arms from private mer-
36 
chants. Although Currey believes that William's achieve­
ments in Prussia have never been properly recognized, he 
fails to enumerate them, Currey is convinced that Franklin 
assumed that he was responsible for obtaining recognition 
from as many countries as possible, and therefore he ignored 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp, 157-159, 
A 
Auger, Secret War, p, 216, 
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37 
any attempt by William to gain recognition from Prussiao 
The suspicious and proud attitudes of the Lees were 
manifested in the feud which developed between them and 
Deane and Franklin. Most historians have blamed Arthur's 
unreasonable accusations and his antipathy against Deane, 
who had replaced him in dealing with Beaumarchais, for the 
magnitude of this feud, Thomas Perkins Abernethy, in his 
article, "The Origin of the Franklin-Lee Imbroglio" (1938), 
deviates from this traditional approach and supports Arthur's 
contention that Franklin and Deane were intent on taking the 
privateering business out of the hands of the agents ap­
pointed by Congress and retaining control of it for their 
own purposes. Although William Lee was officially appointed 
to oversee the commercial agency at Nantes, Deane and Frank­
lin ignored him, entrusting the business to Jonathan Williams. 
They had no authority for this act, „ but the prize 
business was profitable and important, and they could not 
afford to let it fall into the hands of a man who would not 
cooperate with them„" Because of the control Franklin and 
Deane exercised over the privateering enterprise, Congress 
never derived any advantage from it. Abernethy is convinced 
that the only mistake committed by the Lees was that they 
attempted to obtain an account of public moneys, and thus 
came into conflict with Franklin and Deane. The one offense 
of the Lee brothers overlooked by historians was that William 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 190. 
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speculated on the London Stock Exchange while acting as a 
commercial agent, but then Deane and his associates did the 
38 
same, 
In contrast to Abernethy's defense of the accusations 
o£ the Lee brothers against Deane and Franklin, Miller, James 
and Auger find many of Arthur Lee's charges invalid and un­
substantiated, The dispute began with Arthur's assertions 
that Deane was involved in a fraud against the United States 
with Beaumarchais and Robert Morris. Miller denies that any 
substantial evidence of irregularity was produced. Lee dis­
trusted most men with whom he associated, but he was partic­
ularly suspicious of Deane and Beaumarchais, accusing them 
of traitorous activities. Franklin irritated Lee by defend­
ing Deane's honesty. Lee finally ended his own diplomatic 
career, and returned to Congress with an intense antipathy 
towards Deane and Franklin, as well as France, which had 
taken extraordinary precautions to insure that the Congress 
39 
did not injure Deane. Auger agrees that Lee's attempts to 
prove Deane was involved in stockjobbing were based purely 
upon circumstantial evidence. Because of his unfounded 
accusations involving Beaumarchais and Deane, Lee incurred 
the dislike of Beaumarchais, which probably influenced French 
sentiments against him. The power of the Lee family made it 
impossible to ignore these unsubstantiated charges against 
Deane and Franklin, however. James views the Lee brothers 
^^Abernethy, "Franklin-Lee Imbroglio," 51, 45, 52. 
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 369, 371, 376. 
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as being motivated by their own selfishness, as Arthur 
devised a plan by which he would be the only commissioner 
in Pariso William suffered from frustration, because he 
believed that he was being denied a commercial opportunity, 
since Deane already controlled Nantes„ According to James, 
Arthur's paranoia eventually caused him to conclude that he 
was being victimized by a cabal formed by Deane and Frank-
, . 40 
lin. 
Analyses of Arthur Lee's attitude towards Deane often 
deal with the personality conflict between them. E, James 
Ferguson in "Business, Government and the Congressional In­
vestigation in the Revolution" (1959), believes that Lee 
was simply shocked by the commercialism and self-promotion 
of the trading world and diplomacy. However, the United 
States benefitted from the recall of Deane and Lee, which 
enabled the mission to be represented by more adroit diplo-
41 
mats like Adams and Jay. 
Morris and Currey compare the honor of the Lees and 
Deane. Morris states that the Lees were not without guilt 
in participating in the commercial and political opportun­
ities afforded by the Revolution. Arthur had shipped per­
sonal merchandise on the Continental ship Alliance, and 
William is credited with the dubious distinction of being 
the only American to hold the post of alderman in London. 
4 0  
James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 105, 97, 134. 
41 
Ferguson, "Congressional Investigation," 318. 
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He, too, was not above trying to capitalize on his advance 
4 2  
knowledge o£ the French alliance. Currey admits that the 
constant trouble among the commissioners was disgraceful, ^ut 
he blames Franklin and Deane for the quarrel, since they were 
responsible for the economic discrepancies that appeared in 
the financial records. Lee's solution for alleviating such 
mishandling of public funds was to place himself in sole 
4 3  
charge of the Paris mission. 
Although Silas Deane was more victimized by Arthur 
Lee's accusations, Benjamin Franklin did not completely 
escape Arthur's attempts to discredit him. Because of his 
established reputation and his popularity in Europe, he was 
less vulnerable, however. Richard Henry Lee criticizes 
Franklin's aggravating temperament and inclination towards 
4 4  
frivolity in France. Carl Van Doren's biography of Frank­
lin (1941) refutes the idea that Arthur enjoyed a position 
in the virtuous majority. Van Doren maintains that Lee 
would remain in the minority as Franklin would always be 
supported by the majority and would not be affected by his 
shrill accusations. Lee bred trouble where he could not 
find it, and Franklin summarily commented on the recall of 
both Lees and Izard that . .no soul regrets their de-
4 5  
p a r t u r e .  . . . "  
42Morris, Peacemakers, p. 11. 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 210-211. 
^^Lee, Arthur Lee, p. 171. 
45carl Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin (New York: Garden 
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Franklin's personal business and his associations also 
aroused Lee's suspicions. Auger acknowledges Franklin's 
involvement in the Vandalia operation but charges that Lee 
was bitter, because the Ohio Company, with which he had 
been associated, had been displaced by the more successful 
Vandalia„ 
Another question associated with Lee's career was his 
relationship with John Thornton. Originally Thornton gained 
Lee's confidence by supplying the information that Deane had 
se n t  B a n c r o f t  t o  L o n d o n  t o  g a m b l e  o n  s t o c k s ,  b u t  s o o n  L e e  b e ­
came the main source of information for the British spy. 
H. James Henderson's article on the congressional faction­
alism and the efforts to recall Franklin (1970) states that 
4 7 
Lee also charged Franklin with stockjobbing. 
Whatever doubts earlier historians have concerning the 
validity of Lee's accusations, Currey believes that Frank­
lin's activities with regard to Lee amply demonstrate his 
perfidy. According to Currey, Franklin's nefarious plans 
are best demonstrated by the plot to place Thornton in Lee's 
employ which would hopefully ruin his credibility. Lee had 
come dangerously close to recognizing the working relation­
ship Bancroft enjoyed with Franklin as well as Deane, and 
City Publishing Co., 1941), pp. 584, 609, (Hereinafter re­
ferred to as Van Doren, Franklin.) 
46Auger, Secret War, pp. 197, 272-273; see also Van 
Doren, Franklin, p. 382. Because Lee was not always in the 
confidence of Franklin and Deane, Thornton could not learn 
much. 
^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 249. 
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Franklin conceived of this plot to discredit Lee. Lee 
also charged that Franklin was stealing from public funds. 
However, Vergennes discounted Lee's charges because of his 
association with Thornton, and Congress placed little 
credence in his attack on Franklin, Thus, Lee's importance 
48 
has been diminished in historical perspective. 
Although Lee remained in Paris working with Adams and 
Franklin, he, too, was eventually recalled by Congress, 
Deane's charges against him of revealing information to 
Shelburne, of sponsoring Dr. Berkenhout while he was a 
British agent in America, and of dragging out the French 
negotiations to give England time for a counter-proposal 
proved too critical for Congress to overlook. Lee considered 
his recall a form of censure, but in 1789 an investigating 
congressional committee concluded that his conduct while in 
Europe had been creditable. 
The only significant result of the recall of the two 
feuding diplomats was the sectional feelings that surfaced, 
Richard Henry Lee verifies the sectional interests in Europe, 
saying that Arthur worked to import supplies to Virginia, 
w h i l e  F r a n k l i n  a n d  D e a n e  f a v o r e d  n o r t h e r n  i n t e r e s t s . O n  
the subject of the sectional split over the recall, James 
states that the Lee brothers and Ralph Izard were convinced 
48currey, Code #72, pp. 191-192. 
49james, "Revolutionary Career," pp, 164-165, 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 235. 
SlLee, Arthur Lee, p. 101. 
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that Franklin \^{jiproved of Deane's favoring New England's 
52 
commercial interests over southern agriculture. Franklin 
was fortunate to remain untouched by the condemnation of the 
Lees, while Deane was more vulnerable. 
The French interference in the congressional dispute 
only widened the breach between New England and the South. 
Gerard's campaign against Lee did nothing to heal the dis­
pute, according to Stinchcombe. Gerard emerged victorious 
from the congressional and personal battles, as he was suc­
cessful in replacing Lee with Jay who the French assumed 
would not insist on all the American claims for fishing 
53 
rights. Henderson also discusses the French cabal against 
Lee, pointing out that Gerard was able to secure southern 
support for his cause. Gerard emphasized Lee's unfavorable 
position in Paris, and he persuaded a significant number of 
southerners to reject Lee in favor of a strong Franco-
54 
American alliance. 
The major contribution of the Lee brothers to American 
diplomacy seems to be their undaunted persistence in attempt­
ing to gain recognition of American independence from Euro­
pean countries. Arthur was the more controversial of the 
two brothers as he endeavored to direct the commission at 
Paris, to travel to other European courts seeking recogni­
tion of American independence, and to curtail the extraneous 
52 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 123. 
53 
Stinchcombe, French Alliance, p. 66. 
^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 250-251. 
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financial activities in which he suspected Franklin and 
Deane of indulging. Despite the discussions of Arthur's 
d i p l o m a t i c  c a r e e r ,  S a m u e l  F l a g g  B e m i s  d e s c r i b e s  h i m  " . . .  
as an historical mystery, who may never be satisfactorily 
kn o w n .  . . . "  
Arthur Lee's papers have never been systematically 
arranged. They were randomly divided in three parts and 
placed in the libraries of the University of Virginia, Har­
vard College and the American Philosophical Society. 
Richard Henry Lee's account of the life of Arthur Lee is 
the only printed source using most of these papers. Thus 
this two-volume work has become the main point of reference 
based on primary material on Lee. However, the outstanding 
bias in favor of Arthur is indicated by his editorial com­
ments. Therefore, historians are without biographies of 
Arthur Lee that would be more objective. Two of the best 
primary sources are the volumes of diplomatic correspondence 
edited by either Sparks or Wharton, as they explain the con­
troversies surrounding both Lee brothers. Historians also 
gain background on the activities of the Lees in Europe from 
the papers and correspondence of Franklin and Deane. 
The diverse interpretations which historians provide 
demonstrate that there are no definite answers as to whether 
Arthur and William Lee's diplomatic behavior actually bene­
fitted the United States. Those authors who deal with Arthur 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 268. 
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Lee to any extent, like Bemis, Miller, Auger and James, rely 
upon the primary sources mentioned above. Bemis is once 
again outstanding from the standpoint o£ his sources as 
he also derives information from the official documents of 
the countries where the Lees journeyed. Diametrically oppos 
ing the informative studies by Miller and Bemis is Cecil B„ 
Currey's sensational account of Franklin's activities in 
Paris which lead Currey to assume he was sympathetic to and 
spying for the British Empire. Since Franklin and the Lees 
were constantly feuding, they, and especially Arthur, enjoy 
high commendation from Currey for their efforts to control 
Franklin and Deane. Thomas Perkins Abernethy's article con­
t r a s t s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w i t h  C u r r e y ' s  v i n d i c t i v e  a c c o u n t ,  a l ­
though he also is attempting to demonstrate that history has 
unjustly condemned the Lees. However, his approach is more 
subdued and scholarly than Currey's, and thus lends more 
credence to his defense of the Lees's charges against Frank­
lin, 
The controversies concerning the diplomatic careers of 
Arthur and William Lee arise primarily from Arthur's sus­
picious and stubborn temperament. The feud over the repay­
ments to Beaumarchais creates disagreement among historians» 
Because Beaumarchais switched from Lee to Deane in negotiat­
ing for French aid to America, Hale, Miller, Auger and James 
all agree that Lee contrived the notion that French aid was 
given gratis to America. Bemis states a different opinion^ 
He assumes that Congress was at fault for supporting Lee's 
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arguments, because it should have realized that Deane had 
been officially authorized to buy supplies. 
In other discussions, Bemis, Currey and even James agree 
that Arthur's support of America was undeviating, and Richard 
Henry Lee credits him for establishing the basis for French-
American negotiations upon which Franklin and Deane would 
later capitalize. Corwin also defends Lee's patriotism and 
success in dealing with the French. Currey's anti-Franklin 
bias is emphasized by his praise of Lee's concern for Amer­
ican sovereignty. Once again. Miller and Auger concur that 
Lee actually was only a minor figure in the Franco-American 
negotiations, because he incurred the dislike of both Ver-
gennes and Gerard, who launched a campaign against Lee in 
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  M o s t  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i a n s  a t t e m p t  t o  p r e ­
sent both the positive and negative aspects of Lee's career 
in Europe, while Currey makes no pretense at disguising his 
sentiments that Lee was the only honest member of the Paris 
commission. 
Most historians agree that Arthur's diplomatic ventures 
to foreign courts to seek recognition of American indepen­
dence were ineffective. Auger is especially critical of the 
policy of "militia diplomacy," as it was only a method con­
jured up by the Lees to satisfy their personal egos. 
Richard Henry Lee is forced to acknowledge that Lee's Spanish 
mi s s i o n  w a s  i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l ,  a t  b e s t ,  a n d  s e r v e d  o n l y  t o  e m ­
phasize his willingness for public service. The Prussian 
venture was a formidable task, and it was no discredit to 
72 
Lee that nothing was accomplished. Auger and Miller dispel 
any illusions that Lee achieved anything of significance in 
Prussia, and even Currey considers the theft of the impor­
tant state papers as the outstanding event of this mission. 
Both Lees were involved in the feud with Franklin and 
DeanCo Characteristically, Currey defends Arthur's posi­
tion in attempting to halt the dishonest activities of 
Franklin and Deane. In a more objective and informative 
study, Thomas Perkins Abernethy explains in detail the 
origins of the hostilities among the men, and criticizes 
other historians for ignoring obvious evidence that would 
implicate Franklin and Deane for diverting public money for 
their private use. In contrast, Miller, James and Auger 
find many of Arthur's charges against Deane and Franklin 
lacking in evidence. Carl Van Doren dismisses Arthur's 
charges against Franklin as unbelievable. The outcome of 
this serious dispute was the recall of both Arthur Lee and 
Silas Deane. Ferguson represents the majority opinion stat­
ing that the United States gained more strength diplomatically 
after their recall as it could deppnd upon Jay and Adams who 
were less concerned with personal gain. 
Defending the Lees is a difficult task, and thus even 
historians who support their moti.es do not always commend 
the way in which they executed their plans to make indepen­
dence possible. The temperaments of the Lees have made them 
controversial in a study of American diplomacy, but they un­
deniably added another dimension of interest to American 
diplomacy. 
CHAPTER IV 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S CAREER IN EUROPE 
The early foreign policy of the United States combined 
varying degrees of pleading, pressure and tact, and history 
has traditionally praised Benjamin Franklin for his unique 
ability in applying these qualities to help achieve American 
independence. His perceptive approach in dealing with the 
French and his general dedication to the American cause were 
not the only factors contributing to the winning of indepen­
dence, but some historians credit his abilities as guaran­
teeing the success of American foreign policy. Other his­
torians reject his role as a hero and criticize his actions 
as a diplomat. The debate over Franklin's career in Europe 
encompasses many aspects of diplomacy, but this chapter will 
not attempt to discuss the details of his diplomatic efforts„ 
Rather it shall explain the situations he encountered in 
Pa r i s  a n d  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  h i s  c a r e e r  t h e r e .  H i s t o r i a n s  d i s ­
agree on Franklin's attitudes towards the purpose of diplo­
m a c y .  A l s o ,  h i s  f r i e n d l y  a p p r o a c h  t o w a r d s  F r a n c e ,  i t s  o f ­
ficials and its people have made some authors skeptical that 
he might have been less inclined while negotiating to keep 
A m e r i c a n  i n t e r e s t s  f o r e m o s t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  " p r e s s u r e  d i p l o ­
macy" that he applied to Vergennes implies to other historians 
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that he was more committed to American interests than to 
French desires. According to critics, Franklin maintained 
an interest in land speculation which diverted his attention 
from diplomacy to personal financial concerns. This activ­
ity, along with Franklin's association with Edward Bancroft 
and other Englishmen suspected of spying, aroused the wrath 
of the Lee clan, especially Arthur. Naturally, historians 
have argued over the validity of the Lees's attacks on Frank­
lin, and the effects they had on the American commission in 
Paris. Although Congress believed it had alleviated the 
problem of personality conflicts when it appointed John 
Adams to succeed Silas Deane, the conflicts over life styles 
and diplomatic tactics between Franklin and Adams have caused 
historical controversy. Franklin and John Jay were compat­
ible on the peace commission, yet their differences over 
procedures during the peace negotiations with England stimu­
late an historical debate. Historians disagree whether Jay 
induced Franklin to support separate negotiations with the 
English, or whether Franklin suggested the idea himself out 
of dedication to American independence. 
Franklin had formulated opinions concerning diplomacy 
and its purposes before he left the United States for his 
official mission in Paris. Historians encounter problems 
in defining precisely what these opinions were and how Frank­
lin planned to execute his diplomacy. Franklin generally 
opposed the idea of seeking recognition from European coun­
tries, which he characterized as "militia diplomacy." 
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However, his instructions from John Hancock stipulated that 
Franklin should seek recognition and aid from France and 
Spain.^ Francis Wharton, a nineteenth-century editor and 
author, explains in his first volume, which introduces an 
extensive collection of revolutionary diplomatic correspon­
de n c e ,  t h a t  m i l i t i a  d i p l o m a c y  c a u s e d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  p r o b ­
lems since Congress sent unqualified men drifting about 
Europe seeking aid and recognition. Franklin differed from 
these inexperienced men because of previous assignments in 
England beginning in 1757 as a pre-revolutionary colonial 
agent. According to Wharton, he demonstrated exceptional 
2 
diplomatic ability. 
A group of distinguished twentieth-century historians, 
Samuel Flagg Bemis, Gerald Stourzh and Richard B. Morris, 
agree that Franklin was humiliated by the prospect of run­
ning from court to court '"begging for money and friend-
3 
ship.*" Stourzh's Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign 
Policy (1954), which is an excellent study of Franklin's 
attitudes toward foreign policy, claims that from the incep­
tion of militia diplomacy in 1776, Franklin maintained a 
4 
consistent opposition to it. Morris, in The Peacemakers, 
the Great Powers and American Independence (1965) , also 
^Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 63-64. 
2 
Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, pp. 294, 487-
488. 
3 
Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 114. 
4 
Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 126. 
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emphasizes Franklin's continued dislike of militia diplomacy 
as he criticized Adams's mission to Holland as another humil­
iating experience of begging for money.^ 
Franklin's opposition to militia diplomacy did not mean 
that he objected to any form of relations with Europe. Felix 
Gilbert's article on new American diplomacy in World Politics 
(1951) states that Franklin devised his own formula for the 
direction America should take in establishing a role in world 
affairs. He explains that Franklin believed commerce would 
be the basis for diplomatic relations between France and the 
United States. Franklin separated cooperation at sea from 
cooperation on land. While he preferred that no member of 
the French army should ever place foot in America, he would 
commit America to a monopolistic commercial agreement with 
France. Stourzh agrees that Franklin desired only commercial 
relationships in Europe while avoiding any entanglements in 
European feuds and negotiating only from a position of 
strength. Franklin concluded that American diplomacy should 
be based upon security as one of the natural rights of man, 
rather than upon power politics. Franklin's vision of world 
peace and security is demonstrated in a conversation he had 
with a young Englishman. In speaking of nations of the 
world, he said, 
But, if they would have patience, I think 
they might accomplish it . . . agree upon 
an alliance against all aggressors, and 
agree to refer all disputes between each 
^Morris, Peacemakers, p. 190. 
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other to some third person, or set o£ men, 
or power. Other nations, seeing the advan­
tage of this, would gradually accede; and 
perhaps in one hundred years, all Europe 
would be included.6 
However, Franklin's love o£ peace never implied that he 
would neglect precautions which a "world of power politics 
required." He urged that the United States guard her posi­
tion in the world by maintaining fidelity to the treaties 
agreed upon, and avoiding being lulled into a false sense 
of security. Critics complain that Franklin failed to dis­
tinguish between French aid and the intention of the French 
government to surround the new nation with certain checks 
to prevent her from becoming entirely independent. Frank­
lin always intended that the United States would be inde-
7 
pendent, a point his critics often ignore. 
In Coy Hilton James's unpublished dissertation. Frank­
lin is presented as a commercial diplomat, but James realizes 
that his economic plan for the United States included ships 
from all countries, not only from France. One of the conse­
quences of American independence from England would be the 
exclusion of the United States from the British mercantile 
system. Therefore, she would have to establish her own trad­
ing enterprises. Franklin reasoned that a non-aggressive 
policy towards France was feasible, because he believed 
France realized that it was in the best interests of her 
^Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 134, 223. 
^Ibid., pp. 246, 180. 
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commerce that the United States break away from England. 
James's analysis of Franklin's diplomacy emphasizes the 
importance Franklin placed on winning the affection of the 
French people, and then the government. Still the most 
important guide to Franklin's attitude towards diplomacy 
was his dictum that,'", . . a virgin state should not go 
suitoring after alliances, but wait with a degree of dig-
g 
nity for the application of others.'" 
In contrast to earlier authors, Max Beloff's article, 
"Benjamin Franklin: International Statesman" (1955), pri­
marily considers Franklin's desire for imperial unity. 
Beloff perceives that Franklin sought a commercial policy 
equally beneficial to both the United States and Great 
Britain. Franklin then began to consider how the United 
States could take advantage of the desire of France and 
Spain to weaken the British Empire without falling into 
dependency upon Britain's enemies. Beloff's evaluation 
concludes that Franklin meant to achieve an early form of 
manifest destiny, since he believed it was the future of 
the United States to expand without any entangling alli-
9 
ances. 
Stourzh's thorough treatment of Franklin's diplomacy 
lessens the importance of the remarks of other historians. 
O 
James, "Revolutionary Career," pp. 62, 109, 68. 
q 
Max Beloff, "Benjamin Franklin: International States­
man," Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary 
and Philosophical Society. XCVII (1955-56), 16, TT, 30. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Beloff, "International Statesmano") 
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However, Julian P. Boyd's article on Silas Deane (1959) 
does comment briefly on Franklin's fitness for diplomacy. 
The diplomatic success of Franklin was commendable, because 
he was able to ignore the narrow suspicions of the Lees and 
Izard and transcend the charges of disloyalty. 
Page Smith, in his biography of John Adams (1962), 
discredits Franklin by calling him indolent. However, he 
maintains that Franklin's personality was ideal for a 
diplomat, because he had a style with which everyone could 
identify, while Adams in comparison seemed austere and 
self-righteous. 
Some historians commend Franklin's influence in forming 
the French-American treaties of 1778, while a few authors 
have criticized his self-interest and his general indiffer­
ence to their success. Franklin's autobiographical writings 
talk very little about the negotiating procedures. However, 
his tactic with Louis XVI was to emphasize America's sole 
reliance upon French power. Franklin states that the king's 
friendship for the United States was demonstrated through 
the fairness of the treaties, and France's refusal to claim 
12 
any special privileges in commerce with America. 
A question which arises from historical interpretations 
of Franklin's policy towards the French relates to his use 
of pressure tactics or pressure diplomacy in urging the 
lOBoyd, "Silas Deane," 228. 
^^Smith, Adams, I, p. 281. 
12 
Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical Writings, pp. 434-435. 
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French to negotiate a treaty. Samuel Flagg Bemis's "British 
Secret Service and the French-American Alliance" (1934) 
first introduces the concept that Franklin was willing to 
coerce France into the alliance with the United Stateso For 
instance, he made sure that Vergennes knew about his talks 
with Paul Wentworth, in order that the French foreign min-
13 
ister would fear American reconciliation with Britain, 
However, Bernard Fay indicates that Franklin was sympathetic 
with Vergennes's hesitency in making a formal agreement with 
the Americans. He briefly mentions that Franklin employed 
some pressure on Vergennes but does not explain if it was 
successful. Fay does not attempt to discredit Franklin's 
importance in dealing with Vergennes, as he emphasizes that 
the envoy had considerable influence over Vergennes. How­
ever, France entered the war not only for America's benefit 
but also to teach Britain a lesson and to gain "... only 
14 
a few commercial advantages." Franklin, too, considered 
his country's welfare as he appealed to the American people 
to support the cause of independence, thus showing potential 
European supporters that they were sincere in their efforts. 
In his book, Triumph of Freedom (1948), John C. Miller 
agrees with Bemis that Franklin was primarily concerned with 
securing the alliance and would resort to devious means to 
achieve it. When he found Vergennes hesitating, he purposely 
1 
Bemis, "British Secret Service," 489-490. 
^"^Fay, Apostle, pp. 443, 444-445. 
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spoke with Benjamin Vaughan in a Paris bathhouse, hoping 
to frighten Vergennes into believing that reconciliation 
with Britain was possible. He deliberately tried to make 
the French anxious by spreading the rumor that he would soon 
leave for England in the role of a peacemaker. Miller agrees 
that Franklin's tactics were successful, but he also praises 
France for demonstrating enlightened thought in agreeing to 
15 
the text of the treaty. 
Once again, Gerald Stourzh's analysis of Franklin's 
policy towards France is objective and informative. It 
was not Franklin alone who was responsible for the success­
ful negotiations of the treaties; rather a history of the 
French alliance indicates that her national interests, not 
personalities, decided the issue. However, Franklin's 
prestige served to influence public opinion in France to 
support Vergennes's policy. Franklin understood the French 
desire to re-establish their prestige, yet he cared more 
for the honor of the United States in Europe and was reluctant 
to beg for financial help.^^ 
According to Helen Auger's book. The Secret War of 
Independence (1954), both Franklin and Vergennes understood 
each other's motives. Vergennes wanted an alliance to weaken 
Britain rather than to emancipate the United States, and 
Franklin was willing to play the game of power politics in 
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 295, 301, 306. 
^^Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 253-254, 140, 
162. 
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17 
order to keep France as an ally. Therefore, they played 
a game of delicate manipulation to see where their interests 
could merge. The statement that no separate peace would he 
concluded was the point where their interests coincided, as 
France could relax from the fear of an Anglo-American recon­
ciliation, and the United States could receive much needed 
aid. 
Considering the possibility of Franklin's use of pres­
sure diplomacy, Max Beloff denies the entire concept, while 
James, Boyd and Roger Burlingame, Benjamin Franklin: Envoy 
Extraordinary (1967), agree that it was used with success. 
Beloff argues that Franklin's affection for France prevented 
18 
him from employing such tactics. James, Boyd and Burlingame 
point out that Franklin met with Wentworth in an effort to 
frighten France into thinking that Anglo-American reconcilia-
19 
tion was near. Burlingame considers Franklin's plan of 
meeting with Wentworth to intimidate France into supplying 
2 0  
aid as an adroit demonstration of diplomacy. 
Franklin's major critic, Cecil Currey, in Code #72, 
Ben Franklin: Patriot or Spy (1972), contends that Franklin 
went to Paris to satisfy personal motives. If the American 
cause succeeded, he would receive great acclaim for negotia-
l^Auger, Secret War, p. 150. 
l^Beloff, "International Statesman," 26-27. 
l^james, "Revolutionary Career," p. 117; see also Boyd, 
"Silas Deane," 329. 
20Roger Burlingame, Benjamin Franklin: Envoy Extra­
ordinary (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1967), pp. 146-
147 (Hereinafter referred to as Burlingame, Envoy.) 
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tions with France= I£ it failed, he would be safer in Paris 
than in the United States. Edmund Burke, a close friend of 
Franklin's during his previous residence in England, argued 
that Franklin would never end a long life with '"so foul and 
21 
dishonourable a fights'" Currey believes that Franklin's 
strongest attachments were with Great Britain, rather than 
with either France or the United States. 
While historians argue about Franklin's intentions in 
dealing with the French government, they generally agree 
that Franklin's relationship with the French people had a 
positive effect in securing the allianceo Hale indicates 
that the French generated their enthusiasm for the United 
2 2 
States because of Franklin's example in France. Accord­
ing to Corwin, Franklin could demand that terms of equality 
be incorporated into the treaty, because the French greatly 
23 
respected him. Auger's statement that the French were 
enthusiastic about Franklin to the point of hysteria seems 
a bit exaggerated, yet fits into the rather dramatic tone 
24 
of her book. Changing his analysis from his earlier 
article, Bemis concludes in The Diplomacy of the American 
Revolution (1935) that Franklin, rather than the commission, 
personified the Americian cause in 1777 , and that his flair 
\ 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 75-76, 78. 
^^Hale, Franklin, I, p« 69. 
23 
Corwin, French Policy, p. 93„ 
74 
Auger, Secret War, p. 148. 
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for public opinion made him the "American virtuoso" in 
25 
Paris. More recently, Claude Anne Lopez states that 
Franklin's arrival in France had a vital effect in stimulat­
ing the French war effort because of his favorable reception 
by French officials, as well as by influential members of 
2 6 
French society and the common man. 
Any agreement that historians arrived at concerning 
Franklin's favorable impression on the French ceases as 
they discuss his outside financial interests in relation 
to his commitment to his diplomatic duties. The main issue 
centers around Franklin's involvement in the Vandalia 
operation, which had been organized for large-scale specula­
tion in western lands. Stourzh denies that Franklin had 
any personal interest in western lands. Primarily, Franklin 
considered these lands as possessions of the United States, 
and did not mention them in his plan of confederation or the 
peace treaty. He deemed it inappropriate to speak about the 
27 
western lands as they were not his immediate concern. Al­
though Auger recognizes Franklin's connection with The Van­
dalia Company, she insists that during the Revolution, he 
was one of the few men without any private business inter-
^ 28 
ests. 
Julian P. Boyd and Richard B. Morris maintain that 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 48-49. 
26ciaude-Anne Lopez, Mon Cher Papa. Franklin and the 
Ladies of Paris (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1967), p. 13. (Hereafter referred to as Lopez, Mon Cher Papa.) 
^^stourzh. Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 204. 
28Auger, Secret War, p. 198. 
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Franklin retained his association with Vandalia during the 
Revolution, which Burlingame denies. According to Boyd, 
Franklin's statement withdrawing his name from the list o£ 
Vandalia associates was a mere formality, since he retained 
his shares in the company. Franklin hoped that "'when the 
troubles of America are over my posterity will reap the 
29 
benefits of them.'" Such involvement ran counter to pub­
lic policy and not only involved him but also Bancroft and 
Deane in correspondence with the enemy. Richard B. Morris 
agrees that Franklin created a conflict between public ser­
vice and private interest, by maintaining secret holdings 
in the Vandalia Company. However, he concludes that Frank­
lin's speculative interests seem not to have affected his 
30 
patriotism. Burlingame denies that Franklin indulged in 
any questionable financial activities while in France by 
pointing out that Franklin disapproved of the privateering 
war as it offered too many personal advantages for the com-
31 
missioners, 
Currey is unalterably convinced that Franklin was in­
volved in some form of commercial enterprise. Currey is 
inclined to make such accusations, and without any qualifi­
cations, he places Franklin in the midst of private financial 
operations, although he lacks evidence. Supposedly Franklin 
^^Boyd, "Silas Deane," 534-535. 
30 
Morris, Peacemakers, p. 249. 
31 
Burlingame, Envoy, p. 17 5. 
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utilized the eleven months before the treaty was ratified 
for commercial ventures of his own. In addition, Franklin 
received written information via Edward Bancroft from 
Thomas Walpole, the English banker, relating to Walpole's 
efforts to purchase shares of stock in the land enterprise 
from other men. Walpole also enclosed Franklin's share of 
the profits. Finally, he and Deane regularly purchased 
captured prizes at a low price, only to sell them at consid­
erable profit. 
Franklin's friendship with Silas Deane, a man whom 
many historians suspect of dishonest intentions in the 
Revolution, also raises questions as to his loyalty. In 
1782 Franklin finally qualified his support of Silas Deane, 
explaining to Deane that the respect held for him in the 
United States had diminished after the publication of his 
letters condemning the Revolution, It appeared to many 
Americans that Deane had abandoned his country's cause, as 
33 
Benedict Arnold had done. Hale's account of Franklin's 
career in France indicates that Franklin might have been 
made cognizant of Deane's commercial business with the French 
from Beaumarchais, Vergennes, or Deane himself, but probably 
deemed it none of his business. 
Although some historians implicate Deane, Fay, Auger 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 114-115, 144, 148. 
33 
Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical Writings, p. 513. 
34 
Hale, Franklin, I, p. 51. 
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and James state that Franklin readily defended Deane from 
Arthur Lee's charges, thereby risking the wrath of the Lee 
3 5 
family. Franklin and Deane found relief from Lee's ha­
ranguing by sending Lee on diplomatic missions to Spain and 
Prussia^ Auger sympathizes with this action and with Frank­
lin's defense of Deane. Although Deane might have been in­
volved in questionable financial transactions. Franklin 
missed him after his recall by Congress, since Adams and Lee 
were not helpful in running the commercial aspects of the war„ 
Also, James suggests that their compatibility during the mis­
sion in Paris induced Franklin to defend Deane against Arthur 
Lee.^^ 
In contrast to the preceding opinions, Boyd and Currey 
are most suspicious of the friendship between Franklin and 
Deane. Franklin was concerned with protecting his personal 
interests, and thus recommended that Congress settle its 
accounts with Deane, Remaining out of the controversy. 
Franklin managed to emerge as an impartial witness, while 
37 
Deane was accused of spying for the British. Currey 
criticizes historians who have dismissed the idea that 
Franklin knew of Deane's treachery. Franklin's virtual 
escape from historical condemnation further infuriates 
^ 38 
Currey. 
35Fay, Apostle, p. 443. 
36james, "Revolutionary Career," p. 41. 
37Boyd, "Silas Deane," 532. 
^^Currey, Code #72, p„ 142. 
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Franklin's acquaintance with men known to be associated 
with the British Secret Service arouses additional criti­
cisms about his conduct in Europe, His eminent biographer, 
Carl Van Doren, explains that Franklin trusted most men, 
39 
including Edward Bancroft» Miller agrees that Franklin 
and Deane implicitly trusted Bancroft, sharing secrets with 
him that they withheld from other American diplomats in 
40 
Europe, Auger does not indicate that Franklin and Bancroft 
enjoyed a particularly close relationship, and any associa­
tion was a result of a failing in Franklin's usually shrewd 
41 
analysis of character. Continuing the theme of Franklin's 
curious gullibility about the innate goodness of mankind, 
Burlingame hesitates to accuse Franklin of deliberately 
passing information to the British, although Franklin was 
exceedingly casual in his disregard of the warning that 
British spies surrounded him. His reply to the advice that 
he should be more cautious with his papers was that he had 
42 
nothing to hide. 
In contrast to authors who defend Franklin's involve­
ment with Bancroft as innocent. Van Alstyne and Currey dis­
close that he was aware of Bancroft's association with the 
British, Van Alstyne states that Eden, knowing of Bancroft's 
close friendship with Franklin and Deane, paid him to keep 
Van Doren, Franklin, p, 580, 
4 n 
Miller, Triumph, p, 283, 
41 
Auger, Secret War, p, 136. 
42 
Burlingame, Envoy, p, 141, 
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the British government informed about their activities„ 
According to Van Alstyne, Bancroft's importance has been 
exaggerated by historians, who have failed to observe that 
Stormont had no dealings with Bancroft since his sources 
43 
of intelligence were superior to those of Bancroft. 
This theory is quickly discounted by Currey who places 
Franklin in the center of the spy network. The only reason 
Bancroft even associated with Deane was because Bancroft 
realized that he would then be closer to Franklin. Frank­
lin accepted Bancroft's frequent travels across the channel, 
because he returned with information supposedly valuable to 
American efforts, although it happened to be false. Currey 
provides considerable detail regarding Franklin's associations 
with Bancroft, Deane, Carraichael, Captain Joseph Hynson, and Samuel 
Wharton. Currey absolves Franklin only on the charge that 
he carried on regular conversations with Wentworth, because 
it appeared that Franklin was adamant for independence when 
44 
he did talk with Wentworth. 
The man who has caused historians to argue about Frank­
lin's character was one of the original commissioners, Arthur 
Lee. Although Franklin rebutted the charges of secrecy and 
dishonesty that Lee made against him with the succinct reply 
45 
that he was responsibile only to the public and Congress, 
Lee was relentless in his campaign against Franklin. When-
43van Alstyne, Empire, p. 134, 
''^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 67, 88, 187. 
4 5 
Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, pp. 440-442. 
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ever Lee was in Paris, the commission was torn with strife, 
as he went about Paris "whispering whatever suspicion oc­
curred to him at the moment." Only when Lee was gone was 
46 
Franklin free from his intrigues, according to the Hales. 
Although the Lees have generally been considered as 
the instigators of the quarrels involving themselves. 
Franklin and Deane, some historians have defended their 
actions. Thomas Perkins Abernethy of the University of 
Virginia criticizes the historical practice of hero-worship 
that tends to discard evidence that Franklin was not alto­
gether upright in his actions. His short article, based 
upon the correspondence of the ministers and their associates, 
emphasizes that the argument between Deane and Franklin and 
the Lees arose, because the first two were intent on taking 
the privateering business out of the hands of the agents 
appointed by Congress and obtaining control of it for their 
own purposes. Thus Congress was deprived of a source of con­
siderable profit, which outraged Arthur Lee's pure sense of 
honesty. These historians who have condemned the Lees have 
used general accusations, while Abernethy feels that the 
evidence of Franklin's commercial activity and his concerted 
efforts to withhold records from public accounting is more 
47 
concrete. 
Other historians condemn Lee's tirades against Franklin 
and commend the latter's unusual calmness in coping with 
'^^Hale, Franklin, I, p. 140. 
^Abernethy, "Franklin-Lee Imbroglio," 52. 
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Lee's hysteria. Van Doren justifies Franklin's efforts to 
exclude the Virginian from the commission's confidence, be­
cause he knew that Lee's own secretary was a spy. Assur­
ances from Lord North that Franklin was not engaged in stock-
48 
jobbing failed to convince Lee that Franklin was an honor­
able person. Throughout Lee's verbal accusations, Franklin 
remained the master of the serenity which has come to 
personify his character. However, Franklin's calmness 
eventually became disturbed by Lee's activities, especially 
when he masterminded a plan to remove all the commissioners 
49 
but himself from Paris. 
Gf course, Currey sympathizes with Lee's efforts to 
again make the commission honest. Franklin angrily denied 
Lee's accusations, because he wanted to protect himself. 
His concern about the commission was only secondary. Currey 
adds that every time Lee left Paris, the two remaining com­
missioners virtually forgot about diplomacy. Whenever Lee 
returned. Franklin did his best to ignore him, and finally 
embarked upon a plan to discredit him by arranging to install 
the Britisher, John Thornton, as Lee's personal secretary and 
then openly proclaim Lee's insanity.^® 
Because of Lee's ambitious project to have Franklin as 
48 
Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, pp. 282, 
598-599. 
49 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 105; see also. 
Auger, Secret War, p. 217. 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 156, 191-192. 
92 
well as Deane recalled, the controversy that arose in Con­
gress must be mentioned. H. James Henderson's article on 
the recall of Franklin (1970) aptly illustrates the section­
alism o£ the country as demonstrated in Congress. Although 
some members o£ Congress felt a wholesale revamping of the 
diplomatic service was needed, any efforts in that direction 
only caused a battle over personal and sectional interests. 
Robert Morris felt that, in order that he might obtain one 
of the diplomatic posts in Europe, Franklin must be re­
called. Gerard was not adverse to this, as he would have 
been able to manipulate the ministers with greater ease.^^ 
Ultimately Franklin was able to maintain a neutral position 
in Congress which gained his reappointment. 
If Franklin anticipated that the congressional recall 
of Silas Deane would result in a replacement who would bring 
harmony among the commissioners, he was to be disappointed 
with the appointment of John Adams. Adams turned out to be 
another antagonist of Franklin's. In view of Adams's dis­
gust over Franklin's obvious enjoyment of French society, 
and his direct antagonism against Vergennes, some authors 
contend that Adams made it difficult to secure aid from the 
French. On the other hand, proponents of Adams's hard-line 
diplomacy applaud it as necessary in stabilizing the turbulent 
commission. Although Adams had no specific reason to be 
critical of Franklin, his Autobiography and Diary (1777-
^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 265-266= 
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1780) states that upon his arrival in Paris, he realized 
that he was destined to mediate between Franklin and Lee, 
5 2 
and that his voice would be the deciding opinion. Hale's 
primary sources reveal that Adams regarded Franklin as sus­
ceptible to flattery by the French, but Adams failed to gain 
respect on the commission by arguing with Vergennes over the 
American desire to seek aid from Holland and particularly 
over the currency issue. Briefly the dispute over currency 
involved a congressional decision to pay off a French loan 
according to the value of the United States money at the 
time the loan-office certificates were issued. To Vergennes, 
it appeared that Congress was reducing the two hundred million 
dollars which it owed to five million, which would mean a 
considerable loss to French creditors. Adams reacted 
strongly against Vergennes's accusation that Congress de­
preciated its paper money in order to finance the Revolution 
53 
and to avoid repaying the full amount due. Mutual distrust 
developed between Franklin and Adams, as Adams verbally fought 
with Vergennes over the currency problems, Adams's indiscreet 
and independent approach to Vergennes regarding currency 
54 
depreciation intensified Franklin's dislike of Adams, 
52 
L, H. Butterfield, ed, , Diary and Auto)3iography of John 
Adams, 1777-1780, (4 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press, 1961), IV, pp. 118-119. (Hereafter referred 
to as Butterfield, ed,, Diary and Autobiography,) 
53 
Smith, Adams, I, p. 475. 
^^Hale, Franklin, I. p, 380. 
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In his book, John Adams (1894), John T. Morse denies 
Franklin's charges that Adams interferred in the diplomacy 
with the French, especially with regards to the currency 
issue, which Franklin believed was his responsibility, Adams 
feared that Franklin was neglecting his duty by not estab­
lishing a basis for repayment of this Continental loan, and 
55 
Adams felt obligated to clarify the issue with VergenneSo 
Adams's desire for recognition motivated him to dis­
credit Franklin, who was regarded with high esteem in Paris 
Fay explains that Adams was irritated when he was relegated 
to a role subordinate to Franklin's, and thus he was impelled 
to believe the accusations which linked Franklin to British 
spies,W. P, Cresson, in Francis Dana, a Puritan Diplomat 
at the Court of Catherine the Great (1930) , quotes at length 
Adams's criticisms of Franklin. In Adams's mind Franklin had 
to be watched because in .French hands he was "'submission it-
57 
self. 
Van Doren and Miller agree that the two men were not 
compatible, but Van Doren insists that the antipathy between 
them did not exist until the peace negotiations began. He 
^^John T. Morse, Jr., John Adams (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin and Co., 1894), p, 182. (Hereinafter referr^ed.-tjo as 
Morse, Adams.) See also Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence. 
I, p. 508, where Adams states his objections to Franklin, 
^^Fay, Apostle, p, 442, 
57 
W, P. Cresson, Francis Dana, A Puritan Diplomat at 
the Court of Catherine the Great (New York: The Dial Press, 
1930) , p. 256. (Hereinafter r;.§f'erred to as Cresson, Puritan 
Diplomat.) 
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says that Adams respected Franklin and that Franklin recip­
rocated the feeling, although they disagreed fundamentally 
on how to deal with the French. By the time of the peace 
negotiations Adams had developed such an aversion to Franklin 
5 8 
that he supported John Jay without reserve. Miller ob­
serves, however, that Adams led the fight in Congress against 
commissioning Franklin to seek an alliance with France„ Upon 
his arrival in Paris, Adams was outraged at Franklin's in­
dulgence in frivolities. Adams's chief rival for the posi­
tion of "Number One Diplomat" was stealing the limelight 
despite Adams's efforts to lessen the French admiration for 
Franklin. Miller explains the irony in Adams's efforts to 
be recognized in history, as he seemed to be destined to be 
59 
mentioned as "also being present." Adams's accusations 
that Franklin was deceitful and received orders from Vergennes 
were exaggerated, according to Miller. 
There was a basic difference between Adams's blunt 
treatment of the French, which has been characterized as 
"shirtsleeves diplomacy," and Franklin's praise of France's 
generosity in negotiating the treaties. Thus, Stourzh ex­
plains that the disagreement between Franklin and Adams was 
over diplomatic tactics rather than basic policy. Although 
Adams criticized Franklin's "diplomacy of gratitude," at the 
conclusion of the peace negotiations, Adams agreed with 
Franklin that France's friendship was essential so long as 
^^Van Doren, Franklin, pp. 607, 667, 688-689. 
5Q 
Miller, Triumph, pp. 273, 358-359. 
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Britain held Canada.^® James agrees that both men viewed 
the present in terms of how it would affect the future. 
Page Smith, the talented biographer of John Adams, 
argues that Franklin enjoyed a life of dissipation in France 
while still receiving credit for his diplomatic accomplish­
ments. Adams's constant criticism of Franklin included 
assertions that Franklin intentionally promoted his own 
fame and was overly conciliatory in his attitude towards 
France. Although Adams suggested that Franklin be made the 
sole minister plenipotentiary, Smith regards him as a more 
profound student of diplomacy than Franklin in spite of the 
latter's experience. However, Adams generously acknowledged, 
at the end of the peace negotiations, that Franklin had con-
6 2 
tributed to their success. 
Basically Adams objected to Franklin's proclivity for 
indolence, as Morris and Van Alstyne agree, but they realize 
that Adams was tactless, which made working with him diffi­
cult. Morris maintains that Adams's treatment of Vergennes 
was too argumentative, whereas Franklin knew how to handle 
the French foreign minister. Morris indicates that Adams 
only gave credit to Franklin's efforts after the peace treaty 
was completed, and for him, this was "an enormous conces-
6 3 
sion." Van Alstyne is inclined to defend Franklin against 
^^Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 153, 183. 
61 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p. 62. 
^^Smith, Adams, I, pp. 377-381, 479, 523, 548. 
fl >7 
Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 196, 380. 
97 
Adams's criticism of his conduct in French society and in 
the circle o£ statesmen. Adams admitted that the French 
had no confidence in him, and Van Alstyne states that Adams 
had been offensive in his "indiscreet speeches," Adams's 
blunt policy led Franklin to refer to him as a "'mischievous 
madman,'" intent on forcing apart the Franco-American alli­
ance upon which the United States depended and in which 
64 
Franklin believed. 
The most adamant critic of Franklin is Cecil B, Currey, 
who supports Adams's negative comments about the venerable 
diplomat. Of course, Adams regretted the diplomatic dispute 
which had arisen out of Franklin's alleged duplicity, and 
Adams had the courage to try to control the wily doctor. Ac­
cording to Currey, Franklin demonstrated his consistent oppo­
sition to alliances and friendships with European countries 
in his attempts to block Adams's diplomatic trip to Holland. 
Fortunately for the peace effort. Franklin's relationship 
with John Jay was much less tempestuous. They were in accord 
about the goals of Jay's mission to Spain and of the peace 
negotiations, although Jay was skeptical of the French role 
in the peace talks. They reached an agreement on separate 
negotiations, which allowed the talks to procede harmoniously. 
Also, according to Franklin, Frank Monaghan, Jay's biographer, 
and Richard B. Morris, they decided that any concessions to 
the Spanish concerning navigation on the Mississippi River 
6'^Van Alstyne, Empire, pp. 380, 164, 228. 
^^Currey, Code #72, pp. 217, 235. 
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were inadvisableo 
Roger Burlingame, Richard W. Van Alstyne and Cecil 
Currey indicate, however, that there was disagreement be­
tween Franklin and Jay after Jay arrived in Paris and the 
informal peace negotiations began. Jay disapproved of 
Franklin's informal conversations with the temporary peace 
commissioners from Britain, In,addition, Jay suspected that 
a secret agreement between France and Spain had been rati­
fied, and he began to press Franklin to cease including 
France in the peace discussion, a prospect that horrified 
6 7 
Franklin. Since Jay and Adams were close friends. Van 
Alstyne states that they regarded themselves as having per­
formed a rescue operation for the United States against 
French wiles and Franklin's pliancy.Currey commends 
Jay's independence and foresight in urging negotiations 
independently of France, despite Franklj.n's efforts to per­
suade Jay that France and Spain had not collaborated on a 
secret agreement. He intimates that Jay was reluctant to 
compliment Franklin's service in Paris. Currey points out 
that when Franklin requested that Jay write a letter to Con­
gress supporting him, Jay's commendation was reserved at best 
66van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, p, 483; 
Frank Monaghan, John Jay [New York and Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), p. 186. (Hereinafter referred 
to as Monaghan, Jay); Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 245-246, 
343. 
7 
Burlingame, Envoy, pp, 191-192, 
6 R 
Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 214, 
^^Currey, Code #72. pp, 253, 259, 
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The last controversial activity engaged in by Franklin 
in Paris involves his efforts in the peace negotiations. 
Questions arise concerning his commitment to independence 
in contrast to his desire for reconciliation with Britain. 
Moreover, historians debate Franklin's actions regarding 
the congressional instructions which stipulated that France 
must be included in the proceedings, and his agreement with 
Adams and Jay to exclude the French. Franklin personally 
believed that a sincere reconciliation would be more bene­
ficial than mere peace, because it would indicate that there 
was a mutual good will between the United States and England. 
When he began to negotiate officially with England, his per­
sonal comments show his resolve to abide by the congressional 
instructions stipulating that France be included in the 
peace talks, as he was positive that Spain, Holland and 
70 
France would not negotiate separately. In his interpreta­
tion of Franklin's attitude towards reconciliation, Hale 
explains that Franklin assured Vergennes that he had re­
jected Hartley's proposal for reconciliation. Furthermore, 
he told Vergennes that he would avoid future interviews 
with Hartley in order that no breach might occur in the 
7 1 
Franco-American alliance. In Fay's opinion. Franklin's 
commitment to peace and independence was so strong that 
Franklin was able to receive British envoys in the name of 
peace, and still maintain his position that no Loyalist in 
^^Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, pp. 521, 
582. 
^^Hale, Franklin, I, p. 224; II, p. 50. 
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7 2 
the United States would ever benefit from her victory, 
Fianklin's primary consideration was American indepen­
dence, according to Frank Monaghan, Samuel Flagg Bemis, 
Arthur B. Darling (Our Rising Empire, 1763-1805, 1940), and 
Carl Van Doren, However, their views differ in discussing 
Franklin's opinion of the French alliance. His "necessary 
and advisable articles" in 1782 indicate that reconcilia­
tion was not a part of his plan for the United States, At 
the same time, Franklin distinctly stated that once indepen­
dence was granted, , . the Franco-American treaty was at 
73 
an end.'" Bemis commends the entire commission for break­
ing away from rigid congressional instructions and taking 
74 
advantage of European quarrels to make a successful treaty. 
Darling disagrees that Franklin intended to forget the French 
alliance, since Franklin rebuffed Hartley's proposal of a 
separate treaty, because no man in America would desert a 
"generous friend" for the sake of a truce with the enemy. 
However, Darling continues by explaining that Vergennes had 
no objection to separate negotiations, although he had no 
intention of supporting the land claims of the United States, 
since France recognized that it would make America more 
cautious if she knew Spain still held land adjacent to the 
new nation. Darling observes that Franklin never seems to 
have recognized Vergennes's intentions to impede the negotia-
72Fay, Apostle, pp. 475-477, 
^^Monaghan, Jay, p. 192. 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 255. 
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tions, or i£ he did, he did not deem his motives harmful. 
Franklin genuinely believed that French interest in American 
7 5 
independence lay at the heart o£ French policy. Van Doren 
agrees that Franklin was committed to independence. More­
over, Franklin understood that there was a certain amount o£ 
bartering over agreeable settlements going on among the three 
countries, so he went to Richard Oswald to use Canada as a 
bargaining point. According to Van Doren, Franklin regarded 
the cession o£ Canada as necessary to obtain a durable peace, 
and Franklin also reiterated that he would talk about nothing 
seriously until England empowered her agents to go beyond 
, - . . 76 
preliminaries. 
Miller, Auger and Stourzh agree that Franklin's pri­
mary consideration was obtaining independence £or the United 
States, Despite the rigid congressional instructions that 
the American commissioners were not to make a separate peace. 
Franklin violated these instructions, indicating a willing­
ness to conduct peace talks in secret. The British were 
hopeful that he would then be willing to go all the way and 
make a separate peace. That Franklin would have jeopardized 
77 
the French alliance is extremely unlikely, however. Auger 
emphasizes that Franklin distrusted British motives when they 
^^Arthur Burr Darling, Our Rising Empire, 1765-1801 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940) , pp. 46-47, 66, 
89. (Hereinafter referred to as Darling, Rising Empire.) 
7 
Van Doren, Franklin, pp. 673, 368. 
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 632-634, 
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offered him free passage to Britain to discuss a settlemento 
Because he held to his plan of independence. Auger claims 
that the peace treaty was a major accomplishment for revolu-
7 8 
tionary America and the future of the nation. According 
to Stourzh, Franklin's constant assurances of good will and 
his wishes for peace have occasioned an erroneous interpreta­
tion of his desire for peace with Great Britain. Actually, 
he was referring to the general happiness of mankind, while 
the British assumed he meant reconciliation with Great 
79 
Britain. 
Morris states that Franklin's decision to approach the 
peace negotiations independently of France proved that he 
realized the need to present a solid front to the British 
negotiators for the sake of independence, and thus he joined 
in supporting his two colleagues in negotiating without the 
French. Morris continues that Franklin played upon the divi­
sions between Oswald and Thomas- Grenville, hoping that Shel-
burne would send Oswald back to Paris, since his moderation 
and sound judgment appealed to Franklin. In addition, the 
demand for Canada was only a technique Franklin employed to 
bring England around to his way of thinking on other aspects 
of the negotiations, and he never realistically thought the 
United States could obtain Canada. After the negotiations 
were completed, Franklin defended the failure of the commis­
sioners to include France, assuring Vergennes that none of 
78 
Auger, Secret War, p. 340. 
79 
Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 187. 
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8 0 
the peace articles was detrimental to France. He managed 
to retain Vergennes's support o£ the United States by ask­
ing Vergennes if he would give the British the satisfaction 
of knowing that they had broken the Franco-American alliance. 
Van Alstyne credits Franklin with being the first to violate 
openly the congressional instructions of maintaining confi­
dence in France. He goes further, saying that separate 
negotiations were agreeable to Vergennes, who was trying to 
extricate himself from pursuing both American interests and 
81 
Spanish desires in America and Gibraltar. 
Concluding the discussion of Franklin and the peace 
8 2 
treaty, Currey intimates that Franklin worked against it. 
But Currey needs factual evidence to verify his allegations, 
which are conspicuously undocumented throughout his book. 
In writing about Benjamin Franklin, historians have had 
access to his personal papers and correspondence, but the 
context in which this information is applied provides vary­
ing interpretations which make a historiographical discussion 
of these books possible. Those authors who focus on Frank­
lin's career tend to present a more favorable impression of 
his diplomatic career than those who include the many aspects 
and complications of diplomacy in Europe and discuss the 
methods by which the American commissioners, individually 
^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 357, 276, 384. 
81 
Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 216. 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 256. 
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and collectively, approached the problems o£ negotiating 
for recognition and alliances in Europe. To illustrate 
this comparison, Bernard Fay, Carl Van Doren, Gerald Stourzh 
and Roger Burlingame praise Franklin's insight and tact in 
his diplomacy. Bernard Fay is useful because of his exten­
sive use of French sources dealing with Franklin and his 
activities and associations in Paris. In addition, his 
French interpretation of American sources, especially Frank­
lin's personal papers, serves to emphasize the twentieth-
century viewpoint that Benjamin Franklin was vital to the 
success of American diplomacy in Europe. From the evidence 
offered through Franklin's autobiography, writings, and 
correspondence. Van Doren obviously believes that Franklin 
directed the success of the American commission in Europe. 
However, he does not limit his investigation only to Frank­
lin's writings, as he includes English manuscript sources 
and monographs that deal with Franklin and life in America 
and Europe. This biography of Franklin is valuable for the 
insight it gives to the development of Franklin's career and 
philosophy, as well as for the information it furnishes about 
life in eighteenth-century America and Franklin's adaptation 
to the Parisian life-style. Gerald Stourzh's study about 
Franklin and his foreign policy also relies heavily on Frank­
lin's personal writings and correspondence, but combines them 
with some European manuscripts and numerous monographs and 
articles dealing with Franklin's philosophy as it related to 
his foreign policy. Not only is this book necessary for an 
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understanding of Franklin's foreign policy, but it also pro­
vides useful comments about other secondary material written 
about Franklin as Stourzh compares his own interpretations 
to those of other historians. In comparison to the preceding 
authors, Roger Burlingame's more recent book on Franklin's 
years in Europe is more elementary in its approach. However, 
he provides a bibliography for each chapter which indicates 
that his scholarship is commendable. His major sources of 
information are the volumes on Franklin edited by Smyth, in 
addition to English and American revolutionary correspondenceo 
The last chapter of Burlingame's book is a superficial analy­
sis of Franklin in relationship to the United States in the 
1960s, which only serves to weaken his somewhat interesting 
investigation of Franklin's European career. 
Cecil Currey expends much effort in finding minute flaws 
in Franklin's diplomatic career and then expanding them into 
crimes of the highest magnitude, and one finds it difficult 
to believe that he has read the same sources as Stourzh and 
Van Doren. Although some recent historians believe that 
Currey's work is a necessary addition to provide historical 
perspective about Franklin, it does seem that Currey could 
have exercised better judgment than to base his hypotheses 
upon nebulous conjecture. 
Naturally, those authors whose topics circumscribe the 
larger issue of the entire Revolution are unable to deal in 
specifics like those who concentrate on Franklin alone. How­
ever, Bemis, Miller and Darling ably discuss the important 
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aspects o£ Franklin's career in Europe. Once again, Bemis 
represents the transition to modern historical writing in 
his study of the beginning of American diplomatic history. 
Although most of his documentation is from official govern­
mental transcripts from the United States and Europe, he 
also uses the personal papers of Franklin. He claims the 
best biography on Franklin up to the date of publication of 
his book is Fay's 1929 biography, and that is the only 
secondary source he uses in speaking of Franklin. 
Arthur Darling's first chapters deal with the diplo­
matic activities of Jay and Franklin in Europe and their 
efforts on the peace commission. He includes primary 
sources such as the journals from the Continental Congress, 
Wharton's and Franklin's papers. His explanation of Frank­
lin's efforts in Europe is useful. However, he obviously 
believes that John Jay was more crucial to the negotiations 
for a fair peace, so the section on Jay is more extensive. 
John C. Miller's bibliography includes such an extensive 
listing of manuscript sources, memoirs and letters, histori­
cal collections, newspapers, monographs, and biographies 
that it would be impossible to mention them all. His use 
of Franklin's manuscripts from the American Philosophical 
Society constitute his major source on Franklin, which is 
supplemented by Van Doren's biography and numerous other 
primary sources from England and the United States. This 
book is an informed study of the men and events of the 
Revolution, internationally as well as nationally. 
107 
Richard Van Alstyne's short monograph concentrates more 
on the events of the Revolution, yet he does not ignore the 
men o£ importance in the diplomatic area. From Franklin's 
letters, personal papers and writings and numerous official 
reports and personal papers from England and France, Van 
Alstyne compiles an informative study that deals with Frank­
lin's work in Europe and other selected aspects of diplomacy» 
Other authors who contribute interpretations of American 
diplomacy and Franklin's participation in this phase of the 
American Revolution include James, Corwin, Morse, Cresson, 
Monaghan, and Smith. James's unpublished dissertation on 
Silas Deane uses extensively memoirs and personal papers of 
revolutionary leaders, including those of Franklin. He 
also has included biographies and other secondary sources, 
some of which are especially useful in dealing with Frank­
lin, his association with Deane and Lee, and his contribu­
tions to diplomacy. Corwin's rather old but reliable book 
on French policy towards the American alliance relies mainly 
upon Doniol. Bemis commends this book as invaluable to his 
study of American diplomacy. It is easy to dismiss Morse's 
biography as of little historical value because of his com­
plete lack of documentation and obvious prejudice in favor 
of John Adams. However, as a source of reference for Adams's 
career and his relations with the men on the American commis­
sion, it must be mentioned in a historiographical study. 
Cresson and Monaghan have written about figures in revolu­
tionary diplomacy. Their use of collections of personal 
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papers and correspondence from the men on the commission in 
Paris enabled them to write biographies that are useful in 
studying Franklin's role in diplomacy. Smith concentrates 
his investigation on John Adams by using his personal papers 
and only briefly mentions Franklin, Finally, Hale's two 
volumes on Franklin, based entirely upon primary material, 
present insights into Franklin's public and private life 
in Paris. 
The articles from periodicals relating to Franklin and 
his career in Europe are informative. Felix Gilbert's 
treatment of diplomacy in the eighteenth century is unique 
because of his sources. He combines extensive use of French 
works on political philosophy with primary material taken 
from the journals of Adams and Lee, as well as autobiogra­
phies of revolutionary leaders like Franklin. Max Beloff 
utilizes mainly the secondary sources by Stourzh, Bemis and 
Darling but does not ignore Franklin's papers or his corre­
spondence, This article is very similar in viewpoint to 
Stourzh and Darling, and also attempts to compare the chal­
lenges facing Franklin in eighteenth-century diplomacy with 
those of twentieth-century diplomacy. Abernethy deviates 
from the traditionally laudatory approach to Franklin's 
activities in Paris, and emphasizes Lee's charges that Frank­
lin and Deane conspired to take advantage of their positions 
in Paris for their own financial betterment. However, he 
states that historians have ignored evidence that implicates 
Franklin which he found investigating the papers of Deane, 
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Franklin and Lee. This unusual interpretation must be 
considered in a study of Franklin's diplomatic career» 
Julian P. Boyd's articles concentrating upon Silas Deane 
include his relationship with Franklin. Therefore, with 
characteristic scholarship, Boyd includes in his list of 
primary sources the papers and correspondence of Franklin, 
Historians have debated the issues which have been 
discussed in this chapter. Although many times they are 
in agreement, there are points of conflict among their in­
terpretations of historical data. Franklin's opposition 
to militia diplomacy is an accepted concept. However, the 
idea that he intended diplomacy to be based upon commerce 
is supported by Gilbert, Stourzh and James. Stourzh es­
pecially emphasizes that Franklin based his concept of 
commercial diplomacy upon the hope that the United States 
would always remain independent. Some authors maintain 
that Franklin believed an alliance with France was so impor­
tant that he resorted to pressure tactics to persuade 
Vergennes that reconciliation with England was possible if 
France refused to give the United States formal support, 
Bemis, Miller, James, Boyd and Burlingame all agree that 
"pressure diplomacy" was part of Franklin's plan for secur­
ing the alliance. However, Beloff and Fay agree that per­
haps the motivating force in the French agreement to an 
alliance with the United States was her desire to subvert 
England's power in Europe. Stourzh basically agrees that 
the French desire to reestablish her prestige, not the 
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activity of individuals, motivated her to conclude an agree­
ment with the United States, 
Franklin's activities in Europe possibly extended 
beyond the realm of official diplomacy. According to 
Currey and Morris, his interest in personal financial gain 
created a conflict with his official duties. On the other 
hand, Stourzh, Auger and Burlingame deny that he engaged in 
any outside financial affiliations detrimental to the alli­
ance , 
Because of Franklin's financial interests, his friend­
ship with Silas Deane and associations with the British in 
Paris, Arthur and William Lee engaged in a plot to discredit 
Franklin as well as Deane, Fay, Auger, James, Hale, and 
Franklin himself, agree that he was fully aware of Deane's 
faults but wished to protect Deane from Lee's venomous in­
vectives and efforts to have him recalled. Van Doren, Auger 
and Burlingame agree that Franklin trusted the goodness of 
mankind which was the major reason for his failure to recog­
nize Bancroft's evil motives. Van Alstyne claims that Ban­
croft's role in American revolutionary diplomacy has been 
exaggerated. But Currey and Abernethy point out that there 
is a basis for Lee's suspicions of Franklin, Abernethy's 
less dramatic account of the disagreement between Franklin 
and Lee emphasizes that he intends to defend Lee against the 
many historical criticisms of his career in Europe rather 
than to persecute Franklin. 
Franklin's association with the other two peace com­
Ill 
missioners, especially with John Adams, is another area of 
Franklin's career in Paris which historians discuss. Miller, 
Morris and Van Alstyne agree that Adams was unalterably 
jealous of Franklin's superior reception and position in 
Pariso Then Smith and Currey agree to some extent that 
Franklin and Adams were in opposition to each other because 
Adams feared that Franklin opposed any alliances with Euro­
pean countries which would further separate America from 
England. Except for Burlingame and Van Alstyne, historians 
generally agree that Jay and Franklin were compatible, 
Burlingame and Van Alstyne state that Jay was more willing 
to negotiate for peace without French assistance than was 
Franklin. 
With regard to the peace commission, most historians 
agree that Franklin's first consideration was American inde­
pendence. Darling, Bemis and Miller explain that Franklin's 
eventual willingness to negotiate separately with Great 
Britain indicate his dedication to independence, Morris 
studies the peace negotiations extensively and concludes 
that Franklin's efforts, along with those of Adams and Jay, 
were unjustly condemned by Congress which tried to appease 
France's anger over the separate treaty, Stourzh explains 
that some historians have mistakenly construed Franklin's 
determination for peace as a desire for reconciliation with 
England, 
Franklin's diplomatic career involves criticism and 
praise for his efforts in Europe. His activity in Paris 
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is worthy o£ thorough investigation in the study of the 
development of American diplomacy. Although there are 
controversies involving his career as a diplomat, they 
do not seriously detract from his significance in American 
revolutionary diplomacy. 
CHAPTER V 
THE DIPLOMACY OF JOHN ADAMS IN EUROPE 
The Adams family includes some of the most prominent 
and revered names in American history, and John Adams, as 
one of the major figures in the American Revolution, has 
been discussed extensively by historians. This chapter 
will investigate his diplomatic career during the Revolu­
tion, which included two trips to Europe. During the first 
he unsuccessfully negotiated with Vergennes for approval of 
a British-American trade agreement. Later he returned to 
negotiate a successful treaty with Holland and participated 
in the American peace negotiations with England along with 
Benjamin Franklin and John Jay. According to some histo­
rians, many of Adams's problems in Europe stemmed from his 
suspicions and his contentious approach to European offic­
ials. Other historians disagree with this criticism and 
praise his unwavering devotion to independence, regardless 
of how much it irritated European governments. Adams did 
not escape the unfortunate fight between Deane and Arthur 
Lee. Some historians argue that the Lee clan influenced 
him to support its side of the imbroglio, while other 
authors explain that Adams attempted to maintain his neu­
trality by refusing to enter into any of the investigations 
conducted against Deane. In addition, his relationship 
113 
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with the French foreign minister, Vergennes, was far from 
harmonious, and historians debate if his obstinancy in re­
fusing to follow Vergennes's advice about negotiating com­
mercial treaties with England and Holland was detrimental 
to Franco-American relations. The difficulties Adams 
encountered in Holland while negotiating for an alliance 
causes some authors to question Adams's fitness for diplo­
macy, while others defend his tenacity in surmounting the 
endless delays of the Dutch government and achieving a com-
merical treaty beneficial to the United States, Adams's 
hostility towards Benjamin Franklin hindered the progress 
of the peace negotiations, according to some historians, 
Adams disagreed with Franklin's insistence that France be 
included in all the peace negotiations. He believed that 
Franklin's enjoyment of Parisian society and his affable 
relations with Vergennes proved his preference for the 
French over the United States. The varying interpretations 
of historians continue to make John Adams a controversial 
character in American diplomatic history. 
One of Adams's principal supporters, John T, Morse, re 
gards Adams as a competent diplomatic representative of the 
United States, Although Morse acknowledges in his book-
length essay on John Adams (1899) that Adams was outspoken 
and incapable of concealing his dislike for certain people, 
he considers him to have been the right man in the right 
place. In comparison to Adams, Franklin was less capable 
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in the field of diplomacy.^ Since historical documentation 
is lacking in Morse's book, his personal prejudice for Adams 
is obvious. 
Frank Monaghan, John Jay's biographer (1935), disagrees 
with Morse's support of Adams, and John C, Miller questions 
Adams's ability as a diplomat. Monaghan discusses Adams's 
patriotism but feels that his extreme devotion to the United 
States did not enhance his competency as an agent in Paris 
and adds that . .he was the complete egotist who sus­
pected himself to be a universal genius," With his strict 
view of American isolationism, he divided the world into 
Americans and foreigners. Miller wonders how he could 
have exerted any significant influence in Europe, since 
he never lost the haughtiness and contentiousness which 
3 
continually offended people. 
Clinton Ross iter and Bernard Bailyn explain Adams's 
rather untraditional attitudes in Europe, while Richard B, 
Morris declines to criticize his unusual character traits. 
Rossiter's article, "The Legacy of John Adams" (1957), is 
an analysis of Adams's personality, including both positive 
^Morse, Adams. pp. 165-166, 168. See Collections of 
the Massachusetts Historical Society. Warren Papers (7 0 
volumes, Boston: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1878), 
I V ,  p o  2 4 0 0  A d a m s  w a s  m i s p l a c e d  i n  t h e  F r e n c h  C o u r t  b e ­
cause of his plain habits and unpolished manners, (Herein­
after referred to as Warren Papers.) 
2 
Monaghan, Jayg p, 170. 
^Miller, Triumph, pp. 573-574, 
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and negative character traits. The core of Adams's politi­
cal thought was an austere view o£ the nature o£ mankind, 
compounded by skepticism, distrust, pity and charityo How­
ever, he was not overbearing or conceited, but rather suf­
fered from a lively sense of persecution which developed 
into a penchant for self-debasement, Franklin once said 
of him, o o always an honest man, often a wise one, 
but sometimes, in some things, absolutely out of his 
senses,"' If he deprecated himself, he compensated for 
this by maintaining courage and independence from outside 
influences in double portion,^ 
Rossiter's more understanding view of Adams's nature 
influences opinions expressed in later studies on Adams, 
Bernard Bailyn's short article on "Butterfield's Adams" 
(1962) also emphasizes Adams's insecurity. Adams never 
overcame his sensitivity to slights and ridicule, and his 
distrust of others was demonstrated by his suspicion that 
Franklin had hired a secretary to spy on him„^ Even Morris, 
who is enthusiastic about Franklin's role in diplomacy, 
seems almost sympathetic towards Adams's very touchy nature 
which, Morris says, resulted in inconsistency and an in­
ability to ever make up his mind,^ 
^Clinton Rossiter, "The Legacy of John Adams," The Yale 
Review, XLVI (June, 1957), 534. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Rossiter, "Legacy,") 
^Bernard Bailyn, "Butterfield's Adams: Notes for a 
Sketch." William and Mary Quarterly. IX (April, 1962), 252, 
(Hereinafter^referred to as Bailyn, "Butterf ield' s Adams ,") 
^Morris, Peacemakers. p, 207, See his example about 
Adams first wanting to go to Vienna, then noting its im­
propriety, then suggesting that he go. 
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This New England diplomat began his career in Paris, 
because Silas Deane had been recalled to America, Just how 
much Adams sympathized with the Lee family, with whom his 
n a m e  h a s  b e e n  u n a l t e r a b l y  l i n k e d ,  h a s  r e c e i v e d  v a r y i n g  d e ­
grees of affirmation and denial. His own account of the 
recall in his Diary and Autobiography agrees that Deane 
had spent sums of money which had remained unaccounted for, 
and had authorized contracts which had almost ruined the 
military and thoroughly embarrassed Congress, Because he 
believed that Deane and Franklin had been reluctant to 
supply information that might have cleared up questions 
about the accounts, he wrote to Samuel Adams that the min­
isters were living too high at the expense of the country 
7 
and perhaps one minister would be sufficient, Adams does 
not mention that he urged that Franklin be appointed the 
sole minister in Paris, 
According to Coy James and Page Smith, Adams refused 
to become involved in the Deane-Lee imbroglio. In a letter 
written in 1778, Adams explained that he had never concealed 
his sentiments against men whom he had opposed in public 
life, but that Deane . , is not and never was a man of 
enough importance to make me deviate from a rule I have ob­
served all my life, when obliged to be a Man's Enemy, to be 
8 
open and generously so,'" Page Smith's biography of Adams 
7 
Butterfield, ed,, Diary and Autobiography, pp, 88, 
106-108„ 
g 
James, "Revolutionary Career," p, 136, 
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(1962) substantiates the view that Adams did not want to 
become involved in the controversy and refused to investi­
gate Deane himself. However, he definitely sympathized 
with Arthur Lee's accusation that Deane conducted a per­
sonal business enterprise while in Paris, Smith commends 
Adams's initiative to proceed with the negotiations and 
g  
overlook the Deane~Lee feud. 
Evidence that Adams remained free of the feud and its 
implications is provided by James Henderson's article 
on the recall of Benjamin Franklin (1970). The congres­
sional investigation of the activities of the Paris com­
mission implicated all the envoys except Adams. 
Hale, Bemis and Miller deny the suggestion that Adams 
adamantly opposed any alliances with European countries. 
Hale argues that Adams preferred strictly commercial treaties 
with no political or military clauses.Bemis mentions 
Adams's sympathy towards the alliance, stating that both 
he and Franklin agreed that alliances would facilitate in-
12 
dependence as well as trade with all nations. Miller 
traces Adams's changing attitude towards the French alliance 
from his fight against the congressional commission instruct­
ing Franklin to make an alliance with France to his later 
Q 
Smith, Adams, I, pp= 381, 376o 
^^Henderson, "Congressional Factionalism," 258„ 
^^Hale, Franklin, I, p. 179o 
12 
Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 36, 
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declaration that it was "'a Rock upon which we may safely 
build,'" Regardless of his support of the French alliance, 
he strongly opposed any French interference in the internal 
13 
affairs of the United States, 
One of the best analyses of Adams's sentiments towards 
the French alliance is Felix Gilbert's article on "The New 
Diplomacy of the 18th Century" (1951), Its second section 
deals with American diplomacy, and Gilbert utilizes journals, 
diaries and autobiographies to substantiate his interpreta­
tions, From these sources and secondary studies on American 
isolationism and foreign policy, Gilbert explains that Adams 
did not oppose the French alliance but rather wanted to 
avoid all obligations and temptations to take part in future 
European wars, Adams considered the only common interest 
the United States and Europe would share would be in the 
realm of commerce, Adams's step-by-step outline as to what 
an alliance should entail never implied a political bond. 
After Adams returned from The Hague, he was more convinced 
of the validity of establishing commercial relations with 
Europe, because peace was only a "delusive dream, 
According to William Stinchcombe in The American Revolu­
tion and the French Alliance (1969), John Adams intended to 
"strengthen independence" with the model treaty he drafted 
^^Miller, Triumph, pp, 381, 575, 
^^Felix Gilbert, "The New Diplomacy of the 18th Cen­
tury," World Politics, IV (October, 1951), 19, 24, 30, 
(Hereinafter referred to as Gilbert, "New Diplomacy,") 
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in 1776o This formed the basis for the instructions to 
the newly appointed commissioners to France, At this time, 
the questions of commerce and trade relations were secon-
Although most historians agree that Adams anticipated 
that the United States would benefit from the alliance, 
his personal relationship with Vergennes arouses much more 
controversy. Historians generally acknowledge that he was 
basically unable to get along with the foreign minister, 
but exactly who was responsible for the disagreements be­
tween them remains a controversial and unanswered question, 
Adams believed the arguments began when Vergennes imperti­
nently refused to discuss the possibility of Adams's negot­
iating a treaty of commerce with England similar to that 
concluded with France until Gerard arrived with Adams's 
instructions from Philadelphia.^^ Adams was offended by 
this insult to his authority and also concluded that Ver­
gennes planned to extend the war to achieve a French advan­
tage in the final settlement, Adams resolved to do his best 
to cooperate with Vergennes as he submitted to Vergennes his 
official instructions, although he informed Vergennes that 
this was not a particularly satisfactory solution to the 
17 
issue. In the collection of personal letters between John 
^^Stinchcombe, French Alliance, p, 8, 
dary ones to Adams. 
^^Butterfield, ed., 
244-245, See also Hale, 
1 7 
' *0* « ^ ^ ^ "J ^ Ji Butterfield, ed,. Diary and Autobiography, IV, p, 253, 
Diary and Autobiography. IV, pp 
FranklilT] I, p. 3/9 , 
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Adams and Mercy Warren, Adams argues that Vergennes attempted 
to deny Adams's authority, because he had discovered that 
Vergennes was not entirely honorable in his intentions to-
18 
wards America„ Morse explains Adams's justification for 
his dislike of Vergennes„ Vergennes dreaded and would at­
tempt to prevent any commercial relationships between the 
United States and Great Britain. In addition, he desired 
control over the peace negotiations in order that France 
might first secure her interests, Morse is obviously sym­
pathetic with Adams's anger towards Vergennes, and he makes 
only a minimal attempt to conceal his bias in favor of 
Adams. 
In contrast to Morse's defense of Adams's attitude 
towards Vergennes, E, S. Corwin and W, P, Cresson criti­
cize Adams's suspicions of Vergennes, which were exaggerated 
by his blunt and tactless diplomacy. In Corwin's book, 
French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778 (1916), he 
believes that Adams was true to his obstinate form in refus­
ing to consider Vergennes's simile that appealing for a com­
mercial treaty with England was like , furnishing a 
house before the foundation is laid,'" With an amazing 
lack of tact, Adams pressed the French government by refer­
ring to an English circular which blamed France for intending 
to exhaust the , . strength and resources of this country 
[England] and of depressing the rising power of America,'" 
1 O 
Warren Papers, p, 414, 
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Corwin enumerates Adams's offenses against Vergennes^, but 
Vergennes's toleration ended when Adams accused the French 
king of abandoning the United States» Finally, Vergennes 
bluntly announced that he would limit his negotiations to 
19 
Franklin, Wo P„ Cresson assumes in his book, Francis 
Dana; A Puritan Diplomat at the Court of Catherine the Great 
(1930), that had Adams been the sole minister in France, he 
could have easily broken up the alliance, Adams believed 
the United States was dangerously close to becoming a French 
protectorate and was determined to place America's interests 
first. However, Cresson does not claim that Adams's declara­
tions signified total devotion to his country, but instead 
suspects him of thinking that his close connection with Con­
gress placed him in a superior and supervisory position on 
the commission., Adams also exercised "tactless diplomacy" 
as he insisted on talking to the British Ministry, ignoring 
20 
Vergennes's advice that this was not the proper time„ 
John Adams's irascible temper did nothing to ingratiate 
himself with Vergennes, but Bemis argues that Adams deserves 
better treatment from historians than they have been willing 
to give himo Vergennes associated Adams with the members of 
Congress who opposed the principles of the French alliance 
and who were eager to undertake separate negotiations with 
Englando Adams's insistence that he should at least give 
1 q 
Corwin, French Policy, pp, 274-278, See also 
Monaghan, Jay, p= 171, 
7 n 
Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp, 65, 87-88„ 
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England the chance to accept America's terms for peace in­
creased Vergennes's suspicions of Adams, because Vergennes 
believed such an overture would only demonstrate to England 
21 
a rift in the Franco-American alliance. 
Gerald Stourzh argues that Adams tried to demonstrate 
American power through his own capabilities. The determi­
nation of Adams to conclude a commercial treaty with Britain 
preceded the opposition of Vergennes to any of Adams's sub­
sequent activities. Stourzh emphasizes that Adams inten­
tionally set about to prove that his negotiating power was 
independent of French advice. To exemplify this sentiment, 
in 1780 he purposefully delayed his first meeting with 
Vergennes for several weeks. When he finally met with the 
French minister, Adams informed Vergennes that he was 
authorized to negotiate peace and a commercial treaty with 
22 
Great Britain. 
In contrast to Adams's critics. Page Smith defends his 
perception in realizing French motives with regard to Ameri­
can independence. At first, Adams was grateful to the French 
for negotiating such liberal and generous treaties, but 
eventually he realized that the Gallic crown was using Amer­
ica's struggle for independence to advance its own interests. 
Apparently, Adams was prepared to ignore Vergennes's lack of 
candor, but the intent of the foreign minister to hinder the 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 176-177. 
22 
Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, pp. 155-157. 
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peace effort and their argument over the currency issue 
23 
aroused the famous Adams temper. 
The debate over Adams's relations with Vergennes is con­
tinued by Morris and Stinchcombe who basically agree that it 
was Vergennes who instigated the quarrel between them. Be­
cause Adams had expressed his disapproval of Franklin to 
Chevalier de La Luzerne and had cautioned him that the French 
alliance would be endangered if the French minister became 
involved in the internal party alignments of Congress, La 
Luzerne presented an unfavorable picture of him to Vergennes, 
Therefore, Morris contends that Vergennes was exceptionally 
rude to Adams and determined to have his powers to negotiate 
with England curtailed. Naturally, Adams had no patience 
with Vergennes's attempts to control his activities by de­
manding full knowledge of his instructions, Vergennes argued 
with Adams over the congressional decision to redeem its de­
preciated currency at forty to one, instead of speaking with 
Franklin, who was the accredited minister of Congress to 
France, Actually, Adams bore no official responsibility 
24 
for Franco-American relations, Stinchcombe also claims 
that Vergennes should have taken his grievance about the 
congressional decision to depreciate the currency to Frank­
lin instead of Adams, Vergennes decided to restrain Adams, 
who considered himself to be defending the United States, by 
urging Congress to place in Franklin's jurisdiction the pro-
2 ̂  
Smith, Adams, I, pp, 426, 475-477, 
24 
Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 194-196. 
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posed mediation conference at Vienna. Vergennes would have 
been satisfied had Congress limited Adams's power or placed 
2 5 
him under the direct control of the French government. 
When John Adams was appointed to the mission to Holland, 
he was given the opportunity to demonstrate his diplomatic 
prowess. Most authors agree that Adams's perseverence in 
Holland resulted in a successful agreement with the Dutcho 
Franklin reveals that, at first, Adams was reluctant about 
9 A 
going because of the gloomy prospects for a loan. Morse, 
who is usually very complimentary towards Adams, says little 
about his mission to the United Provinces to negotiate a 
27 
treaty of alliance. 
Both Cresson and Bemis realize that Adams's mission to 
Holland was difficult, because Vergennes disliked the trucu­
lent Adams, and the French foreign minister also objected to 
the United States competing with France for loans from Am­
sterdam. Despite Vergennes's opposition, the Dutch recog­
nized Adams as a minister plenipotentiary in 1782, which 
enabled him to negotiate a successful treaty of commerce 
2 8 
and friendship. Cresson agrees that Adams represented a 
threat to Vergennes's desire to maintain Dutch neutrality 
because the Anglo-Dutch alliance was no longer binding. But 
at least Adams was free from Franklin's influence, and he 
25 
Stinchcombe, French Alliance, pp. 155, 156, 
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Van Doren, ed.. Autobiographical Writings, p. 529, 
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Morse, Adams, p, 191, 
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Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 169, 
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was able to put his diplomatic talents to use as he employed 
journalistic propaganda to persuade Hollanders of British 
cruelties. Cresson adds that the success of Adams's nego­
tiations focused Catherine's attention on completing her 
mediation policy, because she desired a reconciliation be-
2 9 
tween the Stadtholder and King George, 
Cecil Currey lacks the intellectual sophistication to 
delve into details of Adams's mission to Holland. His main 
purpose is to discredit Franklin's activities in Europe, and 
he is delighted to support anyone who disagreed with Frank­
lin. Therefore, he unhesitatingly commends Adams's 
3 0 
. extremely successful mission in Holland," 
Cresson and Bemis discuss Adams's misconception of the 
goals of Catherine's mediation policy, while Morris commends 
his understanding of the empress's foreign policy. While 
Adams was in Holland, the plans of the Russian empress for 
a League of Armed Neutrality aroused his interest, according 
to Cresson. Adams believed that the United States should 
naturally be a participant in this confederation, which 
proved his misunderstanding of the Czarina's foreign policy. 
She had no intention of allowing a belligerent into the 
31 
League, Bemis further demonstrates Adams's ignorance of 
Russian foreign policy, since he believed that he could 
2Q 
Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp. 125, 131-132, 233, 
^^Currey, Code #72, p. 247. 
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persuade Catherine to his sentiments with the same firm 
diplomacy he employed in Holland. Bemis concludes that 
Adams ultimately opposed the mediation plan, because he 
thought that it was designed by Vergennes to control the 
32 
United States bid for independence, Morris credits Adams 
with exceptional insight, because he discerned that the 
League members placed their own desires above American 
interest. Thus, Adams insisted that they acknowledge a 
minister from the United States as the , . representa-
33 
tive of a free and independent power.'" 
Adams's critical and opinionated judgments were not 
limited to European officials since he regarded Franklin 
with varying degrees of hostility, according to most his­
torians, Adams defined their relationship as a "friendship 
commonly felt between two members of the same public assem­
bly," He held no high regard for Franklin, as Deane was 
well liked by Franklin, an association of which Adams dis­
approved . 
Early historians argue about Adams's association with 
Franklin, Hale and Morse disagree on whether Adams inter­
fered with Franklin's diplomacy with Vergennes, especially 
concerning the currency controversy. Hale feels that Adams 
overstepped his authority in arguing with Vergennes about 
32 
Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 186, 
^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 205, 208-209. 
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Butterfield, ed.. Diary and Autobiography, IV, 
p. 118, 
128 
the congressional decision, while Morse defends Adams for 
taking the responsibility of informing Vergennes of the 
repayment schedule, as Franklin had neglected his duty to 
35 
inform Vergennes. 
In the points of view of Cresson and Fay, Adams was 
jealous of Franklin, which contributed to their conflict. 
Adams scorned Franklin's urbane sophistication in diplomacy, 
resented his success in dealing with Vergennes, and criti­
cized Franklin's popularity within French social circles. 
Cresson adds that Adams was sure that Franklin supported 
Vergennes's negotiations with the Russian court regarding 
mediation. On this subject, he was justified in his appre-
hension of Vergennes's motives. Fay assumed that Adams 
was insulted when he realized that he was merely a reflec­
tion of Franklin in Paris. The antipathy he felt towards 
Franklin was manifested by his support of Lee's charges 
3 7 
that Franklin worked closely with Bancroft and Carmichael, 
Van Doren and Miller explain Adams's dislike of Frank­
lin because of Franklin's congeniality with the French, as 
well as his successful approach to Vergennes. It was par­
ticularly distressing to Adams that Vergennes would not 
properly recognize him. Adams assumed that Vergennes pre­
ferred Franklin, because he was more pliable in Vergennes's 
3 5 
Hale, Franklin, I, pp. 380-381; see also, Morse, 
Adams, p. 184. 
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Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp. 92-93, 169. 
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3 8 
hands. Franklin did not respond to Adams's antagonism, 
39 
maintaining that he was basically very capable. Miller 
also states that Adams considered Franklin to have bungled 
matters badly in France, because of his policy of subservi­
ence to French ministers, Adams resolved to establish a 
new approach of independence and boldness towards the French 
government, especially Vergennes, However, Franklin's repu­
tation was superior, which frustrated Adams's continual 
efforts to discredit him.^^ 
Stourzh's analysis of the Franklin-Adams relationship 
stresses that their basic disagreement was over tactics, 
not policy. Adams preferred to approach the French alliance 
with emphasis on the strength of America, and failed to 
understand that Franklin's overt gratitude towards and 
friendship with Vergennes were politically more expedient 
than offending Vergennes. 
Both Auger and Smith agree that Adams was suspicious of 
Franklin's pro-French sentiments. However, Auger does men­
tion that Adams suggested that Franklin be retained as the 
3 8 
Van Doren, Franklin. p. 621. See also, Wharton, 
Diplomatic Correspondence. I, p. 568. (Adams could not 
tolerate it when French and British ministers turned to 
Franklin.) 
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Miller, Triumph. pp. 574, 578. See also. Darling, 
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only minister plenipotentiary. On the other hand, Smith 
explains that Adams's suspicions of Franklin's loyalties 
included his sympathy with the English as well as the French, 
Adams saw Franklin being seduced by the British proposals 
for breaking the American alliance with France and agreeing 
to a separate "accommodation" with England, When the peace 
negotiations began, Adams's suspicions of Franklin lessened, 
because they both disagreed with congressional instructions 
43 
to follow France's lead in the peace negotiations. 
The idea that Franklin would consider unofficial pre­
liminary peace talks with the English upset Adams. Morris 
adds that Adams accused Franklin of allowing William Alexander, 
his Passy neighbor, to spread the word in England . , that 
no such acknowledgment of our independence would be insisted 
on.'" Franklin's choice of the double-talking Alexander for 
the mission of extending peace feelers convinced Adams that 
the doctor ignored ordinary "prudence and discrimination in 
his choice of agents," Throughout the peace negotiations, 
44 
Adams was inclined to berate Franklin and praise Jay, 
Richard Van Alstyne briefly mentions the Franklin-Adams 
disagreements, and he agrees with Miller that Adams was ap­
parently jealous of Franklin in Paris. Adams complained that 
Franklin , , is not a sufficient statesman for all the 
business he is in,'" But he finally acknowledged that only 
42 
Auger, Secret War, p. 385, 
^^Smith, Adams, I, pp, 393, 539-540, 
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Franklin combined the qualities that satisfied French soci­
ety and French statesmen. The main problem with Franklin, 
Adams thought, was that he had spread his abilities in too 
many areas and was insufficiently informed about any,^^ 
The general antagonism between Adams and Franklin could 
have precluded a successful peace treaty, except for John 
Jay's rather moderate character, according to Frank Monaghan, 
Towards Jay, Adams exhibited a rare trust and affection that 
overshadowed any disagreement he might have had with Jay 
over policy towards the French, the British and Franklin, 
Adams especially admired men who shared his views, and when 
he found Jay's similar to his own, their relationship was 
46 
all "eulogy and friendship." Monaghan denies, however, 
that Jay shared Adams's venomous distrust of Franklin. 
According to Morris, both Franklin and Adams commended 
Jay's role in the peace negotiations. For Adams, Jay's 
direct approach to explicit independence was a pleasant con­
trast to Franklin's murky course. Morris agrees that there 
was no real controversy between Franklin and Jay, and he also 
explains how well they got along, indicating that Adams and 
Jay were not exactly similar in their attitudes towards 
47 
Franklin, 
Discounting any respect either Jay or Adams might have 
held for Franklin, Currey's analysis places Jay and Adams 
45 
Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 164, 
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Monaghan, Jay, p. 171, 
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in a consensus about Franklin's dangerous vulnerability to 
Vergennes. Both were concerned that Franklin was unaware 
o£ the French conniving in the peace negotiations, Currey 
assumes that there were at least two honest men in Paris 
to control Franklin, but to a less biased author, the ques­
tion might arise as to who needed the controlling--Franklin 
Aj 48 or Adams, 
John Adams's moment o£ glory came with the peace nego­
tiations, and his righteous fight for the United States 
right to the fisheries. La Luzerne had finally succeeded 
in having his powers to negotiate a commercial treaty with 
49 
England revoked, and Adams's last opportunity for histori­
cal fame seemingly rested upon affixing his name to an out­
standing peace. Although Arthur Darling criticizes Adams's 
unfounded skepticism about Franklin, he maintains that 
Adams's contributions to the peace settlement were bene­
ficial. Adams realized the need of New England fishermen 
to utilize the fishing grounds in Newfoundland and pursued 
that issue in the negotiations. According to Darling, his 
major flaw was his lack of diplomatic tact.^® 
The most strenuous objection Adams raised during the 
peace discussions was over the congressional instructions 
48  
Currey, Code #72, p. 250. 
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Morse, Adams. p. 208. See Butterfield, ed,, Diary 
and Autobiography, IV, pp. 175-176, (Adams flattered La 
Luzerne, emphasizing his continuing high opinion of the 
French minister.) 
^^Darling, Rising Empire, p. 88. 
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that France be included throughout the negotiations, Morse 
sympathizes with Adams's anger at these instructions, as 
Morse recognizes that his negotiating procedures would only 
be hindered by French influence, Adams also insisted that 
all European quarrels must be settled before a treaty was 
signed, 
Although E. S. Corwin briefly criticizes Adams's 
policy, he does not mention Adams's feelings against the 
French. Instead he believes Adams was partial to his native 
Massachusetts, since he particularly insisted on fishing 
52 
privileges off the Grand Banks. Corwin implies that Adams 
was chiefly concerned about the area where his domestic 
attachments lay. 
The issue of separate negotiations is important to 
Miller's analysis of Adams's work on the peace commission. 
Both he and Jay were confident that they could handle the 
British without French aid. Although France did not appear 
to be seeking undue advantages in the peace, her support 
of Spain's"extravagant" land claims effectively placed her 
in a position opposing American efforts. To Adams and Jay, 
the congressional instructions offended their fierce patri­
otism, because they believed that taking France into their 
confidence during the negotiations was comparable to surren­
dering American independence. Adams maintained that by 
^^Morse, Adams, pp. 204-205. 
52 
Corwin, French Policy, pp. 345-346. 
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disregarding the congressional instructions the commission 
had saved the United States from a French-dictated peace 
which . , would have made Us long the miserable Satel-
53 
lites o£ some great European Planet."* 
Page Smith states that the negotiations began with Adams 
considering the French and American to be , allies and 
equals in theory, i£ not in fact." He did not condemn Ver-
gennes's efforts to guide and influence Anglo-American 
negotiations, because he recognized that the French foreign 
minister was only acting in accordance with the requirements 
of his responsibilities to his country. However, he did ob­
ject to those members of Congress who advocated that the 
commissioners rely upon French advice, because he considered 
this a threat to American honor and independence» Smith 
considers the congressional reprimand to the commissioners 
as unjust and praises Adams's determination that Americans 
54 
must above all be independent. 
Morris, in his investigation of Adams's efforts on the 
peace commission, commends as his finest moments his nego­
tiations for the fishing rights in Newfoundland, However, 
Adams also demonstrated his skill in framing an ambiguous 
clause, stipulating that individual states legally settle 
the Tory claims, which mollified the British and left the 
53 
Miller, Triumph, pp. 632, 646, See also, Bemis, 
Diplomacy, p, 174. (Tie indicates that the congressional 
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their own discretion in securing American goals,) 
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actual situation unchanged. Morris adds that neither Adams 
nor Jay forgave Congress for criticizing their efforts which 
not only included separate negotiations but also the secret 
article concerning West Florida, Morris, at this point, 
substantiates Adams's suspicion of Franklin by recognizing 
that Franklin was unwilling to assume the consequences of 
55 
the actions of the commission. 
Stinchcombe explains that congressional instructions 
to the commission were an effort by southern delegates to 
prevent Adams from seeking the fisheries for his region at 
the expense of other sections of the nations. He continues 
that the United States voluntarily placed the fate of the 
negotiations in the hands of a few men by agreeing to hold 
them in Europe, Although Congress would set the broad poli­
cies, the individual ministers would actually make the 
majority of the decisions 
Adams's attitude towards the French during the negotia­
tions is attributed to the way his thoughts evolved the 
longer he stayed in Europe, Van Alstyne claims that Adams 
never really defined his sentiments towards either France 
or England, At first, he regarded England as a , , nat­
ural and habitual enemy,'" which forced the United States to 
seek help from France, It seems only logical that France 
and Spain would desire to punish Great Britain, and thus 
^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 376-378, 380, 444-445. 
^^Stinchcombe, French Alliance, pp, 168, 76, 
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France was a '"'natural ally.'" However, by 1783, his senti­
ments had changed so that he became eager for a commercial 
treaty with England and for the exchange of ministers be-
5 7 
tween the United States and Great Britain. Therefore, 
if Van Alstyne is correct, it was not so much his antipathy 
against France, but his anticipation of commercial advan­
tages from England which influenced his policy during the 
peace negotiations. 
John Adams's contributions to American foreign policy 
receive no general consensus of praise or condemnation. 
Although his temperament might not have been suited for 
tactful diplomacy, his devotion to the ideas of American 
independence defines his role in Europe as patriotic and 
possibly even beneficial to the American cause. Adams's 
personal papers and correspondence as well as those of his 
compatriots have been available to twentieth-century authorso 
Lo Butterfield edited a four-volume edition of Adams's 
autobiography and diary which contributes additional insight 
into Adams's diplomatic career and personal attitudes towards 
his associates. John T. Morse's study of John Adams is sus­
pect on account of its complete lack of documentation. How­
ever, his lengthy essay on John Adams is valuable for his­
toriography as it attempts to explain Adams's personality 
traits and his efforts to secure independence for the United 
States. Monaghan, as John Jay's biographer, necessarily 
1^7 
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included information on Adams to complete thorough study of 
Jay, The major primary source Monaghan uses with regard to 
Adams are the ten volumes of his works, edited by Charles 
Francis Adams. Monaghan includes such traditional editors 
and authors as Wharton, Bemis, Hale, Doniol, and Corwin, 
all of whom speak to the question of Adams's character and 
actions in Europe. John C, Miller adds helpful insight 
into the personality of John Adams with the information 
from Adams's works, Doniol, Sparks and the papers, journals 
and correspondence of other men who were associated with 
Adams, both in Europe and America. Also, Adams's collection 
of papers from the Massachusetts Histor .cal Society provides 
useful background on Adams before he departed for Europe. 
One of the most thorough and readable accounts of Adams's 
diplomatic career is by Richard B. Morris. His extensive 
use of the journals and correspondence of the three peace 
commissioners, and archival material from Europe and the 
United States, provides invaluable information about Adams's 
career in Europe, He also includes secondary works which 
have been previously mentioned. The two-volume biography 
of Adams, written by Page Smith, relies almost solely upon 
Adams's writings and correspondence. The first volume, 
which includes his diplomatic career in Paris and Holland, 
is complimentary of his abilities and achievements. This 
book needs to be balanced by other accounts of Adams which 
are more critical in order to achieve a somewhat realistic 
picture of Adams. Samuel Flagg Bemis discusses Adams in 
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relation to his contributions to the peace negotiations. 
Along with the ten volumes of Adams's works, he incorporates 
significant information from Jay's diary, the Hales®s vol­
umes and English primary materials pertinent to the peace 
negotiations. His belief that the work of the peace com­
missioners was exceptional coincides with other accounts 
of this aspect of Adams's diplomacy, Gerald Stourzh adds 
additional useful interpretations of Adams in comparison 
to Franklin, using basically the same primary sources as 
other authors. As has been previously stated, however, 
his comments on secondary sources are also helpful and in­
teresting, William Stinchcombe does not concentrate on one 
particular man in his study of the Franco-American alliance, 
but he compares source material from Adams's works to French 
studies of the alliance for a useful interpretation of 
Adams's attitudes towards the French alliance. 
The articles dealing with Adams also examine his per­
sonal traits and diplomacy. Both Rossiter and Bailyn 
examine his rather unique and complex characteristics which 
made him so sensitive and determined to adhere to his con­
cept of independence regardless of the influences from 
others. They both rely upon Butterfield's editions of 
Adams's autobiography and his correspondence, Felix Gil­
bert's study of Adams's diplomacy is based upon Adams's 
works, biographical accounts and an extensive study of French 
philosophical writings concerned with foreign policy. This 
article provides an interesting and unique interpretation 
139 
of Adams's theories on American foreign policy. 
The authors who have studied Adams have disagreed over 
his diplomatic tactics, but most of them concur that he was 
a devout American patriot. John Adams, as a diplomat in 
Europe, arouses differing opinions with regards to his 
abilities, Morse, in his favorable account of Adams, ac­
knowledges his outspoken manner but asserts that he was the 
right man in the right place. No other author suggests such 
a one-sided opinion. Monaghan and Miller examine his ten­
dency continually to offend the French especially in his 
efforts to place American independence foremost. They 
interpret his actions as indications of his fear that he 
would not receive the credit and acclaim for negotiating 
American independence which Franklin would. Rossiter and 
Bailyn realize that his touchy and sensitive nature possibly 
hindered his negotiating ability as he was constantly aware of 
personal slights. Morris agrees that Adams's personality 
hindered his ability as a diplomat. 
Another early controversy in Adams's diplomatic career 
relates to the feud between Deane and Lee, According to 
his own diary, he remained convinced that Deane and Frank­
lin were enjoying Parisian life at the expense of Congress, 
but apparently he remained detached from direct involvement 
in the controversies. Page Smith reaches the same conclu­
sion as Coy James, who states that Adams purposely remained 
uninvolved in the controversy. The congressional journals 
furnish further proof that Adams was absolved from all 
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charges arising from the imbroglio, according to H„ James 
Henderson, 
Two of the most controversial aspects of Adams's career 
was his attitude towards the French alliance and his rela­
tionship with the French officials, especially Vergennes, 
Hale, Miller and Bemis state that he was never opposed to 
the French alliance, because he considered it a matter of 
necessity, Felix Gilbert is much more articulate in explain­
ing Adams's attitude towards the alliance. He introduces 
the idea that Adams believed the alliance to be the begin­
ning of a future commercial relationship without entangle­
ments necessitating further American irvolvement in European 
affairs, Stinchcombe refutes this concept and states that 
Adams's thoughts were centered on independence. Unfortu­
nately, Adams encountered difficulties with Vergennes, who 
insisted that Adams conduct his negotiations in accordance 
with the provisions of the Franco-American alliance. Re­
gardless of Adams's personal accounts of his suspicions of 
Vergennes's motives, both Corwin and Cresson conclude that 
Adams was unduly suspicious of Vergennes, and thus was blunt 
and tactless in defying Vergennes's requests. On the other 
hand, Bemis and Stourzh indicate that critics have been un­
fair in condemning Adams's basic policy, Stourzh emphasizes 
that his tactics with Vergennes were different from Frank­
lin's, but essentially they both considered the needs of 
the United States first, Bemis indicates that Adams wished 
to open negotiations for a commercial treaty with England 
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with the hope that it would eventually lead to peace. Page 
Smith defends Adams's perception in realizing Vergennes's 
duplicity in dealing with the American commissionerso Both 
Morris and Stinchcombe, through their extensive use of 
Adams's personal correspondence, decide that Vergennes was 
unnecessarily rude to Adams» 
Generally, historians agree that Adams's mission to 
Holland was successful, but both Bemis and Cresson maintain 
that Vergennes also controlled Dutch policy; yet Adams suc­
cessfully overcame his influence. Cecil Currey simply ac­
claims Adams's success in Holland in an effort to support 
one of Franklin's antagonists, without objectively inter­
preting his sources. 
The subject of Adams's relationship with Franklin is 
extensively discussed, and most authors agree that the 
enmity between them arose because of Adams's jealousy of 
Franklin's official and personal successes in France, How­
ever, Smith is convinced that Franklin's suspicious activi-
ties with both the French and English justified Adams's 
doubt of Franklin's priorities. 
In contrast to the conflict between Adams and Franklin, 
he and Jay were compatible, although Currey's rather biased 
and unprofessional investigation concludes that Adams and 
Jay equally distrusted Franklin, Currey's interpretation 
of the same sources used by previous authors, who reached 
much different conclusions, is questionable at best, 
John Adams's contribution toward the peace negotiations 
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is generally commended by historians because of his undeviat-
ing commitment to independence. Arthur Darling, whose source 
material is extensively drawn from journals and correspon­
dence, agrees that while Adams's judgment of Franklin was 
incorrect, his work on the peace negotiations was highly 
commendable 0 Adams's disregard for the congressional in­
structions that France must be included in the negotiations 
with England is not criticized by historians, who recognize 
that Adams saw this procedure as the only way to negotiate 
efficiently for American independence without contending with 
French demands. Both Smith and Morris maintain that the 
congressional rebuke for this action waj unjustified. 
Most historians rely upon the information supplied by 
official European and American government documents, the 
papers of Jay and Franklin, and Adams's own diary and let­
ters to reach a conclusion as to his success or failure as 
a diplomat. There is no definite judgment on his abi lity 
in the diplomatic negotiations in Europe, However, most 
historians state that, regardless of his petulant and sensi­
tive personaltiy, his commitment towards American indepen­
dence was commendable. Thus, he endeavored to work for the 
establishment of his country's role as a new and expanding 
nation in a world dominated by European powers. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE MISSIONS OF JOHN JAY 
John Jay began his diplomatic career in Spain, and al­
though it was a disappointing experience, he then moved to 
Paris where he gained a measure o£ fame for his role in the 
negotiations for the treaty of peace between Great Britain 
and the United States. He was commissioned to Spain late in 
1779 for the purpose of securing an alliance similar to the 
one between France and the United States, but he was unsuccess­
ful. The mission to Spain frustrated him, because the harder 
he tried to gain recognition and aid for his country, the 
more obstacles he encountered. Some historians stress Jay's 
inability to adapt to the inscrutable tendencies of Conde de 
Floridablanca, the Spanish foreign minister, while others 
commend Jay's efforts to avoid the United States submission 
to unreasonable Spanish demands involving" land claims and 
navigation rights. Jay faced a dilemma: whether to abide 
by the congressional instructions, while realizing that his 
personal judgments on obtaining the most beneficial results 
for his country sometimes contradicted these instructions. 
Another controversial aspect of his experience in Spain 
which extended to the negotiations in Paris, was the animos­
ity he developed against the French, presumably because of 
the dubious advice Gerard and Comte de Montmorin offered 
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to him regarding the most successful ways to deal with the 
Spanisho Then, after Congress decided that Jay would serve 
his country better in Paris negotiating for peace, he was 
dispatched there only to encounter new difficulties which 
also merit historical comment. The very diverse personal­
ities of Franklin and Adams placed Jay in the position of 
a mediator, according to some historians. Yet, a few authors 
maintain that Jay was more compatible with one over the 
other., The peace treaty and Jay's efforts to insure its 
successful completion inspire debate among historians, as 
they evaluate the degree to which Jay contributed to or 
hindered the progress of the peace negotiations. Although 
Congress ratified the peace treaty, it reprimanded the 
three commissioners for violating their instructions and 
negotiating without France. The justice of the congressional 
action involves historians in still another unresolved de­
bate „ 
John Jay's appointment to Spain came after Deane, Lee 
and Franklin had laid the groundwork for American negotia­
tions with other European countries. His instructions were 
specific, in that he was to secure recognition of American 
independence and an alliance with Spain while also obtain­
ing a financial loan from Spain. 
Bemis criticizes Jay's irresolute approach to the Spanish 
since he maintained, apart from his instructions, that an 
American guarantee to Spain of free navigation of the Missis­
sippi River to and from the sea was contingent upon an imme­
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diate Spanish acceptance of American proposals for a treaty 
and loan. But in Bemis's opinion, Jay faced too many adverse 
circumstances for one to characterize him as a personal 
failure. Hence, it was no discredit to Jay that the two 
most important dates of his mission were those of his ar­
rival and departure.^ 
Jay encountered difficulties in his negotiations with 
the Spanish government. Initially, he considered that the 
United States, as a sovereign nation, was free to borrow 
money on the same principle of repayment of principal with 
interest, as E. S. Corwin points out. The congressional 
instructions concerning the Mississippi also presented a 
dilemma for Jay. Although he personally was somewhat am­
bivalent in his sentiments, actually the congressional in­
structions made his own opinion irrelevant. Eventually, 
Jay disregarded the orders of Congress and adopted the opin­
ion that free navigation should be granted only upon Spanish 
insistence. Corwin denies that Jay was disgruntled and 
disillusioned when he left Spain, pointing out that Jay 
fully expected to renew negotiations with the Conde de 
Aranda, who was the head of the Consejo de Castilla, the 
3 
supreme governing body for all Spain. This plan proved 
^Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed,, American Secretaries of State 
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futile, because Aranda was not empowered to deal with such 
4 
matters in Paris, 
Jay's lack of success in Spain was not his fault, ac­
cording to Frank Monaghan, his biographer, Monaghan admires 
Jay's diplomacy and tenacity in dealing with the Spanish, 
and makes no attempt to conceal his sentiments. According 
to Monaghan, from the beginning of Jay's stay in Spain, he 
was a victim of Spanish procrastination, receiving excuses 
such as the minister was ill or Gardoqui was not at the 
court, when he definitely was. Floridablanca, the Spanish 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was Jay's main prob­
lem in his efforts to execute his instructions. First, the 
Spanish minister vehemently disliked republics and their 
principles. Adding to this difficulty was his resolve to 
free Spain from French influence; thus, he refused to con­
sider the 1778 treaty between the United States and France 
as a basis for a Spanish-American agreement. The proposal 
by Floridablanca that the Spanish government would pay the 
costs incurred in building ships for American merchants 
within two years if the United States would immediately 
supply Spain with frigates aroused Jay's indignant protests. 
The Spaniard continued his questionable tactics with the 
American minister, assuring Jay that Abbe Hussey and Richard 
Cumberland had come to Spain on personal business, when, in 
fact, they were confidential agents of the British ministry, 
^Corwin, French Policy, p. 326, 
^Monaghan, Jay, pp. 146, 150, 144-145, 
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Ultimately, Jay recognized that no significant aid would be 
forthcoming, since Spain had little money. Congress added 
to Jay's difficulty by drawing bills upon him, assuming 
that he had received a loan from the Spanish when, in reality. 
Jay had not even received an interview with Floridablanca to 
discuss the possibility of a loan,^ Jay's awareness of 
Spanish duplicity increased when he realized that his cor­
respondence from the United States was intercepted and read 
by the Spanish, and thus they knew of congressional plans 
before he did. Jay also suspected that the Spanish pro­
crastination in meeting with him was based upon Spain's 
desire to enfeeble permanently the American colonies in 
order that Spain might establish firm control over the Gulf 
of Mexico and the Mississippi Valley. Monaghan believes 
that it is to Jay's credit that he continued to work for an 
alliance with Spain, even after he had received news of a 
potential peace with Britain. It was only after Montmorin 
encouraged him to depart for Paris that Jay resigned himself 
7 
to the futility of his mission. 
Another question arising regarding Jay's mission is 
whether France sincerely supported the American cause in 
Spain. Monaghan insists that Montmorin intended to place 
the United States in a position subservient to France and 
^Ibid.. pp. 141, 153; see also, Henry P. Johnston, ed.. 
The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (4 vols.. 
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1890), I, p. 338. (Herein­
after referred to as Johnston, ed.. Jay Correspondence,) 
7 
Monaghan, Jay, pp. 134, 181. 
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Spain. Jay's frustration in continually being ignored by 
the Spanish foreign minister led him to seek assistance 
from Montmorin. Instead of volunteering to approach 
Floridablanca on behalf of the American minister, the 
Frenchman reminded Jay that he represented , , only 
rising states, not firmly established or generally ac­
knowledged . , , and urged him to write Floridablanca 
a letter . . praying an audience.'" Monaghan continues 
his account of this incident with a lengthy dialogue between 
the two men in which Jay firmly stated his opinion that the 
United States should never lower itself to begging for 
recognition. Jay emphasized that the French government had 
been of no assistance in arranging a meeting between him 
and Floridablanca, although it had promised that France 
would help the Americans in Spain. Monaghan feels that 
Montmorin placed Jay in an untenable position, because he 
insisted that Jay be humble in dealing with the Spanish 
foreign minister. 
Miller explains the relationship between the French 
and Spanish with his typical clarity and conciseness. When 
France aligned herself with the United States, Spain was 
outraged at such unilateral action. So Vergennes faced the 
task of appeasing Spain in order to insure her participation 
in the war against England. Therefore, Vergennes agreed 
with Spain that the United States should be permanently 
8 
Ibid.. pp. 147-148. See also Johnston, ed.. Jay 
Correspondence. 
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weakened by surrendering the Floridas and its claim to the 
navigation of the Mississippi to Spain. Also, Vergennes 
had little sympathy with the United States growing into a 
world power, which further insured French support of Spain's 
Q 
demands on America, 
According to Samuel Flagg Bemis in The Diplomacy of 
the American Revolution (1935) , the Spanish mission was a 
complete failure, but he refrains from accusing Jay of sole 
responsibility. Jay maintained that Spanish hesitency to 
aid the United States was attributable to the stand Congress 
had taken on the Mississippi question. As has been dis­
cussed previously, Jay opposed the idea of . bartering 
the Mississippi for a Spanish alliance.'" Moreover, in 1781, 
when Congress empowered him to recognize the , , exclu­
sive right of Spain to the navigation of the Mississippi 
below 31' in return for a Spanish alliance , . . Jay 
obliged but worded the concession with "reserve and ambigu­
ity." Ultimately, it was Spain's decision to <, , win 
her own stakes without corresponding American successes , o 
which signalled the futility of the mission,^® 
Although Miller sympathizes with the difficulties Jay 
encountered in attempting to negotiate with the Spanish 
indirectly through the French or personally with Florida-
blanca, he criticizes Jay's diplomatic procedures. Miller 
^Miller, Triumph, pp. 386-387. 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 106-107, 111. 
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confirms that no American diplomat would have been received 
favorably by the Spanish, , but John Jay settled his 
fate by bringing to the Spanish court the proud, mettlesome, 
and uncompromising demeanor of an American republican," 
Jay's eagerness for the Spanish alliance was not so great 
that he was willing to yield the navigation of the Missis­
sippi, although Congress had instructed him to do so. His 
stubbornness in regards to the Mississippi question was par­
ticularly detrimental, because Floridablanca was fully 
aware of Jay's instructions from Congress, Jay's plea of 
his country's poverty was no exaggeration, but Floridablanca 
exhibited little sympathy for his monetary plight of the 
United States, carefully explaining that Spain was hardly 
in a financial position to underwrite any other nation. In 
an evaluation of Jay's contribution to American diplomacy in 
Europe, Miller concludes that because of the treatment Jay 
received in Spain, his international sympathies disappeared 
and he became a confirmed nationalist, advocating isolation­
ism, For Jay, travel to Europe was a disastrous experience, 
because he became acquainted with the ", , , deplorable 
realities of European power politics. 
In contrast to Miller, Donald Smith states in his col­
lection of Jay's writings, John Jay, Founder of a State and 
Nation (1968), that congressional instructions precluded 
any agreement between the United States and Spain, Smith 
specifies that the congressional demands for recognition of 
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 568, 567, 571, 
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American independence, substantial financial aid, and a 
formal treaty of alliance, combined with Floridablanca*s 
desire for exclusive navigation rights on the Mississippi 
River were major points of disagreement. Not only did 
Spain's duplicity anger Jay, but Congress increased the 
difficulty of the Spanish-American negotiations by drawing 
12 
upon funds that did not exist. 
Both Richard W. Van Alstyne and Richard B. Morris state 
that congressional irresponsibility regarding finances and 
the navigation of the Mississippi River caused the main 
points of contention between Jay and the Spanish. Van Alstyne 
adds that Jay's refusal to submit to Spanish demands regard­
ing the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico was the 
13 
reason Floridablanca stopped payment on Jay's bills. 
Morris also considers the navigation of the Mississippi 
River to be the main point of contention between Jay and 
the Spanish, who also enjoyed French support. Spain's re­
fusal to recognize Jay added to his problems. Originally, 
Jay was instructed to "'. . . seek free navigation of the 
Mississippi into to and from the sea, . . .'" and to secure 
a free port or ports below 31® NL on the river. In return, 
America would guarantee the possession of the Floridas to 
S p a i n  i f  t h e  k i n g  c o u l d  w r e s t  t h e m  f r o m  t h e  B r i t i s h . A f t e r  
l^Donald L, Smith, John Jay, Founder of a State and 
Nation (New York: Teacher's College Press, 1968], pp. 7T, 
76. [Hereinafter referred to as Smith, State and Nation.) 
13 
Van Alstyne, Empire, p. 183. 
14 
Morris, Peacemakers. pp. 231, 222. See also Johnston, 
ed., Jay Correspondence, pp. 248-250, 
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reconfirming this offer in 1780, Congress altered it in 
1781, permitting him to recede from the Mississippi demands 
o . to remove every obstacle to the accession of Spain 
15 
to the American alliance, , . Montmorin informed Jay 
that he was not in a position to make demands upon Spain 
until he conceded on the Mississippi issues. Both Spain 
and France knew Congress had sent Jay new instructions 
authorizing him to accede to Spanish demands on the Mis­
sissippi issues, and Floridablanca announced that when Jay 
was willing to yield on these points, he could . expect 
frankness in return, , , Morris praises Jay's foresight 
in exercising discretion by . . having placed a limited 
duration on his offer of the Mississippi navigation as 
being '"absolutely necessary to prevent this Court's con­
tinuing to delay a treaty to a general peace. . . , Con­
gress then endorsed Jay's actions, as it had begun to have 
second thoughts about the way it had freely acquiesced to 
X 6 
Spanish demands. Morris adds that Congress contributed 
to Jay's difficulties by drawing bills against money which 
it assumed Jay had received from Spain. There was justifi­
cation for Jay's antipathy against Spain, because he realized 
that Spain had declared war for objectives that did not in-
17 
elude those of the United States, 
15 
Morris, Peacemakers, pp. 231, 222. See also Johnston, 
';?d , , Jay Correspondence, pp, 248-2 50. 
^^Morris, Peacemakers. pp. 240, 242-243, see also 
Johnston, ed.. Jay Correspondence, pp, 418-419; Burlingame, 
Envoy. pp. 190-191, Burlingame speaks of Jay's generous of­
fer to the Spanish in relinquishing the Mississippi rights. 
l^Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 227, 223-224, 
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Jay's problems in Spain, both diplomatically and in 
his personal associations with the French and Spanish min­
isters, were not reflected in his relationships with the 
other two peace commissioners, Adams and Franklin, He was 
particularly successful in gaining the friendship and 
respect of John Adams, a man who was easily offended and 
rarely forgave anyone who slighted his sensitive nature. 
Both Monaghan and Morris cautiously approach Jay's rela­
tionship with Adams, evaluating them as representatives of 
the United States government, Monaghan concludes that 
fundamentally they agreed on the idea that America's future 
did not include European alliances. Both men disliked and 
denounced France and Spain, although Jay's Spanish exper­
ience made his objection to both France and Spain more valid 
than Adams's. Monaghan says that Adams's loathing of Frank­
lin did not persuade Jay to the same opinion, despite what 
18 
other authors claim, Morris emphasizes that Adams and 
Jay agreed that explicit recognition of American indepen­
dence was the only course to follow in the peace negotia­
tions, Adams was delighted when he observed how similar 
19 
their attitudes were on the peace proceedings. Morris 
hesitates throughout his book to describe any personali ty 
clashes that might have hindered or detracted from the glori­
ous role of the American peacemakers. Thus he declines to 
1 8 
Monaghan, Jay, pp, 207, 186, 
19 
Morris, Peacemakers. p„ 256, See also Johnston, ed,. 
Jay Correspondence, pp, 330-331. 
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mention whether Adams's dislike o£ Franklin affected Jay's 
personal opinion of Franklin, 
Currey rejects the idea that Jay might possibly have 
condoned Franklin's activities. According to Currey's 
hostile account of Franklin's career, both Adams and Jay 
reached the conclusion that Franklin was susceptible to the 
French connivings during the peace negotiations, Currey is 
less vitriolic in his discussion of the attitudes of Adams 
2 0 
and Jay towards the career of the venerable diplomat. 
In speaking of the relationship between Jay and Frank­
lin, Morris approaches it strictly from the standpoint of 
diplomatic negotiations. Franklin possibly held some reser­
vations about Jay's legal quibbling, but his admiration for 
Jay allowed them to work in harmony. Jay was successful in 
persuading Franklin that separate negotiations with the 
British were the only feasible solution to achieving a 
peace favorable to the United States, Together they managed 
to conceal most of their diplomatic moves from Vergennes and 
21 
his entourage. 
The idea that Jay and Franklin were not entirely com­
patible is touched upon by Van Alstyne and confirmed by 
Currey, Adams and Jay were convinced that they had literally 
rescued the American operation from French deception and 
Franklin's servility to the French, Fortunately, Jay per-
^'^Currey, Code #72, pp, 250, 248 , 
21 
Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 339-340. 
22 
Van Alstyne, Empire, p, 214, 
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ceived that Spain was receiving France's primary attention 
and determined to defy congressional instructions, despite 
Franklin's protestations. Jay was never overly enthusiastic 
about Franklin's assistance on the commission, and only 
briefly commended his cooperation in promoting the final 
23 
terms on the fisheries. 
Although Jay arrived in Paris enthusiastic over the 
prospects of peace, he harbored some resentment against 
France who, he thought, had influenced Spain's uncooperative 
attitude^ Most historians concur that Jay objected to the 
activities of Vergennes when they detracted from achieving 
a peace settlement favorable to the United States, Some 
authors contend that Jay's dislike of France was intense 
and was inherited from family sentiments, while more moderate 
evaluations portray Jay as being objective in trying to judge 
whether France actually promoted the best interests of the 
United States, E, S, Corwin's favorable appraisal of French 
policy explains that Jay's attitude towards France was grate­
ful but cautious. Jay ungrudgingly acknowledged France's 
generosity but realized that France would continue the war 
to achieve her own objectives as well as those of the United 
States. Therefore Jay heartily resisted congressional in­
structions, because they forced American ministers to . o 
receive and obey the instructions of those on whom no Ameri-
24 
can minister ought to be dependent, , « Jay's suspi-
22currey, Code #72, pp, 253, 259, 
2 4  
Corwin, French Policy, pp, 336-337, 346-348, See also 
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cions o£ French intentions deepened when he read Joseph-
Matthias de Rayneval's proposal to divide part of the western 
lands into two Indian protectorates under Spanish and American 
jurisdiction, and then leave all the territory north o£ the 
Ohio River to the British, This controversial proposal added 
to Jay's doubts that France's actions were in the best inter­
ests o£ the United States, Corwin justifies the French activ­
ities by explaining that France was not trying to prolong the 
war, but was only meeting her commitment to Spain, a concept 
2 5 
the American commissioner failed to understand. 
Monaghan and Bemis maintain that Jay developed a dis­
like for France while in Spain. Monaghan claims that his 
unfortunate relations with Montmorin led him to suspect 
France of trying to keep both America and Spain under her 
influence. The secret Treaty of Aranjuez in 1779 bound 
France to support Spain, It stipulated that France would 
not terminate the war or negotiate for peace until Spain 
secured Gibralter, and that Spain would not recognize Amer­
ican independence before Great Britain did. Bemis also 
points out that France had invoked Jay's distrust while he 
was still in Spain, Gerard had done his best to persuade 
Congress that the French alliance with America did not guar­
antee American territorial rights up to the Mississippi, As 
if to defy directly the Franco-American alliance, France 
Johnston, ed,. Jay Correspondence, pp, 256-259, While in 
Spain, Jay spoke o£ Frencn generosity. 
^^Corwin, French Policy, pp, 336-337, 346-348, 
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signed the Treaty o£ Aranjuez, but its contents did not long 
remain secrete Jay became more reserved around Vergennes, 
as the French foreign minister urged the American commissioners 
to refrain from making extreme claims concerning boundaries 
2 6 
and fishing rights. 
Miller's account of Jay's attitude towards France 
denies that Jay, early in his mission, suspected French 
motives. As late as 1779, Jay was considered a strong sup­
porter of France, speaking well of that country and earning 
the respect of the French ambassador in Spain and Vergennes 
in France. According to Miller, Jay endeared himself to 
Spain and France when he said of the Mississippi River navi­
gation "... that it was a privilege 'which we would not 
27 
want this age. . . . Unfortunately, other authors do 
not comment upon Miller's interpretation of Jay's attitudes 
towards France, 
Jay's skepticism of French motives is developed by 
Gerald Stourzh, Page Smith and Roger Burlingame, who con­
clude that although Jay doubted French loyalty to the United 
States, he did not harbor a vindictive hatred against her. 
Jay delivered this astute appraisal of French policy, as 
quoted by Stourzh, 
They are interested in separating us from 
Great Britain, and on that point we may, I 
believe, depend upon them; but it is not 
their interest that we should become a 
^^Monaghan, Jay, pp. 134-135; Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 109, 
215, 241, 234. 
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 565-566, See also Johnston, ed,. 
Jay Correspondence, p, 305, 
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great and formidable people, and therefore 
t h e y  w i l l  n o t  h e l p  u s  t o  b e c o m e  s O o ^ S  
Vergennes supported leaving the territory north of the Ohio to 
lingland and giving the southwest to Spain, He also opposed Amer­
ican participation in the Newfoundland fisheries. Page Smith 
describes Jay's anti-French attitude as so extreme that it was 
disconcerting to Adams, who found himself defending the 
2 9 
French, Finally, Jay realized that the only way to coun­
teract the alleged French conspiracy against American peace 
efforts was to violate the Franco-American treaty, as well 
as congressional instructions, and negotiate separately 
•^n 
with England. 
Morris also agrees that Jay displayed little affection 
for the French. Raised in a circle of Huguenot refugees, he 
had an inherent dislike for the French, This sentiment influ­
enced his later career and was intensified when Jay realized 
that Vergennes agreed with Floridablanca's plan to defer rec­
ognition of American independence until a general peace was 
signed in order to prevent the Americans from dropping out of 
the war before Gibraltar was secured. Jay vigorously argued 
with Franklin that, unless the congressional instructions were 
violated, American honor would be nonexistent. However, he 
maintained that ignoring congressional instructions was not 
31 
synonymous with violating the treaty with France, 
2 8  
Stourzh, Franklin, Foreign Policy, p. 174, 
2Q 
Smith, Adams, I, pp, 540-541. 
^^Burlingame, Envoy, pp. 194-195. 
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Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 309-310. 
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The controversy involving Jay's association with France 
receives attention from William Stinchcombe and Richard W, 
Van Alstyne, Both authors agree that Jay began his career 
favorably inclined towards the French, Gerard asked Con­
gress to appoint Jay as the American representative at the 
peace negotiations, as he was thought to be more amenable 
to French policy, especially regarding the fisheries, than 
3 2 
Arthur Lee had been. Van Alstyne states that upon Jay's 
arrival in Europe, he shared Franklin's enthusiasm for the 
French. When he became aware that the French were favorably 
disposed towards Spanish land claims in America, his senti-
33 
ments towards them became increasingly hostile. 
By the time Jay reached Paris, he was committed to 
achieving independence from Britain through a reasonable 
peace agreement. Historians do not question his motives, 
but some argue that his tactics were not indicative of his 
country's honor. E. S, Corwin mildly criticizes Jay's 
activities in Paris, which included secretly dispatching 
Benjamin Vaughan to England and his decision to disregard 
congressional instructions to include France in the nego­
tiations. Thoroughly alarmed that France might aid Spain 
in negotiating with England for possession of western lands. 
Jay sent Vaughan to London , , to combat Rayneval's 
reasoning and to urge a new commission for Oswald authoriz-
Stinchcombe, French Alliance, p. 66, 
Van Alstyne, Empire, pp. 213-214. 
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ing him to treat with the United States of America,*" 
This measure actually diminished the concessions Britain 
was willing to make to the United States, Shelburne had 
realized that only by authorizing extensive concessions 
to the Americans would he separate France and the United 
States, but Vaughan's mission revealed that this had al­
ready been accomplished. With regard to the commissioners *s 
violation of their instructions, Corwin explains that 
technically they did not violate the , pledge given 
in the Treaty of Alliance." On the other hand, they should 
have warned France that "... the United States reserved 
the right to make a separate peace, if a final peace should 
be obstructed by France for reasons not covered by the 
treaty of Alliance, . . Corwin concludes that the in­
dependent policies adopted by the commissioners were a 
result of Jay's suspicions which, he concedes, were due 
mainly to Jay's interpretation of facts, rather than the 
facts themselves. 
Monaghan explains Jay's evolution from the position of 
refusing to consider separate negotiations to one of realiz­
ing the necessity of independent negotiations with the British, 
When Jay arrived from Madrid, he was indignant over his treat­
ment by both France and Spain, but was further angered over 
the congressional instructions. However, he assured Frank­
lin that there was no possibility of a separate peace with 
34 
Corwin, French Policy, pp. 339, 351, 341-342, 346. 
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Britain so long as France remained faithful to the United 
States, He emphasized that he . . would rather see 
America ruined than dishonored.'" However, Jay's sentiments 
began to change when he saw that the American boundaries 
proposed by the French indicated a settlement favorable to 
Spain and France rather than to the United Stateso When 
Rayneval informed Jay that France would oppose both the 
extension of the United States to the Mississippi and its 
claims of free navigation of that river, Jay was convinced 
of the necessity of negotiating separately with England. 
The intercepted Barbe-Marbois message, which suggested a 
means by which the Americans might be excluded from the 
Newfoundland fisheries, increased Jay's suspicions of French 
motives. Jay's decision to send Vaughan to England to in­
form Shelburne of the commissioners' views towards the 
peace negotiations did not violate congressional instruc­
tions o Monaghan explains that Jay maintained the instruc­
tions had been written under the assumption that France 
would support American demands, but when she discouraged 
American claims, she was no longer entitled to exclusive 
35 
American confidence. 
Bemis says that Jay's suspicion that Vergennes attempted 
, to postpone American independence until French views 
and the objectives of Spain could be gratified by a 
peace , . influenced him to advocate separate negotia­
tions. In an effort to thwart French designs, he sent 
^^Monaghan, Jay, pp, 188, 195, 201, 202-203, 
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Vaughan to England with the message that it would be in the 
best interests o£ France, and not England, i£ recognition 
o£ American independence was postponed, Bemis commends 
Jay's decision to grant West Florida to the British, and 
also indicates that it was not a crucial error for Jay to 
omit Franklin's demand for Canada in his discussions with 
Oswald when they formulated the first draft of the actual 
treaty, Bemis concludes that the commissioners displayed 
insight when they broke away from congressional instruc­
tions, taking advantage of , European quarrels to cut 
their country from them," and Congress ratified the treaty. 
Like the preceding authors, Arthur Darling, in his 
book. Our Rising Empire, 1765-1805 (1940), attributes Jay's 
antipathy for France to the French efforts to play Britain 
against the United States for the benefit of Spain and 
France. Vergennes's plan to limit the independence of the 
United States and their territorial domain, along with the 
Barbe-Marbois message, aroused Jay's suspicion of French 
motives. Darling credits Jay with drafting the major part 
of the treaty to which England finally agreed and praises 
him for insisting that the independence of the United State 
57 
be the basis of peace between the two countries, 
Carl Van Doren agrees that French efforts to use the 
quest of the United States for independence to her advan­
tage prompted Jay to disregard congressional instructions, 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp, 210-211, 255, 
^^Darling, Empire, pp. 77, 81, 85-86, 91, 
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Jay believed that Vergennes intentionally delayed the peace 
negotiations, because he planned to utilize them to secure 
Spanish land claims in America, Thus, Jay urged the Amer­
ican commissioners to follow their own judgment rather than 
their official instructions. In addition, the intercepted 
Barb^-Marbois letter confirmed his suspicions that France 
opposed American independence. Unfortunately, Jay failed 
to realize that England was prepared to meet American de-
3 8 
mands, and as a result did not press hard enough for them. 
According to Miller, Jay's patriotism inspired him to 
disobey the congressional instructions, because he believed 
them detrimental to American honor. Miller labels the con­
gressional instructions a victory for French diplomacy. Al­
though France had not previously sought advantages from her 
association with America, her support of Spanish land claims 
effectively placed her in a position opposing the United 
States. Jay distrusted France to the extent that after 
France failed to secure Spanish land claims in the south­
west, he maintained that France would probably favor British 
claims in the region, rather than see the United States come 
into power there. Needless to say, the British were de­
lighted with Jay as he unreservedly took them into his con­
fidence, and Miller concludes that it is doubtful if, by 
exhibiting their suspicions of France, Jay and Adams served 
the cause of independence. On the other hand. Franklin's 
r Q 
Van Doren, Franklin, pp, 682, 684, 
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more subtle hints to the British that they would be in a 
more favorable position with the United States should they 
39 
make a generous peace, proved more effective» 
The idea foremost in Jay's mind, according to Morris, 
was American independence. Should England and France reach 
any kind of secret agreement, the peacemaking efforts of 
the Americans would be endangered. Jay and Franklin agreed 
on the 45th parallel as a boundary, since Franklin finally 
understood that there was no real chance of securing Can-
ada/° 
Stinchcombe explains the consequences of Jay's blister­
ing attack on Congress in 1781 regarding the instructions 
to the peace commission, while Van Alstyne barely comments 
on Jay's role in Paris. Apparently, Jay exerted consider­
able power in Congress, and his feelings about the instruc­
tions were significant. La Luzerne believed that he was 
more influential in Congress than either Franklin or Adams, 
However, his diatribe only revived the difficulties about 
"authority and honor" among the American diplomats and made 
41 
an open break among them possible. Van Alstyne remarks 
that Jay overcame his "anti-French feelings sufficiently" 
to support Franklin's plea for more money from the French, 
More significantly, however, Jay was receptive to David Hartley's 
proposal of a common citizenship between Great Britain and 
^^Miller, Triumph, pp. 586, 632-633, 639, 641. 
"^^Morris, Peacemakers, pp, 332, 347, 
41 
Stinchcombe, French Alliance, p, 176, 
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the United States, because of his desire to head off any 
possibility of an agreement for mutual security between 
42 
Spain and Britain against the United States, 
If Jay was justified in disputing congressional in­
structions, that legislative body would not publicly recog­
nize that his actions had been in the best interest of the 
country, Monaghan and Morris contend that Jay received an 
unjust reprimand for the steps he had exercised in gaining 
American independence, Monaghan criticizes Congress for 
making Jay justify his violations of its instructions after 
43 
peace had been declared. Morris explains that the major 
conflict developed over the secret and separate article 
involving West Florida, which seemed to many delegates an 
unnecessary insult to congressional honor. Neither Jay 
nor Adams forgave their critics in Congress, and Morris is 
inclined to sympathize with their anger. The American 
commissioners acted on their own initiative to the annoy­
ance of Congress, yet the outcome was to the advantage of 
, • 44 
their country. 
As a diplomatic representative and a member of the 
peace commission, John Jay does not inspire extreme con­
troversy among historians, yet there are varying histori­
cal opinions regarding his career. From his personal papers 
42 
Van Alstyne, Empire, pp, 227-228o 
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and correspondence and those o£ his colleagues, authors have 
been able to in"vestigate his career and reach their own con­
clusions about the success or failure of his diplomatic ef­
forts, His sole biographer, Frank Monaghan, depends largely 
upon manuscript sources, congressional journals and Wharton's 
edited volumes of diplomatic correspondence, and supplements 
this information with several secondary sources. This biog­
raphy lends interesting insight into Jay's diplomatic career 
but also covers his succeeding years as a politician and 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Donald Smith also deals with 
his career from before the Revolution until the end of his 
political activity. His book is comprised of selections of 
Jay's writings, while he inserts occasional comments. The 
book is useful from the standpoint of Smith's choice of 
material, as he feels that it best represents Jay's senti­
ments about the nation, Morris also relies heavily on Jay's 
personal papers for a source^ As has been stated, Morris 
does an exceptional job of discussing the careers of the 
peace commissioners through his emphasis on primary sources 
and some secondary studies. Neither Stinchcombe nor Van 
Alst.yne consider Jay's career as important as those of 
his colleagues in Paris, but their use of collections of 
revolutionary records and the papers of Adams and Franklin 
provides useful information. An early historian, E, S, 
Corwin, conducts his investigation from French sources, 
and there is no lengthy comment about Jay, However, Corwin 
does contribute to the interpretations about Jay's attitudes 
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towards the French, Once again. Miller's monograph, with 
its extensive bibliography, is valuable for its concise 
analysis^ Although he does not include Jay's papers in his 
bibliography, his study of the peace negotiations includes 
a lengthy discussion of Jay's contributions» Miller does 
use information from the papers of European figures in 
revolutionary diplomacy, among them Benjamin Vaughan, which 
adds insight into Jay's activities in Paris, Samuel Flagg 
Bemis edited ten volumes about America's secretaries of 
state, which includes an essay on John Jay» This primarily 
deals with his later diplomatic efforts, but does speak 
briefly about his fruitless mission to Spain and his later 
success in Paris, Semis's full-length book on American 
revolutionary diplomacy speaks about Jay's endeavors in 
Spain and France, With these sections, he includes infor­
mation drawn from Jay's diary and public papers, and he 
presents Jay as an able diplomat in Paris, Arthur Darling 
devotes an entire chapter to Jay's successes on the peace 
commission based mainly upon the writings of all three com­
missioners, He presents as valuable a study of Jay's di­
plomacy in negotiating for peace as any of the historians 
who deal more extensively with Jay's diplomatic career, 
John Jay does not receive undue criticism for his lack 
of success in Spain; however, the difficulty he encountered 
attempting to persuade the Spanish government to accede to 
American requests is extensively discussed by historians, 
Corwin and Monaghan agree that Spain's insistence on 
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monopolizing the navigation rights on the Mississippi River, 
and congressional indiscretion in drawing upon funds it 
assumed Jay had obtained from Spain were the main problems 
Jay needed to overcome to succeed at his mission, Corwin 
tends to be less sympathetic with Jay's frustrations as he 
focuses upon Jay's diplomacy with Spain and its effects upon 
his relations with France. On the other hand, Monaghan 
sympathetically discusses Jay's mission to Spain and extends 
his praise for Jay's contributions on the peace commission. 
Jay's failure in Spain was due to uncontrollable circumstances 
and was not a reflection of his lack of diplomatic skill, 
Monaghan's study concentrates upon Jay's diplomatic and po­
litical career, while Corwin's topic demands that he deal 
less with personalities. 
Monaghan and Corwin also disagree over Jay's attitude 
towards the French in Spain, Monaghan believes that Mont-
morin was dishonest in pretending that he would assist Jay's 
cause with the Spanish government. According to Monaghan, 
the French never had any intention of persuading Spain to 
recognize the United States, while Corwin explains that Jay, 
as well as other American officials, failed to comprehend 
that France's first obligation was to support her old Euro­
pean ally, Bemis concurs with Monaghan's basic premise that 
Jay faced insurmountable obstacles in that Spain demanded 
concessions on the Mississippi River issues, which Congress 
first refused to yield until assured that Spain would recog­
nize American independence as France had, Bemis's use of 
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diplomatic material from the Spanish government as well as 
congressional journals and Jay's correspondence lend cre­
dence to his position. Miller also agrees that Jay's prob­
lems in Spain were attributable to the Spanish demands for 
American concessions which were supported by France, Yet 
Miller concludes that Jay was not exactly suited to a dip­
lomatic appointment because of his strong republican senti-
mentSo Donald Smith's short account of Jay's contributions 
to the founding of the nation, taken from Jay's personal 
writings, blames Congress for the obstacles Jay encountered 
in Spain, because the instructions demanded more than Spain 
was willing to grant. Van Alstyne and Morris, who are well-
respected historians, basically agree that congressional 
handling of international finances and the Mississippi River 
questions diminished the prospect of Jay's success in Spain, 
Van Alstyne also points out that Jay's stubbornness regard­
ing the Mississippi questions added to the sense of doom 
which pervaded his mission. Morris contends that congres­
sional ambivalence on the Mississippi questions allowed Jay 
to interpret the instructions as he chose, and Jay's anti­
pathy towards Spain precluded a beneficial agreement between 
the two countries. With respect to France's influence on 
Jay's diplomatic endeavors in Spain, Corwin mainly points 
out that Jay failed to realize the prior commitments that 
France had to Spain, and therefore mistook Montmorin's 
advice as an effort to place him and the United States in 
an inferior position. Most other historians agree that the 
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French minister ignored Jay's demands and supported Spanish 
claims in America. 
In contrast to the disputes over his experiences in 
Spain, there is general agreement among historians that 
Jay's role in Paris was indispensable. Morris and Monaghan 
describe how he was able to maintain harmony in the commis­
sion because of his moderate temperament and friendship 
with both Franklin and Adams. Van Alstyne and Currey, how­
ever, claim that he and Adams, not Franklin, initially de­
cided to ignore congressional instructions, because Frank­
lin was too willing to comply with French suggestions. 
When Jay arrived in Paris, the hostility he harbored 
against France after his experience in Spain was crucial, 
according to Monaghan, Bemis, Stourzh, Smith, and Burlingame, 
In contrast, Corwin and Miller imply that Jay's gratitude 
for France's generosity overshadowed any ill-feeling he 
might have held against France. Monaghan, Stourzh and 
Bemis concur that French designs to control the expansion 
of the United States within boundaries east of the Missis­
sippi infuriated Jay. Page Smith maintains that Jay was 
more anti-French than was Adams. Burlingame defends Jay's 
decision to negotiate separately with England, as does 
Richard B. Morris. Stinchcombe and Van Alstyne conclude 
that Jay's dislike of the French occurred after he perceived 
the dishonest treatment he had received from them in Spain. 
Jay moved to Paris in 1781 and, according to some 
authors, solely directed the negotiations with England. 
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However, Corwin asserts that the independence Jay exercised 
in sending Vaughan to England hindered the American cause, 
as it assured Britain that there was a breach between France 
and the United States. Monaghan, Bemis, Darling and Van 
Doren contend that French efforts to delay the peace by 
playing the United States and Britain against each other 
influenced Jay's decision to defy congressional instruc­
tions. Bemis and Darling are more expertly versed in 
foreign policy than the other historians, and their use 
of primary source material from Europe and the United States 
contribute to their understanding of this delicate situation, 
Monaghan and Van Doren concentrate more upon the personal­
ities and not the situations which influenced Jay's decision 
to negotiate separately with Britain. Miller continues his 
investigation of Jay's actions and mentions his extreme 
patriotism but does not condemn Jay for defying those in­
structions which would have harmed the future of the United 
States. Stinchcombe's critical opinion that Jay recognized 
his influence in Congress and thus did not hesitate to attack 
this congressional mandate, is not commented upon by other 
authors. Both Morris and Monaghan agree that Jay, along 
with the other two commissioners, was unjustly reprimanded 
by Congress for concluding a peace that would essentially 
define the role of an independent United States and insure 
its security in the world. 
John Jay's early career in diplomacy admittedly was 
doomed to failure, but he successfully proved his diplo­
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matic ability in Paris for the eighteenth-century and 
succeeding generations. He struggled with adverse situa­
tions in Spain, and yet according to most historians, sur­
mounted his failure in Spain by directing the peace nego­
tiations in Paris. Thus, Jay was vital to the success of 
early American diplomacy. 
CHAPTER VII 
FRANCIS DANA IN RUSSIA 
The diplomacy of Francis Dana at the court of Catherine 
the Great has long remained obscure in the history of Amer­
ican foreign policy, although the accomplishments of Adams, 
Jay and Franklin have received extensive attention from his­
torians. Francis Dana was a Boston lawyer whom Congress 
appointed in 1781 to continue the tradition of militia 
diplomacy. He was instructed to seek Russian recognition 
of the United States and some form of alliance. His only 
biography, published in 1930, a 1906 study in early Russian-
American diplomatic relations, and more recently, historical 
articles dealing with Russian foreign policy and the Amer­
ican Revolution, reveal that his mission to Russia was more 
complicated than had been formerly assumed. When Dana 
arrived in Russia, he failed to realize that the Russian 
empress was primarily concerned with insuring Russian power 
in Europe, and that the American Revolution only supplied 
her with a convenient approach towards weakening the British 
Empire. Both he and the American Congress believed that 
Count Panin's friendly attitude towards the United States 
would pervade the entire system of Russian diplomacy. How­
ever, the power of the Russian foreign minister had been 
eclipsed by the time Dana arrived. Thus the envoy encountered 
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the frustrations o£ non-recognition and was victimized by-
Russian deception, which continued throughout his stay in 
Russia. 
Given these circumstances, historians discuss, with 
varying interpretations, the events of his mission, using 
the information provided by the Dana papers, published 
government documents from the United States and Russia, as 
well as pertinent printed sources on Catherine and the 
League of Armed Neutrality. Historians differ in discuss­
ing his attitudes towards relations with the Russian offi­
cials. Also, Dana's claims that the French and British 
envoys in Russia worked to secure the goals of their respec­
tive countries and ignored those of the United States cause 
historical discussion. Whether Dana strictly adhered to 
congressional instructions while in St. Petersburg causes 
debate among historians, 
W, P. Cresson's biography of Dana, Francis Dana: A 
Puritan Diplomat at the Court of Catherine the Great (1930), 
emphasizes that the congressional instructions to Dana made 
his mission to Russia especially difficult. His instructions 
assumed that the United States, although a belligerent, would 
readily be admitted to the League of Armed Neutrality. This 
concept diametrically opposed any agreement that Catherine 
was willing to make. According to Cresson, Dana was in­
structed to explain to the empress the . . justice of 
our cause, the nature and stability of our union. . . and 
then impress upon her the advantages that a treaty of friend­
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ship and commerce could provide for Russia. Yet Congress 
failed to provide him with reasons which might convince 
Russia.^ Upon his arrival there he realized that Catherine 
had assumed an attitude of impartiality, as she was hoping 
to control the proposed mediation conference at Vienna, 
Dana was unprepared for this reception, because Count Panin 
had always been favorably disposed towards the United Statesc 
Robert Livingston, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had 
assumed that Catherine would receive Dana amicably and had 
been confident that Russia would agree to treaties with the 
United States and invite it to join the League of Armed 
Neutrality. The tenor of the congressional instructions 
changed when Livingston realized that Dana's efforts were 
only languishing among the intrigues of the court, and he 
began to discourage further negotiations. A congressional 
committee on foreign policy then enunciated the purposes 
of the United States in European affairs: . . The true 
interests of these states require they should be as little 
as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of 
2 
European Nations.'" Ultimately, even before Dana was re­
called, Congress abandoned its interest in his mission and 
gave him no further responsibility. 
The more recent articles by David M. Griffiths on 
Russian-American relations are vital to a study of American 
revolutionary diplomacy. Based upon a wide array of primary 
^Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp. 142-143, 
^Ibid.. pp. 301-302. 
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sources, he explains Dana's mission to Russia as part of 
the efforts of the Adams-Lee faction in Congress to dis­
credit the relationship Franklin enjoyed with France, 
Griffiths also suggests that the Adams-Lee faction urged 
that Dana's mission be immediately authorized, because 
they feared that Franklin's subordination to France would 
insure a French monopoly of American commerce. In their 
minds, recognition of American independence by Russia would 
3 
lessen the potential of control by one country. 
Dana's Russian venture was excessively complicated. Al­
though he received instructions from Congress, other men 
attempted to exert influence over his tactics. John C, 
Hildt's Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States 
and Russia (1906) explains that Franklin had urged that Dana 
should go to St. Petersburg as a private citizen, as he op­
posed sending an official minister before the United States 
4 
was assured of recognition. After arriving in Russia and 
establishing communications with Count Ostermann, a vice-
chancellor and one of the ruthless aides of Prince Potemkin, 
Panin's successor, Dana suffered innumerable delays and 
excuses from the Russian court. Thus, he received an early 
3 
David M. Griffiths, "American Commercial Diplomacy in 
Russia, 1780-1783," William and Mary Quarterly,. XXVII (July, 
1970), 384. (Hereinafter referred to as Griffiths , "Commercial 
Diplomacy.") 
'^John C. Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the 
United States with Russia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins ~ 
Press , 1906) , p. ITi (Hereinafter referred to as Hildt, 
Diplomatic Negotiations.) 
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introduction to the problems he would face as a minister 
unrecognized by the court to which he had been sent. 
Cresson elaborates further on the unforeseen diffi­
culties of Dana's mission caused by the capriciousness of 
various individuals. He received no support from Franklin 
and Vergennes, both of whom opposed the futile efforts of 
militia diplomacy. In addition, Adams warned Dana to be­
ware of the intrigues of Vergennes and Franklin who, he 
claimed, would attempt to control the mission, Adams urged 
Dana . . to let Catherine send an ambassador to the 
United States . . . and thus avoid the insidious influ­
ence of Franklin and Vergennes. However, Cresson's major 
emphasis on the human obstacles confronting Dana stresses 
the instability of the Russian court. Ostermann informed 
Dana that he would receive an audience only after a peace 
treaty had been signed. As time went on, Dana began to 
understand that favoritism and blackmail were routine in 
the Russian court.^ Catherine's prejudices and her pursuit 
of personal pleasures diverted her from ever meeting with 
Dana. Time after time, he was denied diplomatic recognition 
but he remained optimistic that the United States military 
successes would favorably impress the empress, Dana began 
to realize that European nations hesitated to accept the 
United States into the League of Armed Neutrality, because 
they were waiting to see if Great Britain would recognize 
^Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp. 148, 222, 
178 
American independence. According to Dana, the nations in­
volved in the League might risk the loss of commercial 
benefits tendered by the United States if they waited too 
long. Dana remained convinced that future relations with 
Russia would be based upon commerce.^ 
Samuel Flagg Bemis states that the whole mission was 
"ill-considered" from its inception. The original idea 
of the United States joining the League of Armed Neutrality, 
even if Russia had recognized her, was incomprehensible to 
Russia, according to Bemis, because she was a belligerent. 
In addition, Catherine was maneuvering for acceptance of 
her mediation policy through which "... Great Britain 
could negotiate with the revolted colonies separately and 
independently and at the same time negotiate a European 
peace without recognizing their independence." Russian 
recognition of American independence could have proven 
7 
disastrous for Catherine's diplomacy. 
Griffiths maintains that Catherine and Russian commer­
cial policy were responsible for Dana's failure. His article, 
"Nikita Panin, Russian Diplomacy and the American Revolution" 
(1969), points out that Dana's frustrations were a result of 
Catherine's fickleness towards her own ministers and the 
O 
subsequent removal of Panin from power, his later article 
^Ibid., pp. 220, 245. 
7 
Bemis, Diplomacy, p. 165. 
O 
David M. Griffiths, "Nikita Panin, Russian Diplomacy 
and the American Revolution," Slavic Review, American Quar-
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on Russian-American commercial policy states that a commer­
cial problem was a basic cause of the failure of his mis­
sion, Dana's major task was to counter Russian fears that 
American trade in Europe would compete with Russia's, Dana 
supplied sound arguments to Russian advisors, insisting that 
the importance of American commerce to Russia was , be­
yond all question . . which met little or no response, 
Catherine was not openly hostile to the American proposals 
for an alliance based upon Russian recognition of indepen­
dence but regarded the benefits of trade with the United 
States as being of little significance in relation to the 
magnitude of European commerce. 
Not only did Dana have to contend with Catherine's 
unpredictable and vacillating diplomatic and political 
activities, but he also was countered by the French and 
British representatives at the Russian court. They were 
seeking to secure political and diplomatic advantages for 
their own countries from the titular head of the Russian 
Empire. Historians argue over the relationship between 
Britain and Russia, and J. C. Hildt, F. A. Golder and 
W. P. Cresson basically agree that Catherine hoped to use 
the American Revolution to effectively weaken British influ­
ence in Europe, Hildt explains that Catherine was sympathetic 
terly of Soviet and East European Studies, XXVII (March, 
1969) , 19"i (Hereinafter referred to as Griffiths , "Russian 
Diplomacy.") 
^Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," 379. 
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to the American cause only because she hoped to frighten Brit­
ain into a humiliating peace by pretending that she would sup­
port the efforts of the United States for independence<, In 
reality, her only desire was to see an increase of Russian 
prestigeo^^ Concurring with Hildt's premise is F, A, Golder's 
article, "Catherine II and the American Revolution" (1916), 
Although his thesis lacks documentation, he argues that 
Catherine's only interest in the American Revolution was the 
impact it would have on British and European politics, 
Catherine blamed Britain for the failure of her mediation 
proposals, because Britain refused to free the colonies. 
And Catherine purposely informed France and Spain of British 
attempts to bribe Russia into supporting the British war ef­
fort in order to increase their antipathy towards Britain, 
W, P. Cresson adds that Catherine came to realize that her 
role as mediatrix was impeded, as well as her plans for east­
ern expansion, so when Charles James Fox quit office upon the 
death of the Marques of Rockingham all negotiations between 
1 ? 
Great Britain and Russia were suspended, " 
Griffiths also discounts the notion of a political 
agreement between England and Russia. He explains that 
Russian policy divides into two distinct phases: the first 
under Panin, who sought to preserve the status quo in Europe 
and to secure de facto independence for the American colonies 
^^Hildt, Diplomatic Negotiations, pp. 18-19. 
^^Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, p, 265. 
12 
Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, p. 236. 
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through Russian mediation; the second began when Panin was 
removed in 1781, and the empress's advisors . . en­
couraged a more aggressive foreign policy that could only be 
hampered by a peaceful solution to the war. ..." That is, 
Russia could expand her borders if she took advantage of 
England's weakness. Apparently France was the country with 
which Russia felt the most kinship in the first phase. 
Vergennes explicitly explained that the Franco-American 
alliance contained no exclusive trade privileges for France, 
and that trade between the United States and Russia would be 
unimpeded. With this assurance, he hoped to persuade Russia 
to support the American cause. Russia anticipated that free 
trade and American independence would render British power 
politics obsolete and contribute to the downfall of the 
13 
British mercantile empire. 
The French activities in Russia during the Revolution 
also stimulate historical discussion. Hildt expresses the 
opinion that Verac, the French ambassador in Russia, at­
tempted to aid Dana's mission. Hildt says that Verac tried 
to explain Catherine's mediation policy to Dana, specifying 
that the United States must negotiate first with Great 
Britain, and then with other countries. Furthermore, Verac 
pointed out that Russia had no great affection for the rebels, 
and it would only humiliate the United States if France unsuc­
cessfully demanded that Russia recognize their independence, 
Verac advised, to no avail, that Dana would facilitate his 
^^Griffiths, "Russian Diplomacy," 381. 
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cause if he waited until a preliminary peace treaty was 
signed before asking for Russian recognition, but Dana in-
14 
sisted upon negotiating immediately with the Russians, 
Both Cresson and Bemis agree that Dana was justified 
if he suspected that French advice was not always in the 
best interests of the United States. Cresson claims that 
Verac unintentionally misinformed Dana that the United 
States be invited to participate actively in the proposed 
mediation. Dana disagreed with the congressional instruc­
tions that he was to seek French advice throughout his nego­
tiations, because he was sure that Sir James Harris, the 
British minister in Russia, and Verac agreed that a premature 
recognition of American independence was undesirable,^^ 
Bemis supports Dana's reasons for distrusting France. He 
claims that Vergennes had given Verac orders to ignore 
Dana's diplomacy in Russia. Vergennes realized that urging 
the Czarina to recognize France's ally would only antagonize 
her, as her plan of mediation would then be unacceptable to 
Great Britain, 
Griffiths discounts, however, any suggestion that 
Britain and France connived against American interests in 
Russia. Verac understood Catherine's desire to remain in 
the role of the mediatrix, because she felt that neutrality 
was the only way to sustain Russia's commercial trade with 
14 
Hildt, Diplomatic Negotiations, pp. 17, 18, 22. 
^^Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, pp, 171, 177, 
^^Bemis, Diplomacy, pp. 165-177, 407, 
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Great Britain. Despite Verac's warning, Dana was determined 
t o  d e f i n e  h i s  o w n  r o l e  i n  R u s s i a ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  F r e n c h  a d ­
vice. He failed t •) understand that the major obstacles in 
Russian-American diplomacy were Catherine's search for other 
alliances, her efforts to partition the Ottoman Empire, and 
the turmoil of her inner court. Therefore he assumed the 
same distrust for Russia that Adams directed towards the 
French. Dana promised Vergennes that he would make his 
official assignment known only when formal relations were 
assured, but upon his arrival, he commenced acting as though 
he was an official ambassador. Griffiths concludes that 
Vergennes never opposed the mission, and desired only to 
17 
advise Dana about its potential difficulties. 
According to Cresson, John Adams influenced Dana's 
policy in Russia. Although their relationship has not 
aroused an extreme amount of controversy, it merits discus­
sion. Dana was attracted to Adams, because they shared 
common diplomatic frustrations and prejudices. Adams was 
convinced that the same methods of firm diplomacy he used 
in Holland could be applied in Russia. But this approach 
proved unsuccessful in Russia, and it was only Adams's suc­
cess in Holland which, in a measure, vindicated these pro-
j 18 
cedures, 
Cresson and Griffiths state opposing viewpoints in 
^^Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," 391, 400-401, 
18 
Cresson, Puritan Diplomat, p. 229, 
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evaluating Dana's diplomatic career. Cresson explains that 
Congress had relinquished too much o£ its power to the 
French, which frusvrated Dana's efforts to negotiate 
directly with Russia. When Dana realized that Russia 
expected a substantial monetary payment from the United 
States if a coramercial treaty was agreed upon, he dis­
approved of further American involvement in Europe» Thus, 
according to Cresson, Dana formulated a pattern of peaceful 
isolationism, which was the policy the new United States 
government would adopt in regard to Europe. Both Dana and 
Adams were disillusioned with European affairs, and they 
exerted their influence towards securing a complete with­
drawal from European alliances. Their experiences in 
European courts convinced them that the sovereigns were 
manipulating the American Revolution in an effort to place 
their own countries in positions of power and to satisfy 
their own vanities. Following the Peace of Paris, Dana 
also abandoned any hopes of establishing commercial con-
19 
nections with Catherine's court. In contrast to Cresson, 
Griffiths labels Dana's mission a glaring failure, caused 
by his inability to understand the basis of Russian diplo­
macy, which was based upon commerce. For Russia, England 
was more prominent and infinitely more valuable to Russian 
commerce than were American ports. Russian authorities 
were not convinced of the value of American trade, and this 
^^Ibido. pp. 272, 299-300. 
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sentiment became more acute after Panin was forced from 
office. Dana chose to blame the French for many of the 
difficulties which confronted him in Russia, assuming that 
they wanted to subordinate American interests to their 
20 
own. 
As the most recent author dealing with Dana and Russian-
American diplomacy, Griffiths is critical of both Cresson 
and Bemis for their ineffective and unscholarly analyses 
of Dana's mission. The source material for Griffiths's 
articles includes extensive use of Russian official and 
private correspondence and archival material, as well as 
Dana's papers and secondary material pertinent to the topic» 
He dismisses Cresson's biography, claiming that he has in­
vestigated only one source remotely associated with Russia, 
that of an emigre Pole. Cresson, however, clearly states 
in his bibliographical note that his investigation is 
limited to Dana's private correspondence and other manu­
scripts and printed sources dealing with Dana's diplomatic 
career as well as his later political life. Admittedly, he 
was deficient in his use of Russian sources, but he is 
competent in his interpretation of the American primary 
sources. Bemis incurs Griffiths's criticism for his mis­
taken emphasis on Catherine's vanity as the basis of Russian 
policy. Griffiths also chastises Bemis for stating that 
Russian foreign policy was governed by favoritism and 
^^Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," 399-400o 
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blackmail. Although Bemis has used mainly American gov­
ernment documents and correspondence, he also cites informa­
tion from the State Archives at Leningrad, which is avail­
able in the Library of Congress. Griffiths does not comment 
about Hildt's early investigation of Russian-American rela­
tions » Admittedly documentation is lacking in Hildt's book, 
but his work does provide another viewpoint about a rather 
obscure man in American diplomatic history. 
In discussing the issues relating to Dana's mission to 
Russia, Cresson defends his lack of accomplishment, explain­
ing that the congressional instructions and Panin's sudden 
dismissal from power combined to make any significant diplo­
matic achievement impossible. In addition, Catherine de­
cided to assume the role of mediatrix and was reluctant to 
commit herself to the American cause. Griffiths explains 
that Dana was dispatched to Russia to assure the Adams-Lee 
faction in Congress that Franklin would not secure for 
France monopoly of American trade. Dana failed to compre­
hend that Russian commercial trade depended more upon 
Britain's ports than those of the United States, 
Dana's status as an unofficial diplomat also presented 
problems both domestically and abroad. Hildt explains that 
Franklin's consistent opposition to militia diplomacy 
prompted him to urge Dana to travel to St, Petersburg as 
a private citizen. Then upon his arrival in Russia, Dana 
^^Griffiths, "Russian Diplomacy," 23. 
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realized that the Russian officials would not immediately 
acknowledge his official status, and thus he was treated as 
an unrecognized minister. Cresson also comments that Frank­
lin and Vergennes failed to offer Dana any support, and 
that the Russian court chose to ignore him for various 
political and personal reasons. Bemis contends that the 
mission was ill-fated from its inception, because Congress 
assumed that the United States, although a belligerent, 
would be accepted into the League of Armed Neutrality. 
Moreover, Russian recognition of American independence 
would have been disastrous to Catherine's policy of media­
tion. 
Historians also mention the influence exerted in Russia 
by France and England. J. C. Hildt, F. A. Colder, and W, P, 
Cresson explain that Catherine's policy aimed at weakening 
the British Empire by extending the American Revolution and 
mediating a peace. Griffiths also discounts any idea that 
England and Russia enjoyed a political friendship, stating 
that Russia placed her self-interest foremost. He continues 
his explanation of Russia's relationships with other Euro­
pean countries, noting that Vergennes urged Panin to recog­
nize American independence, and assured Russia that the 
Franco-American alliance contained no exclusive trade agree­
ments for France. However, Dana developed a distrust for 
French advice, similar to that held by Adams, Hildt main­
tains that the French ambassador in Russia attempted to 
aid the American cause, but Dana's insistence on proceeding 
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without a preliminary peace and Russian antipathy towards 
Republican rebellion contributed to Dana's failure. In 
contrast, Cresson and Bemis argue that Dana's distrust of 
French motives were justified, because France had a pre­
dilection for placing her national interests first. 
Although Dana's diplomatic achievements in Russia were 
negligible, his mission merits study in an investigation of 
revolutionary diplomacy. Because of his frustrating exper­
iences in Russia, and perhaps his inability to comprehend 
the intricacies of European diplomacy, he developed a fixa­
tion for peaceful isolation that was to influence American 
foreign policy in the first crucial years of its develop­
ment. Thus, Francis Dana contributed his thoughts on 
diplomacy to a nation struggling to formulate a successful 
foreign policy. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
fThe books written about revolutionary diplomacy, or 
dealing to. some ̂ degree witli _this„_aspect o£ the Revolution, 
provide both laymen and specialists in the field of diplo­
mat i^Jlist or y_ with useful information.,. Although there are 
variations in interpretations, there is a certain amount of 
credibility to be found in most of the books. However, 
there are instancesjwhere an author misinterprets evidence 
to substantia^e his sjub-iectlve ideas. 
Admittedly Silas Deane's diplomatic career was not 
distinguished, as he became embroiled in numerous problems 
which, most historians agree, detract from his achievements. 
With the exception of Currey, whose object in writing his 
book is somewhere beyond the realm of historical investiga­
tion, historians concede, however, that Silas Deane did 
contribute to the success of revolutionary diplomacy, 
Currey accuses Deane of joining with Beaumarchais in di­
verting congressional funds for private use, but Auger, 
James and Van Alstyne refute this notion of a secret part­
nership. Deane, being only human, was not a criminal if 
he indulged in some personal financial ventures, as Fergu­
son points out. Helen Auger devotes her entire book to 
the privateering and commercialism that was conducted with 
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both official and unofficial authorization. In general, 
historians agree that Deane directed his efforts towards 
achieving the independence of the United States by securing 
aid from the French through Beaumarchais. Van Alstyne 
points out, however, that the French had been dispatching 
aid to America before Deane and Beaumarchais began their 
business dealings. 
Another aspect of Deane's career which has caused 
debate among historians is his association with Edward 
Bancroft. Most authors agree that they were acquainted, 
but Currey and Boyd, although distinctly different in style 
and scholarship, explain that Deane provided Bancroft with 
information which the British then used. Boyd decides that 
Deane was victimized by a more clever man, while Currey 
states that Deane's dishonesty equalled that of Bancroft's. 
More benignly, Bemis, Auger, James and Miller claim that 
Deane was innocent of any crime and was misled by Bancroft. 
Van Alstyne insists that there was never an organized net­
work of British spies. 
As for the feud which developed between Deane and 
Arthur Lee, Abernethy and Corwin are the proponents of 
Arthur Lee's side of the argument. Traditionally, as Bemis, 
James, Auger and Ferguson demonstrate, historians agree that 
Lee was overzealous in his condemnation of Deane. On the 
other hand, Deane and Franklin enjoyed a rather harmonious 
association, according to Hale and James. Once again, 
Currey's dissenting voice states that they were partners 
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in crime. Allegations such as this emphasize the question­
able scholarship o£ his book. 
Although no historian defends Silas Deane's final defec­
tion to the British, James, Ferguson and Morris explain that 
the congressional investigation was badly conducted and con­
tributed to his bitterness against the United States, On 
the other hand, Henderson and Currey imply that Congress 
was correct in recalling and investigating Deane. 
Although the career of Benjamin Franklin in Europe 
promotes little of the same type of controversy among his­
torians as do Silas Deane's activities, Franklin's diplomacy 
poses some dilemmas for those historians who have discovered 
in their investigations that Franklin also made some errors 
in his negotiations. Due to the questions raised by Aber-
nethy and possibly Currey, the career of Benjamin Franklin 
is not completely free from dispute. 
Franklin's concept of diplomacy emphasized independence 
for the United States but, according to Gilbert, Stourzh 
and James, he believed that alliances with Europe would also 
benefit the United States commercially. Stourzh, although 
one of Franklin's confirmed supporters, concludes that 
Franklin was not essential to the success of the alliance, 
because France had determined to establish it, regardless 
of who represented the United States. However, as Bemis and 
Miller state, and as Morris agrees. Franklin exerted his own 
unique pressure on Vergennes to insure continued French sup­
port of the United States, 
According to Richard Henry Lee, Franklin's financial 
interests interfered with his official duties, and Abernethy, 
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Currey and Morris agree with this assertion. Fundamentally, 
according to the majority of reputable authors, like Fay, 
Auger, James, Van Doren, and Burlingame, there is little 
substance to Lee's accusations. Continuing the criticisms 
of Franklin by his contemporaries, John Adams was often 
contemptuous of Franklin's activities» However, even 
Adams's biographer, Page Smith, admits that Adams was jeal­
ous and suspicious of Franklin. 
Benjamin Franklin also arouses controversy because of 
his determination while on the peace commission to obey 
the instructions of Congress and consult France on all 
negotiations with England. However, Bemis, Darling and 
Miller conclude that independence was Franklin's first 
consideration, and thus he eventually agreed to exclude 
France from the peace negotiations. Stourzh's study of 
Franklin's diplomacy defends Franklin against those who 
maintain that Franklin advocated reconciliation with Great 
Britain. Never, according to Stourzh, did Franklin con­
sider such a step, as was evidenced by his commitment to 
independence, 
The controversies concerning the Lee brothers, espe­
cially Arthur, have been mentioned in summarizing the dis­
cussions among historians about Deane and Franklin. The 
activities of the Lees have been defended by a small mi­
nority of writers. Although Miller and Auger dismiss 
Arthur's role in Paris as insignificant, Currey praises 
him as the only member of the first commission who dis­
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played integrity. Richard Henry Lee, Bemis, Currey and 
even James agree that Lee was a patriot in the purest 
sense of the term but, unfortunately, he was unable to 
direct his patriotism in a constructive manner for his 
country. His missions to Spain and Prussia demonstrated 
this. In addition, his brother's diplomatic endeavors 
were equally futile. 
In Arthur's defense, Abernethy carefully explains that 
Lee's accusations against Franklin and Deane have been dis­
missed although they merited more investigation. Because 
of Abernethy's article, Currey's support of Lee seems more 
believable. 
John Jay gained more fame later in his political life, 
but he was also active in the diplomacy of the Revolution, 
The commission to Spain introduced him to the difficulties 
of negotiating with another nation. His biographer, Frank 
Monaghan, sympathizes with Jay's frustrations in dealing 
with members of the Spanish court. In addition, Bemis, 
Monaghan, Morris and Van Alstyne agree that Congress was 
not considerate in demanding large sums of money from Spain 
through Jay, nor did its vacillation on the Mississippi 
River question abet his cause. Unfortunately, Jay believed 
that France sincerely meant to persuade Spain to support 
the United States bid for independence, and Monaghan and 
Corwin agree that he was mistaken. However, Corwin ex­
plains that Jay was ignorant of France's previous political 
obligation to Spain. Because of Jay's strong republican 
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spirit, both Monaghan and Miller imply- that Jay might not 
have been ideally suited to diplomatic negotiations which 
required flexibility =, 
In contrast to his failure in Spain, historians gen­
erally agree that Jay was an asset on the peace commission, 
although his experiences in Spain intensified his skepticism 
of France, He still thought of France as having deceived 
him in her failure to secure Spanish acceptance of an alli­
ance with the United States, according to Monaghan, Bemis, 
Stourzh, Smith and Burlingame. Then he realized that France 
desired to see the borders of the United States curtailed, 
which increased his distrust of France, This influenced 
his decision to advocate separate negotiations with England^ 
which Monaghan, Morris and Burlingame deem a wise choice. 
The three best accounts of Jay's peace negotiations, by 
Miller, Darling and Bemis, also explain that French efforts 
to delay the negotiations and play the United States and 
Great Britain against one another added to Jay's antipathy 
against France, Because of his contributions to the peace 
efforts, Morris and Monaghan agree that the congressional 
reprimand was unjust, 
John Adams, also a member of the Paris peace commission, 
began his diplomatic career as a replacement for Silas 
Deane. There is no doubt that Adams was a sincere patriot, 
and Morse concludes that his patriotism helped American 
independence. However, Monaghan, Miller, Morris, Rossiter 
and Bailyn point out that his blunt manner and sensitivity 
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to personal slights detracted from his diplomatic abili­
ties, Honesty remained foremost in Adams's concept of duty, 
and Henderson remarks that Congress exonerated Adams from 
the dubious dealings of the first commission^ 
The activities of John Adams in Paris have aroused 
historical debate, Adams's unreasonableness was a negative 
factor in his initial diplomatic mission to France, accord­
ing to Cresson and Corwin, However, Hale, Bemis and Miller 
contend that Adams agreed to an alliance with France, be­
cause it seemed the only practical way for the United States 
to gain independence. On the other hand, Morris and Stinch-
combe conclude that Vergennes was unnecessarily rude to 
Adams and rather deserved Adams's dislike. Page Smith also 
defends Adams's skeptical attitude towards the French, 
If Adams encountered difficulties in France, Smith 
emphasizes that he was successful in Holland and back in 
Paris on the peace commission. Darling and Morris also com­
mend his work on the peace commission and state that the 
congressional rebuke of the efforts of the commissioners 
was unjustified. Smith is convinced that Adams and Jay 
were responsible for the success of the commission, despite 
Franklin's unavailing insistence that France be included in 
all the negotiations. Most historians accept the contention 
between Franklin and Adams as a reflection of the differ­
ences in their temperaments. 
In considering the career of Francis Dana, only a few 
historians have devoted significant research to his mission 
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to Russia. Because Dana achieved nothing concrete there, 
many historians have ignored him, but W. P, Cresson attrib­
utes his lack o£ accomplishment to Catherine's mysterious 
and unpredictable court habits and to the impractical de-
•aands set forth in the congressional instructions. On the 
other hand, Griffiths criticizes Dana's inability to under­
stand that the United States could not offer Russia suffic­
ient commercial advantages to make an alliance worthwhile. 
Dana was also disappointed in the diplomatic support 
which both France and Great Britain extended to Russia, 
Cresson and Berais argue that once again France placed her 
own interests foremost. J. C. Hildt also explains that 
Dana made the situation more difficult by pressuring an 
unwilling Russian court to recognize American independence. 
Eventually, Cresson concludes, Dana became a firm proponent 
of isolationism because of his experience in Russia, 
For research on American revolutionary diplomacy, 
there are primary materials, published and unpublished, and 
numerous secondary works to document an interesting studyo 
The authors dealing with American revolutionary diplomacy 
use essentially the same primary documents, but certain 
historians have made more scholarly studies than others, 
Samuel Flagg Bemis set a precedent for twentieth-century 
historians to follow regarding research and writing that 
few have been able to emulate. However, Gerald Stourzh 
has challenged Bemis's style and scholarship. Fortunately, 
their topics were sufficiently different to avoid a con­
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flict, and both of their books are valuable for this study. 
Although Bemis and Stourzh have ably followed the 
canons of historical writing, other authors have contributed 
competently to the literature of early American diplomatic 
history, Corwin's study on the French alliance provides a 
needed explanation for one of the major problems of the 
Revolution. In a span of four years, Morris, Stinchcombe 
and Van Alstyne published their books, which thoroughly re­
searched the primary materials pertinent to their topics, 
Morris has made the men on the peace commission very real 
characters without submerging his scholarship in shallow 
analyses of personalities. Stinchcombe and Van Alstyne 
also realize the importance that diplomatic negotiations 
played in gaining the alliance with France and independence 
from England. 
From a biographical standpoint, the books by Van Doren, 
Cresson, Monaghan, and Page Smith are necessary to this study. 
Without their lucid explanations of the motivations and 
biases of the early diplomats, it would be difficult to 
evaluate their foreign policies. There is no startling new 
material in these biographies, but then none has been re­
vealed in the collections of documents relevant to these 
American diplomats. 
From the many articles that have been published on 
diplomacy and the men of the Revolution, those by Abernethy, 
Boyd, Bemis, Ferguson, Gilbert and Griffiths are outstand­
ing. Both Abernethy and Boyd distinguish themselves by 
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drawing scholarly and new interpretations from evidence 
that has been available to many historians, Griffiths 
delves into sources on an obscure topic to reveal valuable 
information about Russian-American diplomacy. His posi­
tion, to date, remains unchallenged. Ferguson's explana­
tion of the commercial tendencies of American diplomats 
defends them from the scorn that other authors attach to 
their commercial interests. Gilbert's examination of the 
attitudes of Franklin, Adams and the French philosophers 
of the eighteenth century towards diplomacy lends an inter­
esting perspective to this thesis. 
For historians writing about the diplomacy of the Amer­
ican Revolution, there are not the major difficulties in 
obtaining primary source material that historians dealing 
with more obscure or recent topics might encounter. How­
ever, there is still the problem of writing without includ­
ing a personal bias which might taint the use made of the 
sources. This, of course, is an obstacle which almost all 
historians face, and only a few surmount. 
It would seem that the subject of early American dip­
lomats and their policies has been well researched, but 
there might still be additional material in the archives 
in Spain, Holland and Russia, which has not been revealed. 
Yet recent articles like the ones on Dana by Griffiths 
indicate that perhaps there are other men who have been 
slighted in revolutionary history. However, an author must 
carefully avoid the hazard of inventing dramatic or unusual 
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topics based upon material from the Revolution, Books and 
articles relying upon sensationalism are irrelevant to his­
torical research, but they do add an interesting dimension 
to historiography. Unfortunately, an historiographical 
analysis should also dismiss such writings as almost use­
less o 
Criticism of the diplomacy of the American Revolution 
must be executed with great tact, because the Revolution 
itself is revered in our society, and an iconoclast would 
hardly be appreciated. Therefore, historians are somewhat 
limited by societal restrictions in their approaches to 
revolutionary diplomacy and the men who conducted it. As 
a young nation, we still do not have the perspective of an 
older or perhaps fallen empire with which to evaluate the 
success of our early foreign policy. However, the careers 
of early American diplomats provided the bases for American 
foreign policy in the years succeeding the Revolution, 
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